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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
The four papers in this thesis focus mainly on the impact of accounting standards on banks’
investment decisions. As noted by Holthausen and Leftwich [1983], accounting standards not
only reflect the results of firms’ operations but also can impact these operations. The impact
of accounting standards on banks’ operations is especially important given banks’ special role
in the economy (e.g., Bernanke [1983]). In addition, accounting standards play an important
role in regulatory capital requirements, which are one of the primary tools regulators use to
evaluate banks’ financial condition. The papers in this thesis focus on accounting standards
alone as well as their use in the context of regulatory capital requirements.
In “Fair-Value Accounting, Financial Crises, and Asset Sales by Banks,” I focus on the
effect of fair-value accounting on the types of assets banks sell during financial crises. While
asset sales by banks are a hallmark of crises, the types of assets, “safe” (e.g., United States
Treasuries) or “toxic” (e.g., sub-prime-backed mortgage-backed securities (MBS)), banks
choose to sell has received little attention. Theoretically, I show that relative to historic-cost
accounting, fair-value accounting can induce banks to sell more toxic assets and fewer safe
assets. Empirically, I find that in the 2007–8 crisis, larger write-downs on private-label MBS
are linked with more sales of these securities. Hence, fair value’s use can have an important
impact on which type of assets banks sell during crises.
Fair value’s impact in inducing more sales of toxic assets and fewer sales of safe assets has
a two-sided impact on crises. With certain exceptions (e.g., Greek government debt), toxic
assets tie up substantial capital. Hence, in selling these capital-intensive, poorly performing
assets, banks free up capital to put toward new, more-productive loans. Also, selling toxic
assets while holding on to safe assets improves balance-sheet strength, enhancing the ability
of banks to raise external capital. As a result, crises could come to a quicker close, with fewer
negative spillovers to the real economy. These benefits are more likely under fair value than
under historic cost. As a drawback, sales of toxic assets reduce prices. These price declines
further impair banks’ capital and liquidity, making crises worse by amplifying banks’ distress.
A priori, the net effect of these two conflicting effects is not clear and is an interesting area
for future research.
In “DVA and Systemic Risk,” I focus on how debit valuation adjustments (DVA) can
increase systemic risk by inducing banks to take long positions in other banks’ credit. DVA
is a valuation adjustment whose earnings profile is equivalent to that of an unhedged, undi-
versified short position in own-credit risk. An increase in own-credit risk results in a gain; a
decline, in a loss. As a result of the potential for large swings in banks’ credit risk, DVA can
have a large effect on earnings and in increasing volatility in earnings. This rise in volatility
increases the present value of expected tax liabilities (Smith and Stulz [1985], Graham and
Smith [1999]). Hence, tax concerns give banks incentives to hedge DVA so as to mitigate its
impact on earnings.
DVA is relevant only for global banks. These banks are among the large, “too-big-to-fail”
financial institutions at the heart of the 2007–8 financial crises. To hedge DVA, these banks
take long positions in the credit of other global banks. Given that DVA is effectively a short
position in own-credit risk, banks can best hedge by taking positions that are akin to a long
position in own-credit risk. Common factors account for 62 percent of the changes in global
banks’ credit risk (Eichengreen et al. [2009]). Consequently, changes in these banks’ credit
risk have a strong positive link. In good states, credit risk falls, leading to DVA losses and
gains on banks’ long positions in other banks’ credit. In bad states, an increase in credit risk
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gives rise to DVA gains and losses on hedges.
DVA hedging thus increases systemic risk by strengthening the links between large, global
banks. These banks already are hedging DVA, increasing the systemic scope of future crises.
Goldman Sachs hedges DVA by selling credit protection on other financial firms (Moyer and
Burne [2011]); several others use some type of DVA hedging or are thinking about doing so
(Carver [2012]). In addition, in 2008, several banks hedged prospective DVA gains by selling
credit protection on Lehman Brothers (Alloway [2012]). DVA hedging gives banks direct
exposure to other banks’ credit. Hence, in a crisis, when one bank becomes distressed, other
banks book losses, reducing capital while increasing credit risk. In turn, more banks book
losses, and so on. Concomitant DVA gains do nothing substantive to offset these losses. In
addition, Basel III calls for DVA to be excluded from capital (BCBS [2011]). As a result,
DVA gains during crises would offer no capital relief. Losses on DVA hedges thus could have
an important role in amplifying the scope and magnitude of crises.
In “Balance-Sheet Management by Large Banks,” I focus on whether banks use balance-
sheet management (BSM) to strengthen their reported financial ratios. During the 2007–8
financial crisis, Lehman Brothers used its “Repo 105” program to cut its reported leverage.
Due to Repo 105, BSM by financial institutions has drawn regulatory attention. The Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for instance, sent 24 financial institutions a “Dear
CFO” letter regarding their use of reverse repurchase agreements (repo). Banks can use BSM
to give a temporary boost to financial ratios that are based on positions at quarter-end, a´ la
Lehman and Repo 105. Banks thus can use BSM to report financial ratios that are stronger
than those they maintain during the quarter, in between reporting dates. I focus separately
on BSM by large banks and BSM by other banks; differences in business models give large
banks stronger incentives to use BSM to improve their financial ratios.
Empirically, I find that for large banks, weaker financial ratios give rise to more BSM in
assets. A fall in regulatory capital ratios and a rise in raw leverage are linked with a larger
11
fall in quarter-end assets relative to average assets during the quarter. Also, this link between
lower capital ratios and more BSM in assets is stronger when banks have less capital and have
assets whose disposal has a larger effect in increasing capital ratios. These results suggest
large banks react to weaker financial ratios by using BSM in assets to improve these ratios.
For other banks, capital ratios and raw leverage have no effect on BSM in assets, in line with
the notion that large banks have stronger incentives to engage in financial-ratio-motivated
BSM.
These results imply that large banks use BSM in assets to improve their reported financial
ratios. These results do not imply that banks have used Repo 105-like programs. Lehman cut
its reported (i.e., end-fo-quarter) leverage relative to its average leverage during the quarter
by accounting for reverse repos as true sales and using the cash from these transactions to
pay down debt. Banks could generate the same balance-sheet and financial-ratio effects via
transaction timing or similar methods—by, for instance, selling assets right before quarter-
end and buying similar assets early in the next quarter. These results, however, have similar
implications: Banks with weak financial ratios can use BSM to improve the reported quarter-
end value of these ratios relative to their average value during the quarter.
In “Fair-Value Accounting, Derivatives, and Hedging,” I show that derivatives can reduce
fair value’s adverse effect on financial-sector stability. Theoretically, prior studies show that
fair value can have adverse effects by letting asset-price changes affect earnings—by exposing
banks to market risk, the risk of profit or loss due to changes in asset prices. A rise in credit
spreads, for instance, decreases the prices of corporate bonds. Under fair value, banks book
losses on their corporate bonds because of this fall in prices. In this respect, fair value exposes
banks to market risk. These studies, however, all look at the application of fair value only to
banks’ assets, but fair value is applied also to derivatives. Banks thus could use derivatives
to lay off unwanted market risk—to hedge. As a result, insofar as banks use derivatives to
hedge, and insofar as derivatives are effective in hedging, derivatives could play a useful role
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in blunting fair value’s negative effects.
Empirically, I find that banks use derivatives to hedge and that derivatives are effective in
hedging. As a concrete example, suppose that a bank has a fair-valued corporate bond and
thus is exposed to credit-risk-related market risk: The first result means that this bank, for
instance, buys credit protection using a credit-default swap (CDS) to protect itself against
the price effects of credit-spread changes. Hence, this bank hedges ex ante, in anticipation of
possible price changes. The second result means that once credit spreads do change, the CDS
reduces the bond’s net impact on earnings. Should credit spreads rise, the bond’s price falls,
resulting in fair-value losses on this bond, but the CDS’s price increases, leading to offsetting
gains. Should credit spreads fall, the bond’s price increases, resulting in fair-value gains, but
the CDS’s price falls, resulting in offsetting losses. In this respect, the CDS reduces the net
effect on earnings and capital of changes in asset prices.
In sum, these results suggest that derivatives help blunt fair value’s impact on earnings.
These results relate to the debate about fair value’s potential to have a negative effect on
financial-sector stability. Fair value could do so by exposing banks to market risk, with asset-
price changes thus affecting earnings and capital. My results suggest banks use derivatives to
mitigate these effects. Derivatives were useful in this respect even during the 2007–8 financial
crisis, when fair value’s negative impact was strongest. Morgan Stanley’s 2008 trading losses
of $3.1 billion, for instance, “reflected fair value losses on loans and commitments that were
partly offset by gains on related hedges” (source: Morgan Stanley’s 2008 10-K, p. 43). These
$3.1 billion in losses were large but would have been even larger without derivatives. Hence,
while my results do not imply that fair value is incapable of having destabilizing effects, they
do suggest that focusing jointly on banks’ assets and derivatives is essential to evaluating its
impact.
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ABSTRACT
Asset sales by banks are a hallmark of financial crises. The types of assets, “safe” (e.g.,
US Treasuries) or “toxic” (e.g., sub-prime-backed MBS), banks choose to sell, however, has
received little attention. I show that relative to historic-cost accounting, fair-value accounting
can lead banks to sell more toxic assets and fewer safe assets. Empirically, I find that during
the 2007–8 crisis, larger write-downs on private-label mortgage-backed securities are linked
with more sales of these securities. Hence, fair value’s use can have an important impact on
which type of assets banks sell during crises.
2.1 Introduction
In this study, I focus on asset sales by banks during financial crises. Crises are marked by
large losses and disruptions in funding markets. Consequently, banks face strong pressure to
sell assets. The ongoing European crisis, for instance, is expected to force European banks to
shed as much as $4.8 trillion in assets by the end of 2013 (IMF [2012a]). Asset sales not only
are a result of but also can worsen crises by reducing prices further. Hence, banks face more
capital and funding pressure, potentially resulting in more sales. This sort of self-reinforcing
cycle can have a large effect in making crises worse (e.g., Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin [2005],
Brunnermeier [2009], Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]).
In discussing the effects of asset sales, one common assumption is that sales reduce prices.
The validity of this assumption, however, depends on which types of assets are sold. Assets
differ in liquidity. In 2011, for instance, the markets for United States (US) Treasuries and for
corporate bonds were similar in magnitude at $9.9 trillion and $7.8 trillion, but average daily
turnover was $568 billion in Treasuries, compared to $21 billion in corporates.1 As a result,
sales of different types of assets can have different price effects, with different consequences
for how crises evolve. Deep, liquid markets can absorb positive supply shocks—sales—with a
minimal impact on prices; thin, illiquid markets cannot. Hence, sales of “safe,” liquid assets
(e.g., US Treasuries) are innocuous, whereas sales of “toxic,” illiquid assets (e.g., sub-prime-
backed mortgage-backed securities (MBS)) can reduce prices, making crises worse.
I show how fair-value accounting2 can lead banks to sell more toxic assets and fewer safe
assets than under historic-cost accounting.3 First, I build a model in which banks choose the
quantities to sell of both safe and toxic assets. Banks maximize returns, driven in part by how
1 Source: http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx. Last accessed on August 16, 2012.
2 Fair value is a broader version of mark-to-market accounting (see Laux and Leuz [2009]). For simplicity,
I generally use fair value to refer to both (see Section 4 for more).
3 I use safe assets to refer to assets with minimal default risk and whose price and fundamentals stay stable
during crises (see, e.g., IMF [2012b], Chapter 3). I use toxic assets to refer to assets whose price collapses
and fundamentals deteriorate during crises.
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asset sales affect the odds of a “wholesale run”—a sudden loss of access to wholesale funding,
uninsured funding which many large banks rely heavily on. Wholesale runs can impose large
costs on banks. In the 2007–8 crisis, for instance, wholesale runs were an important factor in
the demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers (Acharya and O¨ncu¨ [2010]). Consequently,
banks have strong incentives to take steps to avoid these runs.
Denoting safe assets by F , toxic assets by X, and the probability wholesale creditors roll
over funds by p, I specify p as an increasing function of capital and balance-sheet strength, or
asset quality, defined as F ’s share in total assets—more capital and stronger balance sheets
imply less credit risk, making creditors more likely to roll over funds. Sales of F and X have
an ambiguous net effect on p. With respect to F , as a plus, during crises, safe assets increase
in price. As a result, banks could book gains on sales, increasing capital. As a minus, selling
F reduces F ’s share in total assets. With respect to X, as a plus, sales increase F ’s share in
total assets. As a minus, during crises, toxic assets decline in price. Banks thus could book
losses on sales, depleting capital. To illustrate this trade-off, in 2008, Merrill Lynch sold $31
billion of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) for 22 cents on the dollar, reducing its CDO
exposure but booking a $4.4 billion loss on these sales (Keoun and Harper [2008]).
Fair value reduces gains on sales of safe assets and losses on sales of toxic assets compared
to historic-cost accounting. Consequently, banks sell more toxic assets and fewer safe assets
under fair value. Under fair value, banks book gains and losses on asset-price changes. Banks
thus book immediate gains on the rise in the prices of safe assets and losses on the decline in
the prices of toxic assets. Booking these gains and losses reduces gains and losses on sales;
changes in the prices of banks’ assets already are reflected in capital. Under historic cost,
banks do not book gains and losses on changes in prices. As a result, sales give rise to gains
and losses equal to the entire change in prices. Hence, under fair value, sales of safe assets
increase capital by less, resulting in a smaller net rise or a larger net fall in p; sales of toxic
assets reduce capital by less, resulting in a larger net rise or a smaller net fall in p.
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Empirically, I look at asset sales by US banks during the 2007–8 financial crisis. For toxic
assets, I use private-label MBS. These MBS include the sub-prime- and Alt-A-backed MBS
that were among the worst-performing assets during the crisis. I focus on how impairment
write-downs on private-label MBS affect sales of these securities. My primary finding is that
larger write-downs on private-label MBS are linked with more sales of these securities in the
following quarter. For a given fall in prices, taking larger write-downs prior to selling reduces
losses on sales. As a result, sales of private-label MBS have a less-negative effect on capital,
inducing banks to sell more of these securities.
This study relates most directly to the body of literature that focuses on asset sales during
financial crises (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny [2010] for a survey). One common assumption
implicit in these studies is that sales depress prices. The validity of this assumption, however,
depends on which types of assets are sold. Sales of safe assets have a different effect on prices
than do sales of toxic assets. Though Cifuentes et al. [2005] and Gauthier, Lehar, and Souissi
[2010] both make this point, both assume that banks always prefer to sell either safe (liquid)
assets or toxic (illiquid) assets. I relax this assumption and take as endogenous banks’ asset-
sale decisions. This approach helps shed light on what drives the types of assets banks choose
during crises to sell.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I describe the differences between
safe and toxic assets. In Section 3, I discuss wholesale runs and the factors that affect banks’
exposure to these runs. In Section 4, I go through the effect of accounting standards on the
asset-sale decisions of banks; in addition, I relate this study to prior studies that look at fair
value’s impact on financial-sector stability. My model is in Section 5. My empirical tests are
in Section 6. In Section 7, I discuss my model’s main implications. Concluding remarks are
in Section 8. Supplemental information about my empirical tests is in the appendix.
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Fig. 2.1: Changes in Yields, US Treasuries v. BAA Corporates
BAA−Rated
Corporate Yields
Spread
10−Year Treasury Yields
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
Yi
el
ds
01
/02
/20
07
07
/02
/20
07
01
/02
/20
08
12
/31
/20
08
07
/01
/20
08
Date
Data source: Federal Reserve.
2.2 Safe Assets v. Toxic Assets
Two empirical observations motivate this study. First, during crises, different types of assets
differ in performance. For safe, liquid assets, prices rise (yields fall), and fundamentals stay
stable. For illiquid, relatively risky assets, prices fall (yields rise), and fundamentals worsen.
At the start of 2007, for instance, the yields on 10-year Treasuries and BAA-rated corporate
bonds were 468 basis points (bps) and 632 bps (Figure 1). By the end of 2008, Treasury and
BAA corporate yields were 225 bps and 807 bps, a rise in spreads from 164 bps to 582 bps.
For illiquid assets that become “toxic” (e.g., whose fundamentals are particularly hard-hit),
price declines are especially large. As an example, the ABX index is a credit derivative whose
reference entity is 20 sub-prime-backed MBS. By September 2008, the ABX AAA and BBB
indices were trading at 60 cents and 10 cents on the dollar (IMF [2008], p. 13).
Second, sales of different types of assets can affect prices in different ways, with different
effects on how crises evolve. Sales of safe, liquid assets have few price effects, whereas sales
of toxic, illiquid assets can depress prices. In perfect markets, traders stand able and willing
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to pay fundamental value for an asset. For safe assets, such as US Treasuries, this perfect-
markets framework is a reasonable approximation. These assets have stable fundamentals,
have few information asymmetries, and are traded in deep and liquid markets with abundant
capital. Hence, market frictions are of little concern. In addition, during periods of distress,
flight-to-quality- and -liquidity effects strengthen demand for safe, liquid assets (e.g., Beber,
Brandt, and Kavajecz [2009], Noeth and Sengupta [2010]). This rise in demand reduces still
further the ability of sales to depress prices.
For toxic assets, such as sub-prime-backed MBS, market frictions are pervasive. Positive
supply shocks—sales—thus can reduce prices. Toxic assets have unstable fundamentals, have
large information asymmetries between investors, and are traded in thin, illiquid markets by
relatively few specialist traders (e.g., hedge funds (Blundell-Wignall [2007])). Hence, frictions
can lead to imperfect markets. Such frictions include fixed investment costs (Merton [1987]),
so that investors do not invest the time and resources needed to get information on an asset
class; principal-agent problems that limit the access of traders to capital (Shleifer and Vishny
[1997]), so that traders cannot obtain from their financiers cash to buy assets; and increases
in margin (Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]), so that traders can borrow less against their
assets and thus have to use more of their own capital. The latter two frictions are particularly
important during crises, when financial-sector-wide distress leads to a systemic shortage of
capital (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny [1992]).
Empirically, Coval and Stafford [2007] find that equity securities sold in distressed sales
experience a rise in price of 6.1 percent in the 12 months after being sold. Mitchell, Pedersen,
and Pulvino [2007] find that convertible bonds were priced by as much as four percent below
fundamentals in late 1998 and early 1999 and from January 2005–September 2006, two times
of widespread sales. These results show that asset sales can reduce prices. With respect to
frictions, Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigernon [2007] and Griffoli and Ranaldo [2010] find
evidence of limits-of-arbitrage effects in prices; Froot and O’Connell [1999] find that a decline
24
in the supply of capital in the reinsurance market increases the price of reinsurance. In short,
frictions enable sales of assets—especially sales of illiquid assets—to depress prices, and prices
can take some time to return to fundamentals.
2.3 Financial Crises, Wholesale Runs, and Asset Sales
2.3.1 Financial Crises and Wholesale Runs
During crises, banks are exposed to “wholesale runs”—a sharp and sudden loss of access to
wholesale funding. Banks with liabilities sourced primarily from government-insured deposits
face little threat of runs. Certain large banks, however, make heavy use of wholesale funds,
such as reverse repurchase agreements (repo) (Table 1). In addition, wholesale funds often
are large banks’ marginal source of funds (Carpenter and Demiralp [2010], Disyatat [2011]),
amplifying their importance. Wholesale liabilities tend to have short maturities. US primary
dealers, for instance, have had up to $3 trillion in overnight repo outstanding, in the aggregate
(Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews [2009]). This combination of a lack of insurance plus short
maturities exposes banks, especially large banks, to wholesale runs. Duffie [2010] and Huang
and Ratnovski [2011] outline how wholesale runs can arise.
In a financial crisis, large losses deplete capital (Figure 2), and asset quality deteriorates.
Hence, credit risk rises, increasing the odds of a wholesale run. During the 2007–8 crisis and
the ongoing European crisis, wholesale runs have imposed large costs on banks. Wholesale
runs had a central role in the demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers (Acharya and
O¨ncu¨ [2010]). Even in less extreme cases, wholesale runs can generate costs by forcing banks
to sell assets, potentially at distressed, fire-sale prices, or even to exit entire lines of business.
Between end-May and end-November 2011, for instance, US money-market funds cut by 89
percent their exposure to French banks and shifted their remaining exposures into shorter
maturities and secured lending (Fitch [2011a, 2011b]). Due in part to this run, French banks
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Tab. 2.1: US Banks’ Liability Composition, Year-End 2010 ($ millions)
Bank
Total
Deposits Repo Deposit % Repo %
Liabilities
Bank of America 2,031,133 1,012,629 243,901 0.499 0.120
JP Morgan 1,940,905 930,369 273,314 0.479 0.141
Citigroup 1,748,113 844,968 189,080 0.483 0.108
Wells Fargo 1,130,239 848,328 35,007 0.751 0.031
Goldman Sachs 833,102 38,496 173,472 0.046 0.208
Morgan Stanley 742,291 63,812 176,692 0.086 0.238
Metlife 681,911 10,317 24,647 0.015 0.036
Taunus 368,305 22,471 177,497 0.061 0.482
HSBC NA 314,314 118,311 69,238 0.376 0.220
US Bancorp 277,464 204,252 9,261 0.736 0.033
PNC 231,577 183,521 4,011 0.792 0.017
BNY Mellon 214,065 145,407 5,125 0.679 0.024
Capital One 170,960 122,211 927 0.715 0.005
TD Bank US 158,334 143,926 2,047 0.909 0.013
Suntrust 149,746 123,044 2,180 0.822 0.015
Others 3,561,292 2,687,043 141,943 0.755 0.040
Data source: FR Y9-C. The 15 banks shown are the 15-biggest US bank holding companies as
of the end of 2010, as measured by total assets. “Other banks” is aggregate data for all other
US bank holding companies.
have exited or reduced scale in areas that rely on dollar funds despite previously being among
the most active banks in certain of these areas, such as trade finance (HSBC [2011]).
2.3.2 Wholesale Runs, Credit Risk, and Asset Sales
Credit risk is a key factor in banks’ vulnerability to a wholesale run. Two factors important
to credit risk are capital and balance-sheet strength (asset quality, or asset risk). More capital
and a stronger balance sheet reduce the odds that creditors will incur losses. Consequently,
credit risk declines, reducing the likelihood of a wholesale run. With respect to capital, for a
given base of assets (or risk-weighted assets), more capital increases banks’ cushion of equity
to put toward absorbing losses. With respect to balance-sheet strength, holding lower-quality
assets implies lower future earnings and increases banks’ exposure to adverse shocks to toxic
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Fig. 2.2: US Banks’ Aggregate Pre-Tax Income, 2000–2011
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Data source: FR Y9-C. PTI is pre-tax income excluding extraordinary items (BHCK4300).
“AVG” denotes average quarterly PTI in a given year. Data are in millions of dollars.
assets, a common feature of crises. Hence, banks are more likely to incur losses in general as
well as large losses, in particular; over 2007–8, for instance, Citigroup booked $32.6 billion in
total losses on sub-prime-related exposures (source: 2008 10-K). Empirically, less capital and
lower-quality (higher-risk) assets are linked with higher yields on uninsured debt (Hannan
and Hanweck [1988], Goyal [2005]).
During crises, safe assets and toxic assets differ sharply in performance (Section 2, Figure
1). As a result, sales of safe and toxic assets have a different effect on credit risk and thus on
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the probability of a wholesale run. With respect to safe assets, as a plus, in crises, safe assets
rise in price. Hence, banks could book gains on sales, increasing capital. As a minus, sales
reduce the share of safe assets in total assets, impairing balance-sheet strength. In addition,
in selling safe assets, banks shed fundamentally sound interest-earning assets, impairing their
ability to replenish capital via retained earnings. Selling safe assets has a positive net impact
on credit risk only insofar as the first effect dominates the sum of the latter two.
With respect to toxic assets, as a plus, sales raise the share of safe assets in total assets,
improving balance-sheet strength. As a minus, sales could reduce capital, in two ways. First,
because of worsening fundamentals and market “dislocations” (e.g., a decline in liquidity; see
also Section 3.1), banks can sell toxic assets only at a discount to par. Banks thus could book
losses on sales, such as Merrill Lynch’s $4.4 billion loss on its CDO sales in 2008 (Section 1).
Second, insofar as toxic assets generate positive net interest income, sales reduce net interest
income. Selling toxic assets has a positive net impact on credit risk only insofar as the first
effect dominates the sum of the latter two.
2.4 Fair-Value Accounting and Asset Sales
2.4.1 Fair-Value Accounting, Financial Crises, and Capital
With respect to asset sales during crises, fair value’s use affects capital in two ways: capital
in place before selling assets, and the effect of asset sales on capital. During crises, the prices
of safe assets rise; the prices of toxic assets decline. Banks’ asset valuations move in the same
way. From the ends of 2007Q2–2008Q4, for instance, US banks’ valuations of US Treasuries
rose from par to seven percent above par; valuations for private-label MBS fell from par to
20 percent below (Figure 3). Under fair value, asset-price changes lead to recognized holding
gains and losses that impact earnings and capital. Hence, under fair value, banks book gains
on the rise in the prices of safe assets. These gains increase capital, but booking these gains
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Fig. 2.3: US Banks’ Security Valuations, 2007Q2–2008Q4 (1 = par)
Treasuries AgenciesAgency MBS
private−label MBS
ABS
state and
municipalities
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
Fa
ir 
Va
lu
e 
D
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
Am
or
tiz
ed
−C
os
t V
al
ue
20
07
Q2
20
07
Q3
20
07
Q4
20
08
Q1
20
08
Q2
20
08
Q3
20
08
Q4
Quarter
Security Type 2007Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4
Treasuries 0.984 1.006 1.021 1.039 1.011 1.014 1.068
Agencies 0.988 1.000 1.009 1.019 1.005 1.006 1.023
State & Munis 0.998 1.005 1.005 0.989 0.984 0.949 0.932
Agency MBS 0.972 0.983 0.995 1.008 0.988 0.997 1.016
Private-Label MBS 0.988 0.992 0.985 0.940 0.930 0.866 0.796
Asset-Backed Securities 0.999 0.981 0.974 0.940 0.945 0.958 0.889
Data source: FR Y9-C. These ratios are for banks’ aggregate banking-book securities (securities
classified as available for sale or held to maturity) and are each security type’s fair value divided
by its amortized-cost value. Lower ratios imply lower valuations relative to par.
lowers gains on sales. Likewise, banks book losses on the decline in the prices of toxic assets,
reducing capital, but booking these losses reduces losses on sales. Under historic cost, absent
sales, asset-price changes impact neither earnings nor capital; sales result in gains and losses
equal to the full change in prices.
Suppose, for instance, that a bank holds US Treasuries and sub-prime-backed MBS whose
par value is 1 and that a crisis hits, so that its Treasuries rise in price to 1.05 and its MBS fall
in price to 0.80: Under fair value, this bank recognizes a per-unit Treasury gain of 0.05 and
an MBS loss of 0.20. These Treasury gains increase capital, these MBS losses reduce capital,
and future Treasury and MBS sales are gain- and loss-free, respectively; the changes in these
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assets’ prices already are reflected in capital. Under historic cost, absent sales, capital stays
the same. Treasury sales result in a per-unit gain and a rise in capital of 0.05; MBS sales, in
a loss and a decline in capital of 0.20. In this respect, fair value induces more sales of MBS
and fewer sales of Treasuries.
Before going on, one point: In discussing fair value, I assess its use vis-a´-vis only earnings
and regulatory capital. Fair value can be applied in different manners for different purposes.
Securities classified as available for sale, for instance, are valued under fair value on banks’
balance sheets but are valued under historic cost with respect to both earnings and capital,
in that price changes in available-for-sale securities have no impact on earnings or capital. In
addition, regulators have the option of excluding from regulatory capital fair-value-related
gains and losses that impact earnings. In my model, I abstract from these issues and assume
that fair value is applied in the same way with respect to both earnings and capital, where
capital denotes regulatory capital, not balance-sheet equity as determined under US generally
accepted accounting principles.
2.4.2 Impairments and the SFAS No. 157 Fair-Value Hierarchy
For simplicity, I focus primarily on “pure” forms of fair-value accounting, under which all
asset-price changes flow to capital on a one-for-one basis, and historic-cost accounting, under
which changes in prices and deteriorations in asset quality more generally never affect capital.
For toxic assets, however, two features of accounting standards can result in deviations from
these regimes. First, impairment losses: Under historic cost, banks have to take impairment
losses on assets that satisfy certain criteria (e.g., a decline in an asset’s expected future cash
flows). Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires banks to consider
“the extent to which [an asset’s] market value [is] . . . less than cost” when deciding whether
to take an impairment (SEC [2009]). During crises, the fundamentals of toxic assets worsen,
and the prices of these assets fall. Consequently, even under historic cost, banks could have
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to take impairment losses on these assets.
Second, the fair-value hierarchy: When applying fair value, SFAS No. 157 stipulates that
banks may use “unobservable inputs” (e.g., internal models) to value “Level 3” assets—assets
that have “little, if any, market activity . . . at the measurement data” (FASB [2010], ¶ 30).
As a consequence, when valuing an asset whose liquidity has declined, banks can rely more
on internal models and less on market-based inputs (e.g., prices). During crises, the liquidity
of toxic assets declines. In addition, those sales that do take place and market frictions more
generally can push these assets’ prices below fundamentals (Section 2). Using fundamentals-
based models helps combat these effects. Consequently, the fair-value hierarchy tends to yield
higher valuations and thus smaller write-downs than does a pure mark-to-market regime (see
Laux and Leuz [2010]).4 Hence, banks need not book on toxic assets immediate losses equal
to the entire decline in the “prices” of these assets.5
With respect to capital, greater recognition of impairments has the same effect as moving
toward fair value; greater use of internal models has the same effect as moving toward historic
cost. Returning to the example in Section 4.1, suppose that the bank’s MBS decline in price
from 1 to 0.80; that under fair value, the bank uses internal models to price its MBS at 0.85,
not 0.80; and that under historic cost, the bank takes a per-unit impairment of 0.05, not 0:
Under fair value, the per-unit write-down falls from 1.00− 0.80 = 0.20 to 1.00− 0.85 = 0.15;
losses on sales increase from 0.20− 0.20 = 0 to 0.20− 0.15 = 0.05. Hence, relative to a pure
fair-value regime, capital before selling assets is higher, while sales reduce capital by more.
4 By definition, safe assets maintain stable fundamentals and have strong liquidity, even in times of distress.
Impairment losses thus are rare, and banks have an abundance of observed transaction prices to use in valuing
these assets. Hence, impairments and the use of unobservable inputs (models) are of little relevance.
5 With respect to the fair-value hierarchy more generally, assets valued under fair value are classified as
either Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 assets. Banks value Level 1 assets using “quoted prices in active markets
for identical assets,” Level 2 assets using “inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are
observable . . . either directly or indirectly,” and Level 3 assets using “unobservable inputs” (FASB [2010]).
For simplicity, while this hierarchy is important, I do not go into more detail regarding its application beyond
the discussion in the body of the paper above. In addition, except where noted, I use fair value in a generic
sense, without respect to differences in the valuation of Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 assets.
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Under historic cost, impairments lower capital by 0.05 per unit of MBS, not 0; losses on sales
fall from 0.20 − 0 = 0.20 to 0.20 − 0.05 = 0.15. As a result, relative to a pure historic-cost
regime, capital before selling assets is lower, while sales reduce capital by less.
2.4.3 Fair-Value Accounting’s “Real Effects”
This study relates to three studies that focus on the “real effects” of fair value. This study is
most similar to Plantin, Sapra, and Shin [2008], who likewise focus on how fair value affects
asset sales by banks. This study differs in three ways from Plantin et al. First, Plantin et al.
focus only on illiquid (toxic) assets, with no attention given to liquid (safe) assets. I focus on
both safe and toxic assets and show fair value affects which type of asset banks sell. Second,
I focus on asset sales within the context of a wholesale run, an important feature of financial
crises. Third, we highlight different ways for fair value to affect banks’ asset-sale decisions.
In Plantin et al., under fair value, banks sell illiquid assets as a result of expectations of sales
by other banks. I focus on fair value’s impact vis-a´-vis the capital effects of asset sales.
In addition, Cifuentes et al. [2005] and Allen and Carletti [2008] both show that fair
value can give rise to contagion. In these studies, when one bank sells assets, prices decline.
Fair value forces other banks to take write-downs, potentially resulting in more sales and a
self-reinforcing cycle of write-downs and sales. My model differs by focusing on banks’ selling
decisions. Cifuentes et al. and Allen and Carletti both take as exogenous these decisions and
focus on the impact thereof. In Cifuentes et al., banks strictly prefer to sell liquid assets and
sell illiquid assets only after running out of liquid assets to sell. Allen and Carletti focus only
on illiquid assets, with sales always reducing prices. In making endogenous banks’ asset-sale
decisions, I show that fair value gives banks incentives to sell more toxic (illiquid) assets and
fewer safe (liquid) assets. Because sales of toxic assets depress prices but sales of safe assets
do not, this investment decision makes fair-value-related contagion even worse.
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2.5 Model
This section proceeds as follows: In Section 5.1, I sketch an overview of my model. In Section
5.2, I describe its set-up. In Section 5.3, I identify the trade-offs at play in selling safe and
toxic assets. In Section 5.4, I show how accounting standards affect these trade-offs.
2.5.1 Preliminaries
In this model, I focus on how accounting standards affect the asset types—safe, liquid assets
or toxic, illiquid assets—banks sell during financial crises. Banks maximize returns, driven in
part by the probability that wholesale creditors roll over funding—by the probability of being
hit by a wholesale run. I focus primarily on how asset sales affect this probability, specified as
a function of capital and balance-sheet strength (asset quality). This model is most relevant
for financial crises, when wholesale runs are most likely. In calmer environments, earnings
and capital are strong, and asset quality is high. Hence, credit risk is low, making negligible
the probability of a wholesale run. This model is most relevant for large banks due to their
heavier reliance on wholesale funding (Section 3.1, Table 1).
I make five vital assumptions. First, banks’ assets are financed by wholesale liabilities,
which are not government-insured. Second, banks’ liabilities mature before their assets. This
combination of wholesale funding and a maturity mismatch leads to rollover risk—wholesale
creditors can pull funding from banks with sufficiently high credit risk. Third, selling toxic
assets reduces returns compared to holding these assets to maturity. Toxic assets have few
prospective buyers even in “good states,” limiting the capital available to buy these assets.
The financial-sector-wide distress that marks crises reduces still further this pool of capital
(see Section 2). Banks thus can sell these assets only at a below-fundamentals price. Hence,
returns on sales are lower than are returns on holding these assets to maturity.
Fourth, banks hit by a wholesale run cannot raise enough cash to meet this run by selling
33
only safe assets; selling at least some toxic assets is needed. Banks keep a stock of safe, liquid
assets to meet short-term cash demands. When a crisis hits, however, banks face demands for
cash from many parties. In June 2008, for instance, Citigroup demanded a $2 billion comfort
deposit from Lehman Brothers to continue clearing on behalf of Lehman in the Continuous
Linked Settlement system (Valukas [2010]). Also, crises can give rise to tighter restrictions on
selling liquid assets—these assets can become “encumbered.” Credit-rating downgrades, for
instance, a common event in crises, can force banks to post to their derivative counterparties
billions of dollars more in collateral—typically, cash and high-quality government debt (e.g.,
US Treasuries). These and similar factors increase banks’ needs to raise cash while impairing
their ability to sell safe, liquid assets to do so.
Fifth, creditors take at face value banks’ capital. Creditors could add to reported capital
unrecognized gains on safe assets and subtract unrecognized losses on toxic assets to arrive at
“true capital.” This adjustment would dampen banks’ incentives to consider the impact on
capital of asset sales. With respect to banks’ asset-sale decisions, however, what matters is
not whether creditors actually do make these adjustments but whether banks think creditors
make these adjustments—whether banks think that they can “fool the market.” Anecdotally,
capital is important, and the prospect of losses on sales can induce banks not to sell assets
whose price has declined. A managing director at Deutsche Bank, for instance, states, “From
a capital perspective, it is difficult to sell assets in the banking book [valued under historic
cost]. Selling an asset below book value means taking a loss” (Whittaker [2012]). As long as
banks think that reporting higher capital is viewed in a positive way by the markets, banks
have incentives to consider how asset sales affect capital.
2.5.2 Set-Up
This model has five dates, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Banks have safe and toxic assets, F and X. F
can be viewed as high-quality government securities (e.g., US Treasuries, German bunds); X,
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as sub-prime-backed MBS. F and X mature at time 4 and are financed in full by wholesale
debt that banks must roll over at time 3. RF is returns on F . R
H
X > R
S
X are returns on units
of X that banks hold to maturity and that banks sell. RF is the same irrespective of whether
banks sell F or hold F to maturity. 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 is the probability wholesale creditors roll over
funds. If creditors do not roll over funds, banks must sell all of their unsold holdings of X,
leading to the below-fundamentals return RSX < R
H
X . Hence, wholesale runs impose costs by
forcing banks to liquidate X at a distressed, below-fundamentals price, reducing returns on
X. Letting SF and SX denote sales of F and X, banks maximize returns, R:
max
SF ,SX
R ≡ RFQF +RHX [QX − SX ] p+RSX [SX + [QX − SX ] [1− p]] , (2.1)
Selling X locks in the below-fundamentals return RSX < R
H
X , a negative effect. Also, sales of
both F and X affect R via their impact on p, as specified below.
The timeline is as follows (see also Figure 4):
• At time 0, banks are exogenously endowed with K0 in capital and QF and QX units
of F and X. P 0F and P
0
X are time-0 prices (and also time-0 book values).
• At time 1, a negative shock—for instance, a housing-price drop that increases mortgage
default rates—hits the economy. PF rises to P
1
F > P
0
F . PX falls to P
1
X < P
0
X . PF ’s rise
can be seen as the outcome of a rise in demand for safe assets; PX ’s fall, of deteriorating
fundamentals and market “dislocations.”
These changes in prices result in per-unit valuation earnings, or mark-to-market earn-
ings, of MF [P
1
F − P 0F ] ≥ 0 and MX [P 1X − P 0X ] ≤ 0. Banks book these earnings on each
of the QF and QX units of F and X they are endowed with at time 0.
0 ≤ M ≤ 1 is the share of the time-1 price changes banks book earnings on. M = 1
corresponds to a pure fair-value, or mark-to-market, regime, under which price changes
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Figure 4: Model Timeline
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time 0
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time 4
to shareholders
flow fully to earnings and capital, on a one-for-one basis; M = 0, to a pure historic-cost
regime, under which price changes never affect earnings or capital.
• At time 2, banks sell SF units of F and SX units of X, with per-unit gains on sales of
GF ≡ [1−MF ] [P 1F − P 0F ] ≥ 0 and GX ≡ [1−MX ] [P 1X − P 0X ] ≤ 0—banks book gains
and losses equal to the entire change at time 1 in the prices of F and X less any gains
and losses already booked on these changes in prices. Sales result in returns of RF and
RSX < R
H
X . Banks use the cash from sales to retire debt, not to reinvest. QF ≥ SF , and
QX ≥ SX , effectively ruling out short sales. (These last two assumptions help simplify
the model and exposition.)
Between time 2 and time 3, banks book net interest income of IF > 0 and IX > 0 on
each unit of F , QF − SF , and X , QX − SX , not sold at time 2.
• At time 3, creditors evaluate banks’ credit risk and decide whether to roll over funding.
Creditors roll over funding either in full or not at all. If creditors pull funds, banks sell
all of their unsold units of F and X. (Letting banks sell only some fraction of F and X
complicates the model without qualitatively altering any results.) Creditors roll over
funding with probability p. Sales result in returns of RF and R
S
X .
• At time 4, F and X mature. Banks collect interest and principal and give the proceeds
to shareholders. Returns on units of F and X held to time 4 are RF and R
H
X > R
S
X .
p = p (K,H), the probability that creditors roll over funding, is an increasing and concave
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function of capital as of time 3, K, and the percentage of F in total assets as of time 3, H.
H is a measure of balance-sheet strength, or asset quality. K and H are as follows:
• K, capital, consists of initial capital, K0, and the change in capital before time 3. This
change in capital is equivalent to total earnings before time 3. K is
K = K0 +
time-1 MTM gains on F︷ ︸︸ ︷
MF
[
P 1F − P 0F
]
QF +
time-1 MTM losses on X︷ ︸︸ ︷
MX
[
P 1X − P 0X
]
QX +
gains on time-2 sales of F︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1−MF ]
[
P 1F − P 0F
]
SF
+
losses on time-2 sales of X︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1−MX ]
[
P 1X − P 0X
]
SX +
net int. inc. on F︷ ︸︸ ︷
IF [QF − SF ] +
net int. inc. on X︷ ︸︸ ︷
IX [QX − SX ] .
• H = QF−SF
A
, where A ≡ QF − SF +QX − SX is total assets.
Hence, more capital and a stronger balance sheet reduce credit risk, reducing the probability
of a wholesale run. p ()’s concavity reflects diminishing returns to increasing capital and to
improving asset quality in increasing the probability that creditors roll over funding. Strictly
speaking, p should be a function of banks’ capital-to-asset ratios, not capital, but using only
capital helps simplify the math without qualitatively changing any results.
Under fair value, MF = MX = 1. Under historic cost, MF = MX = 0. As a consequence,
per-unit mark-to-market earnings and gains and losses on sales are as follows:
MTM earnings, fair value: 1
[
P 1F − P 0F
]
= P 1F − P 0F > 0
1
[
P 1X − P 0X
]
= P 1X − P 0X < 0
gains on sales, fair value: [1− 1] [P 1F − P 0F ] = 0
[1− 1] [P 1X − P 0X] = 0
MTM earnings, historic cost: 0
[
P 1F − P 0F
]
= 0
0
[
P 1X − P 0X
]
= 0
gains on sales, historic cost: [1− 0] [P 1F − P 0F ] = P 1F − P 0F > 0
[1− 0] [P 1X − P 0X] = P 1X − P 0X < 0.
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As a result, under fair value, banks book mark-to-market gains and losses equal to the entire
time-1 change in prices; sales result in no gains or losses at all and thus do not affect capital.
Under historic cost, the time-1 change in prices leads to no gains or losses; sales lead to
gains or losses equal to the entire time-1 change in prices. A higher MX can be seen also as
a more-aggressive impairment regime under historic cost, so that a given change in prices
results in larger immediate write-downs. In this case, mark-to-market losses on X are larger;
losses on sales are smaller. A lower MX can be seen also as letting banks rely under fair value
more on internal models and less on market prices, so that a given change in prices results in
smaller immediate write-downs. In this case, mark-to-market losses on X are smaller; losses
on sales are larger. (These examples are less relevant for F (see Section 4.2).)
2.5.3 The Trade-Offs of Asset Sales
Letting sub-scripts denote partial derivatives, differentiating equation (1) with respect to SF
and SX yields two first-order conditions,
∂R
∂SF
= α
[
pK () [GF − IF ] + pH () SX −QX
A2
]
= 0 (2.2)
∂R
∂SX
=
[
RSX −RHX
]
p () + α
[
pK () [GX − IX ] + pH () QF − SF
A2
]
= 0 (2.3)
α ≡ [RHX −RSX] [QX − SX ] > 0.
α is the per-unit increase in RX due to holding X to maturity instead of selling X, R
H
X−RSX ,
multiplied by the number of units of X banks hold to maturity should creditors not withdraw
funding, QX−SX . Hence, the α [ ] terms are the net impact of asset sales on the probability
of avoiding a wholesale run, as captured by the pK () [ ] and the pH () terms, multiplied by the
benefits of avoiding a wholesale run—of not having to liquidate X at a below-fundamentals
price should creditors pull funding.
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Re-arranging the first-order condition (2),
αpK () [GF − IF ] = αpH () QX − SX
A2
. (2.4)
In (4), the right-hand side is always positive and captures the costs of marginal sales of F .
This cost is the decline in H, F ’s share in total assets, due to selling F . Selling F weakens
banks’ balance sheets. As a result, credit risk rises, reducing p. The left-hand side could be
either positive or negative, depending on whether gains on sales, GF , or net interest income,
IF , dominates. If GF > IF , so that gains on sales exceed the net interest income foregone by
selling F , this term is positive. Sales of F increase capital compared to not selling F . Hence,
credit risk falls, increasing p. If IF > GF , this term is negative. Sales reduce capital, credit
risk rises, and p thus declines. In this situation, sales of F are strictly negative, in that sales
both reduce balance-sheet strength and reduce capital. Consequently, banks choose SF = 0.
If GF > IF , banks choose SF so as to equate the costs and benefits of marginal sales of F .
Re-arranging the first-order condition (3),
αpH ()
QF − SF
A2
=
[
RHX −RSX
]
p ()− αpK () [GX − IX ] . (2.5)
In (5), the left-hand side captures the benefits of marginal sales of X. This benefit is the rise
in H due to selling X. This increase in H reduces credit risk, raising p. The first right-hand
side term is the cost of selling X in passing up with certainty the fundamentals-based return
RHX > R
S
X , multiplied by the probability banks can hold to maturity—do not have to sell at
time 3—units of X not sold at time 2. The second right-hand side term is the cost of selling
X in reducing K. This decline in K increases credit risk, reducing p. In equilibrium, banks
choose SX so as to equate the first effect with the sum of the latter two.
Differentiating (2) with respect to SF and (3) with respect to SX yields the second-order
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conditions
∂2R
∂S2F
= α∗
[
pKK () [GF − IF ]2 + pHH ()
[
S∗X −QX
A∗2
]2
+ pH ()
2A∗ [S∗X −QX ]
A∗4
]
< 0 (2.6)
∂2R
∂S2X
= 2
[
RSX −RHX
] [
pK () [GX − IX ] + pH () QF − S
∗
F
A∗2
]
+ α∗
[
pKK () [GX − IX ]2 + pHH ()
[
QF − S∗F
A∗2
]2
+ pH ()
2A∗ [QF − S∗F ]
A∗4
]
Q 0,
(2.7)
where an ∗ denotes an equilibrium value. Since ∂
2R
∂S2F
< 0, S∗F is a maximum. Technically, (7)’s
sign is ambiguous. This ambiguity is due to the α∗ [ ] term—the first two terms in brackets
are negative, but the third term is positive. In the top-line term, however, the pH () term is
larger in magnitude than is the pK () term.
6 As a result, since the pH () term is positive and
RSX −RHX < 0, the top-line term is negative. Hence, assuming the three terms in brackets in
α∗ [ ] largely cancel out, or that the pH () term is not “too dominant” vis-a´-vis the first two
terms in brackets, ∂
2R
∂S2X
< 0, so that S∗X is a maximum. Going forward, I assume
∂2R
∂S2X
< 0,
which is equivalent to assuming sales of X have diminishing returns.
2.5.4 Accounting Standards and Asset Sales
In this section, I focus on how changes in MF and MX impact S
∗
F and S
∗
X . A rise in MF and
MX can be seen as a move toward fair value; a rise in MX can be seen also as more-aggressive
impairment recognition under historic cost, or as relying less on models under fair value. To
start, in Section 5.4.1, I go over the partial effects of MF and MX . In Section 5.4.2, I focus
on the total effects of MF and MX .
6 In equilibrium, from the first-order condition (3),
[
RSX −RHX
]
p ()+α
[
pK () [GX − IX ] + pH () QF−SFA2
]
=
0.
[
RSX −RHX
]
p () < 0. As a result, to satisfy (3), the α [ ] term has to be positive. α > 0. Since GX−IX < 0,
the pK () [ ] term in brackets is negative. Consequently, the pH () term in brackets must be positive and larger
in magnitude than the pK () [ ] term for (3) to hold.
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Fair Value’s Impact: Partial Effects
S∗F and S
∗
X are jointly determined. Intuitively, this joint determination means that the effect
of MF and MX on S
∗
F and S
∗
X rests not only on the direct effects of MF and MX—how MF
affects S∗F and S
∗
X , and how MX affects S
∗
F and S
∗
X—but also on the indirect effects of MF
and MX . These indirect effects are driven by the link between S
∗
F and S
∗
X . To illustrate, I
show later in Section 5.4 that a rise in MF reduces S
∗
F and that S
∗
F and S
∗
X are complements,
so that sales of one type of asset increase sales of the other type. As a result, the decline in
S∗F that results from a rise in MF reduces S
∗
X . This indirect effect comes on top of the direct
effect of a rise in MF on S
∗
X . The total effect of MF depends on how this direct and indirect
effect interact.
In this section, I work through the partial effects of MF and MX , saving the total effects
for Section 5.4.2. Implicitly differentiating S∗F with respect to MF and MX , where β ≡ ∂
2R
∂S2F
<
0,
∂S∗F
∂MF
= − α
∗ [pKK () [GF − IF ] [[QF − S∗F ] [P 1F − P 0F ]]− pK () [P 1F − P 0F ]]
β
< 0 (2.8)
∂S∗F
∂MX
= − α
∗ [pKK () [GF − IF ] [[QX − S∗X ] [P 1X − P 0X ]]]
β
Q 0. (2.9)
In (9), the impact of a marginal rise in MF on S
∗
F depends on whether GF or IF dominates.
An increase in MX lowers capital, K, by increasing total losses on units of X not sold at time
2.7 Because of diminishing returns to K, a marginal increase in K is more beneficial, and a
marginal fall in K, more harmful, when K is lower. If GF dominates, sales of F increase K,
on net. In this case,
∂S∗F
∂MX
> 0—a marginal rise in MX increases S
∗
F . A rise in MX reduces
K. Consequently, the increase in K that results from selling F is more beneficial, increasing
S∗F . If IF dominates, sales reduce K, on net. In this case,
∂S∗F
∂MX
< 0. Sales of F reduce K,
7 For those units of X banks sell, a rise in MX increases time-1 mark-to-market losses but reduces losses
on time-2 sales. Hence, total losses on X are independent of MX . In the same way, total gains on units of
F banks sell are independent of MF ; MF affects capital only via its impact on unsold units of F .
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and a decline in K is more harmful at lower levels of K. Hence, S∗F declines.
In (8), a marginal increase in MF reduces S
∗
F . −pK () [P 1F − P 0F ] is negative. A rise in MF
increases mark-to-market gains on F . Hence, for any given increase in PF , gains on sales of
F and the rise in capital that results are smaller, reducing S∗F . The pKK () term could be
either positive or negative, depending on whether GF or IF dominates. A marginal increase
in MF increases K by increasing total gains on those units of F that banks do not sell at time
2. Due to diminishing returns to K, when K is higher, a marginal rise in K is less beneficial,
and a marginal fall in K, less harmful. As a result, if GF dominates, so that the pKK () term
is negative, the increase in K that stems from selling F is less beneficial, reducing S∗F . If IF
dominates, so that the pKK () term is positive, the fall in K that stems from selling F is less
harmful, increasing S∗F . In signing (8), I assume GF and IF roughly offset, or that IF is not
dominant enough to offset the unambiguous impact of −pK () [P 1F − P 0F ].
Implicitly differentiating S∗X with respect to MF and MX , where γ ≡ ∂
2R
∂S2X
< 0,
∂S∗X
∂MF
= − α
∗ [pKK () [GX − IX ] [[QF − S∗F ] [P 1F − P 0F ]]]
γ
> 0 (2.10)
∂S∗X
∂MX
= − α
∗ [pKK () [GX − IX ] [[QX − S∗X ] [P 1X − P 0X ]]− pK () [P 1X − P 0X ]] + κ
γ
Q 0 (2.11)
κ ≡ [RSX −RHX] pK () [[QX − S∗X ] [P 1X − P 0X]] > 0.
In (10), a marginal increase in MF increases S
∗
X . Sales of X reduce capital, K, due to losses
on sales and the loss of net interest income. For any given rise in the price of F , a marginal
increase in MF increases K by increasing total gains on units of F banks do not sell at time
2. As a result of diminishing returns to K, declines in K are less harmful when K is higher.
Consequently, the decline in K that results from selling X is less harmful. Hence, banks sell
more units of X. This rise in S∗X contrasts with the fall in S
∗
F that results from a marginal
rise in MF .
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In (11), a marginal increase in MX has an ambiguous impact on S
∗
X . The pKK () term is
negative. Sales of X reduce K. A rise in MX reduces K by increasing total losses on unsold
units of X. Due to diminishing returns to K, a marginal decline in K is more harmful when
K is lower. As a result, the decline in K that stems from selling X is more harmful, reducing
S∗X . The other two terms are positive. With respect to the pK () term, an increase in MX
increases mark-to-market losses on X. As a consequence, for any given decline in PX , banks
book smaller losses on sales. Consequently, sales of X reduce K by less, increasing S∗X . With
respect to κ, a rise in MX reduces K by increasing total losses on unsold units of X. A fall in
K reduces the probability that creditors will roll over funds. Sales of X thus are less costly,
increasing S∗X—because banks are more likely to have to sell X at time 3, selling X at time
2 is less harmful. A rise in MX reduces S
∗
X , on net, only insofar as the first effect dominates
the sum of the latter two. Otherwise, a rise in MX increases S
∗
X .
In sum, marginal increases in MF and MX have the following effects:
(1) A marginal rise in MF reduces S
∗
F , so that banks sell fewer safe assets;
(2) a marginal rise in MF increases S
∗
X , so that banks sell more toxic assets; and
(3) a marginal rise in MX has an ambiguous effect on both S
∗
F and S
∗
X .
Fair Value’s Impact: Total Effects
In this section, I go through the total effects of MF and MX . The Hessian matrix of partials,
E, is
E ≡
S∗FSF S∗FSX
S∗XSF S
∗
XSX
 .
43
Differentiating S∗F with respect to S
∗
X (by Young’s Theorem,
∂S∗F
∂S∗X
=
∂S∗X
∂S∗F
),
∂S∗F
∂S∗X
= α∗ [pKK () [GF − IF ] [GX − IX ]
+pHH ()
[
S∗X −QX
A∗2
] [
QF − S∗F
A∗2
]
+ pH ()
Q2F + S
∗2
F +Q
2
X + S
∗2
X
A∗4
]
> 0. (2.12)
Technically, (12)’s sign is indeterminate. The pKK () term could be negative if IF > GF , so
that selling F effectively reduces capital. In signing (12), I assume GF and IF roughly offset,
or that IF is not dominant enough to offset the other two terms, both of which are positive.
Assuming
∂S∗F
∂S∗X
> 0, S∗F and S
∗
X are complements, so that selling one type of asset increases
sales of the other. Since S∗FSX = S
∗
XSF
> 0, S∗FSF < 0, and S
∗
XSX
< 0, the determinant of E,
Det [E], is positive, so that (S∗F , S
∗
X) is a maximum.
The first-order conditions (2) and (3) can be written as the pair of implicit functions
S∗F = S
∗
F (S
∗
F , S
∗
X ;MF ,MX) = 0
S∗X = S
∗
X (S
∗
F , S
∗
X ;MF ,MX) = 0.
The resulting system of equations is
S∗F () = S
∗
FSF
dSF + S
∗
FSX
dSX + S
∗
FMF
dMF + S
∗
FMX
dMX = 0
S∗X () = S
∗
XSF
dSF + S
∗
XSX
dSX + S
∗
XMF
dMF + S
∗
XMX
dMX = 0.
Focusing first on MF , converting dMF into ∂MF , setting dMX = 0, re-arranging, and writing
in matrix notation,
S∗FSF S∗FSX
S∗XSF S
∗
XSX

 ∂S∗F∂MF
∂S∗X
∂MF
 = −
S∗FMF
S∗XMF
 .
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Re-arranging, where the numerators are the determinants of the relevant matrix:
S∗FMF =
−S∗FMF S∗FSX
−S∗XMF S
∗
XSX

=
−S∗FMF S
∗
XSX
+ S∗FSX S
∗
XMF
Det [E]
Q 0 (2.13)
S∗XMF =
S∗FSF −S∗FMF
S∗XSF −S
∗
XMF

=
−S∗FSF S
∗
XMF
+ S∗FMF S
∗
XSF
Det [E]
Q 0. (2.14)
In both (13) and (14), the indirect effects run counter to—can help offset—the direct effects
of a marginal rise in MF . Hence, theoretically, the total effect of a rise in MF is ambiguous.
In (13), on the margin, an increase in MF lowers S
∗
F , the direct effect. A rise in MF , however,
also increases S∗X , and a rise in S
∗
X increases S
∗
F , the indirect effect. Likewise, in (14), the
direct effect of a rise in MF is to increase S
∗
X , but a rise in MF also reduces S
∗
F , and a decline
in S∗F reduces S
∗
X .
Turning to MX , following the same steps as for MF :S∗FSF S∗FSX
S∗XSF S
∗
XSX

 ∂S∗F∂MX
∂S∗X
∂MX
 = −
S∗FMX
S∗XMX
 .
Re-arranging, where the numerators are the determinants of the relevant matrix:
S∗FMX =
−S∗FMX S∗FSX
−S∗XMX S
∗
XSX

=
−S∗FMX S
∗
XSX
+ S∗FSX S
∗
XMX
Det [E]
Q 0 (2.15)
S∗XMX =
S∗FSF −S∗FMX
S∗XSF −S
∗
XMX

=
−S∗FSF S
∗
XMX
+ S∗FMX S
∗
XSF
Det [E]
Q 0. (2.16)
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Similar to MF , the total effect of a rise in MX is ambiguous. In (15), a marginal rise in MX
can either increase or reduce S∗F , the direct effect. With respect to the indirect effect, a rise
in MX has an ambiguous effect on S
∗
F ; if MX increases S
∗
X , this rise in S
∗
X increases S
∗
F , but
if MX reduces S
∗
X , S
∗
F falls. In (16), an increase in MX has an ambiguous impact on S
∗
X , the
direct effect. With respect to the indirect effect, an increase in MX has an ambiguous effect
on S∗X ; the indirect effect increases S
∗
X if a rise in MX increases S
∗
F and reduces S
∗
X if a rise
in MX reduces S
∗
F .
In sum, theoretically, the indirect effects identified above can help offset the direct effects
of a change in MF and a change in MX . Hence, these indirect effects can dampen fair value’s
total effects. Empirically, however, SF and SX are uncorrelated, while a rise in MX increases
S∗X and reduces S
∗
F , although the impact of MX on S
∗
F is not robust to how MX is defined
(Section 6.6). Consequently, the indirect effects of MF and MX likely have a limited impact
in offsetting the direct effects thereof. As a result, focusing on the partial effects of MF and
MX yields useful insights into fair value’s impact on the asset-sale decisions of banks. In the
rest of this paper, I assess empirically how MX affects S
∗
F and S
∗
X .
2.6 Empirical Tests
2.6.1 The 2007–8 Financial Crisis, Safe Assets, and Toxic Assets
In the empirical tests that follow, I examine security sales by US banks from 2007Q4–2008Q4.
With respect to the sample period, 2007Q4—2008Q4 covers the worst part of the crisis, when
banks’ distress was strongest. In 2007Q3, banks had $33 billion in aggregate pre-tax income
(Section 3.1, Figure 2). Over the next five quarters, aggregate income fell to -$14 billion, $13
billion, -$2 billion, -$32 billion, and -$77 billion. Earnings turned positive once again in 2009,
albeit smaller than before the crisis. With respect to security sales, prior studies (Bernanke
and Gertler [1995], Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox [1995], Kashyap and Stein [2000]) find that
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securities bear the brunt of banks’ short-run asset-side adjustments to adverse shocks.
For safe assets, F , I use US Treasury securities, US Agency securities, and government-
issued or -sponsored MBS (Agency MBS). These securities have either the explicit or implicit
backing of the US government and were among the best-performing assets in the crisis (e.g.,
Noeth and Sengupta [2010]). Banks’ valuations were higher as of the end of 2008 than as of
the end of 2007Q2 (Section 4.1, Figure 3). Liquidity stayed strong. For toxic assets, X, I use
private-label MBS. Private-label MBS are MBS backed largely by low-quality sub-prime and
Alt-A mortgages whose fundamentals collapsed starting in 2007. This collapse led to a sharp
drop in the prices of private-label MBS and similar securities (e.g., IMF [2008], p. 13). By
the end of 2008, banks valued their private-label MBS at 20 percent below par (Section 4.1,
Figure 3). The market for these securities evaporated (Gorton [2008]). In short, private-label
MBS were among the most toxic of banks’ assets during the 2007–8 crisis.
2.6.2 Impairments and Asset Sales
In my model, I focus on the impact of accounting standards on the quantities of safe and toxic
assets banks sell. I focus primarily on how asset sales and the gains and losses thereon impact
capital under fair-value accounting and historic-cost accounting. Compared to historic cost,
fair value reduces gains on sales of safe assets, inducing fewer sales of these assets; fair value
also decreases losses on sales of toxic assets, among other effects, potentially inducing more
sales of these assets. Also, my model yields insights into the effect of impairment losses under
historic cost and the fair-value hierarchy under fair value (see Section 4.2). More-aggressive
impairment recognition is equivalent to a move toward fair value—to a rise in MX . Greater
use of internal models under the fair-value hierarchy is equivalent to a move toward historic
cost—to a fall in MX .
Ideally, I would take the assets of banks valued under fair value, calculate mark-to-market
gains on safe assets and losses on private-label MBS compared to the change in the prices of
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each type of asset, and examine how these gains and losses affect sales of both safe assets and
private-label MBS. Using publicly available data, this approach is not viable. For regulatory-
capital purposes, fair value is applied primarily to trading-account assets. Banks’ regulatory
reports and financial statements both give only a rough proxy for mark-to-market gains and
losses on all trading assets, grouped together. Gains and losses by specific asset type are not
given. In addition, regulatory reports and financial statements provide only the fair value of
trading assets. Changes in these values are due to both price and quantity effects—to both
changes in prices and asset sales. To the best of my knowledge, making a reliable adjustment
that strips out price effects is not possible using available data.
As a second-best solution, I focus on impairments on private-label MBS. I examine the
impact of impairments on sales of safe assets and private-label MBS. Securities are classified
as trading, available for sale (AFS), or held to maturity (HTM). AFS and HTM securities are
valued under historic cost in calculating earnings and regulatory capital. Banks thus do not
book mark-to-market gains and losses on AFS and HTM securities. Banks, however, do have
to take impairment losses on securities that satisfy certain criteria. In taking impairments,
banks write down the book value of the impaired security by the amount of the impairment.
I assess how more-aggressive recognition of impairments—taking larger write-downs—affects
asset sales. Since impairments generally are irrelevant for safe assets, I focus on impairments
only on private-label MBS.
More-aggressive recognition of impairments is akin to a rise in MX . For a given decline in
prices, an increase in impairments increases losses before selling assets and reduces losses on
sales. Technically, impairments are endogenous in that banks have discretion in determining
whether to take an impairment and how large an impairment to take. Banks’ annual reports,
however, are subject to external audits. Also, the SEC has specified criteria banks must use
when determining whether an asset is impaired (SEC [2009]).8 In addition, taking inadequate
8 These criteria include how long and the extent to which the price of a security has been below cost, the
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impairments exposes banks to lawsuits. Citigroup, for instance, paid $590 million in 2012 to
settle a lawsuit with plaintiffs who alleged that Citi, among other actions, took insufficiently
large write-downs on certain collateralized debt obligations (Stempel [2012]). Hence, though
impairments are not completely exogenous, banks do face certain constraints on their ability
to avoid taking appropriate impairments.
2.6.3 Data Sources and Sample
I get all financial-statement data from the FR Y9-C. (Y9-C mnemonics are in the appendix.)
I hand-collect from banks’ 10-Ks and 10-Qs data on impairments and reclassifications. Banks
tend to identify the specific security type impairments and reclassifications relate to, and in a
way that maps into the Y9-C’s security accounts. Citigroup’s 2008 10-K, for instance, states
that Citi took “$1.611 billion of [impairment] losses [on Alt-A-backed MBS].” Hence, I can
distinguish private-label MBS impairments from impairments on other security types, and I
can map impairments on private-label MBS into the Y9-C’s private-label MBS account. Two
exceptions are Bank of America and Wachovia. Both banks refer to impairments mainly on
“ABS CDO,” or CDO backed by asset-backed securities, sometimes private-label MBS. The
Y9-C security account these securities are classified in is unclear. As a result, I run my tests
with and without these two banks. In both instances, my results are the same.
My sample covers each quarter t from 2007Q4–2008Q4. I impose two criteria for inclusion.
First, since I get impairment and reclassification data from public financial statements, banks
have to be publicly traded. Second, banks have to hold (AFS) private-label MBS at the start
of t. Banks may be net buyers, net sellers, or inventory-neutral in t; I impose no restrictions
on the change in private-label MBS during t. I impose this condition so as to focus solely on
relevant banks. In each quarter in my sample, roughly 35 percent of banks held private-label
MBS. Banks that do not hold private-label MBS cannot sell private-label MBS. Hence, given
“financial condition and near-term prospects of the [security’s] issuer,” and the ability of banks to hold the
security until its price recovers. Each of these factors becomes important during crises.
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my focus, these banks are irrelevant. Each bank with private-label MBS at the beginning of
t has safe assets, as well. My sample consists of 417 bank-quarters and 92 individual banks.
In each quarter from 2007Q4–2008Q4, my sample accounts for between 68 and 73 percent
of total (AFS) safe assets and 87 and 90 percent of total (AFS) private-label MBS.9
2.6.4 Models and Hypotheses
Models and Variables
I estimate the models below (see the appendix for more-precise variable definitions):
∆SAFEit = β0 + β1∆MBSit + β2IMPit−1 + β3CAPit−1 + β4LLPit
+ β5DEPit−1 + β6SAFEEXPit−1 + β7MBSQUALit−1 + εit (1)
∆MBSit = γ0 + γ1∆SAFEit + γ2IMPit−1 + γ3CAPit−1 + γ4LLPit
+ γ5DEPit−1 + γ6MBSEXPit−1 + γ7MBSQUALit−1 + it. (2)
The i and t sub-scripts denote banks and time, SAFE and MBS are safe assets and private-
label MBS, ε and  are error terms, and
∆SAFEit = ln [1 + SAFEit]− ln [1 + SAFEit−1]
∆MBSit = ln [1 +MBSit +RAWIMPit −RECLASSit)− ln (1 +MBSit−1] .
Models (1) and (2) include also time and bank fixed effects. Using time fixed effects controls
for period-specific shocks that affected all banks’ asset-sale decisions. Using bank fixed effects
controls for cross-sectional differences in banks’ propensity to take impairments (Vyas [2011])
and other unobservable, time-invariant differences across banks. CAP , banks’ Tier 1 capital
9 This sample consists mainly of large banks (e.g., Bank of America), as these banks accounted for most
of banks’ private-label MBS.
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ratio in excess of a six-percent baseline, and DEP , the fraction of deposits in total liabilities,
control for the impact of capital (in levels) and funding pressure, where a higher DEP implies
less reliance on wholesale funding. LLP , loan-loss provisions divided by average total assets,
controls for the impact of changes in capital. LLP aside, I use lags so as to avoid endogeneity.
Absent suitable controls, impairments could effectively be a proxy for asset quality, with
more impairments representing lower-quality private-label MBS. To control for asset quality,
I use MBSQUAL, defined as fair value divided by the amortized-cost value of banks’ private-
label MBS. Fair values are banks’ estimates of the value of their private-label MBS, calculated
by using market prices, internal models, or some combination of the two. The fair value of an
asset varies with changes in its price, or its value. Roughly stated, amortized-cost values are
par values. An asset’s amortized-cost value does not vary with changes in its price.10 A lower
MBSQUAL indicates a lower fair value compared to amortized-cost value, implying lower-
quality private-label MBS. Hence, MBSQUAL controls for changes over time in the quality
of each bank’s own private-label MBS. (Using bank fixed effects controls for differences across
banks in the quality of banks’ private-label MBS.)
With respect to SAFE and MBS, four comments: First, SAFE and MBS are based on
amortized-cost values, not on fair values. As a consequence, ∆SAFE and ∆MBS are driven
only by quantity effects—by sales and purchases. Second, ∆SAFE and ∆MBS include only
AFS securities. (AFS securities account for over 70 percent of banks’ safe assets and private-
label MBS.) The Y9-C gives only the fair value of trading securities, and banks face penalties
upon selling HTM securities (see FRB of Kansas City [2010], p. 76). Third, impairments in t
reduce amortized-cost values at the end of t. Hence, I add to ∆MBS RAWIMP , total raw
impairments. Fourth, banks may reclassify securities into and out of their trading, AFS, and
10 Taking an impairment reduces an asset’s amortized-cost value. Hence, technically, impairments should be
added back to the amortized-cost value inMBSQUAL. Even without this adjustment, however, impairments
and MBSQUAL are strongly correlated, leading to multicollinearity concerns. Adjusting MBSQUAL for
impairments exacerbates this problem. Hence, I do not adjust MBSQUAL for impairments.
51
HTM accounts. As a result, I subtract from ∆MBS RECLASS, net transfers into the AFS
account.11 Based on financial-statement disclosures, no impairments on or reclassifications
of safe assets occurred during my sample period.
I estimate models (1) and (2) with three-stage least squares (3SLS). ∆SAFE and ∆MBS
are jointly determined and endogenous, with sales of one asset type affecting sales of the other
(Section 5.4.2, equation (12)). 3SLS generates efficient, consistent estimates that account for
this simultaneity and endogeneity (Zellner and Thiel [1962]). 3SLS requires instruments for
∆SAFE and ∆MBS. For ∆SAFE, I use SAFEEXP , the share of AFS safe assets in total
assets; for ∆MBS, I use MBSEXP , the share of AFS private-label MBS in total assets. On
a within-bank, cross-temporal basis, a higher-than-average percentage of safe assets implies
that a bank is overweight these assets, inducing more sales. Likewise, a higher-than-average
percentage of private-label MBS implies that a bank is overweight these assets, inducing more
sales. Due to banks’ large holdings of assets other than safe assets and private-label MBS,
MBSEXP is uncorrelated with ∆SAFE, and SAFEEXP is uncorrelated with ∆MBS
(Section 6.5, Table 312).13
Impairment Definitions and Hypotheses
My empirical tests focus on IMP , defined in two ways. One is IMPTOT , defined as the log
of [1 + total impairments]. IMPTOT measures only the magnitude of banks’ impairments,
without reference to the change in the price of the private-label MBS of banks. MX , however,
is defined as mark-to-market losses as a share of the total fall in the price of X. As a result,
11 More precisely, to calculate RECLASS, I subtract private-label MBS transferred from banks’ trading
to AFS accounts and add private-label MBS transferred from banks’ AFS to HTM accounts. To be clear,
RECLASS concerns reclassifications only into and out of banks’ AFS account, without respect for whether
these transfers involved Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 assets (though most of banks’ private-label MBS were
classified during the crisis as Level 2 or Level 3 assets).
12 Based on supplemental estimations of models (1) and (2) (results not shown), ∆SAFE and MBSEXP
and ∆MBS and SAFEEXP are uncorrelated on a partial-correlation basis, as well.
13 For my sample of banks, in the aggregate, in each quarter from 2007Q4–2008Q4, AFS safe assets equaled
seven percent of total assets; AFS private-label MBS, between two and three percent of total assets.
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as a more precise measure of MX , I use IMPPER, defined as
IMPPERit−1 =
RAWIMPit−1[
MBSACVit−1 +RAWIMPit−1 −MBSFVit−1
]− [MBSACVit−2 −MBSFVit−2] ,
where ACV and FV are the amortized-cost values and fair values on private-label MBS. Over
my sample period, amortized-cost values generally exceeded fair values. Hence, MBSACV −
MBSFV is the total fall in the price, or value, of banks’ private-label MBS since these assets’
acquisition date. A rise in MBSACV −MBSFV from quarter t− 2 to t− 1 implies a decline
in value from t−2 to t−1, with a larger rise implying a larger decline in value. Impairments
reduce amortized-cost values by the amount of the impairment. As a consequence, I add to
the denominator RAWIMPit−1, raw impairments taken during quarter t− 1.
Hence, IMPPER is a measure of MX—of how much of a given fall in price, or value,
banks take a write-down on. To give an an example, suppose MBSACVit−2 and MBS
FV
it−2 are 100
and 80, MBSACVit−1 and MBS
FV
it−1 are 90 and 60, and RAWIMPit−1 is 10: IMPPERit−1 =
10
[90+10−60]−[100−80] =
10
40−20 = 0.5. The MBS were valued at 20 below par at the end of t−2 and
at 40 below par at the end of t− 1, after adjusting for impairments, for a fall in value of 20.
This bank took impairments of 10, implying an “impairment intensity” of 0.5. Suppose that
RAWIMPit−1 is 5, not 10: IMPPERit−1 = 5[95+5−60]−[100−80] =
5
40−20 = 0.25. In this case,
this fall in value of 20 led only to 5 in impairments, implying a lower impairment intensity,
or less-aggressive recognition of impairments.
I test the two hypotheses below, both expressed in alternative form:
(1) Larger impairments on private-label MBS are uncorrelated with ∆SAFE, and
(2) larger impairments on private-label MBS are uncorrelated with ∆MBS.
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Tab. 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean
Standard Percentiles
Deviation 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
∆SAFE 0.024 0.152 -0.096 -0.047 -0.003 0.070 0.177
∆MBS -0.017 0.793 -0.060 -0.040 -0.027 0.015 0.260
IMPTOT 0.938 3.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IMPPER 0.040 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CAP 0.050 0.066 0.019 0.028 0.037 0.052 0.071
LLP 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008
DEP 0.715 0.149 0.534 0.691 0.743 0.799 0.840
SAFEEXP 0.113 0.066 0.034 0.076 0.104 0.138 0.192
MBSEXP 0.030 0.031 0.003 0.009 0.020 0.037 0.070
MBSQUAL 0.957 0.047 0.892 0.937 0.970 0.988 0.999
My sample consists of each bank in each quarter t from 2007Q4–2008Q4 with AFS private-label
MBS at the start of t, for a total of 417 observations and 92 different banks. ∆SAFE: change
in log AFS Treasuries, Agencies, and Agency MBS; ∆MBS: change in log AFS private-label
MBS; IMPTOT : log impairments on private-label MBS; IMPPER: impairments on private-
label MBS relative to the decline in the value of these securities; CAP : Tier 1 ratio in excess
of a six-percent baseline; LLP : loan-loss provisions divided by average assets; DEP : share of
deposits in total liabilities; SAFEEXP : share of AFS Treasuries, Agencies, and Agency MBS
in total assets; MBSEXP : share of AFS private-label MBS in total assets; MBSQUAL: ratio
of fair-value to amortized-cost value of AFS private-label MBS.
IMP has an ambiguous effect on ∆SAFE and ∆MBS, as a result of the ambiguous
signs of
∂S∗F
∂MX
and
∂S∗X
∂MX
, equations (9) and (11) in Section 5.4.1. With respect to ∆SAFE, a
rise in MX reduces capital. Because of diminishing returns to capital, this decline in capital
induces more sales of safe assets if gains on sales dominate net interest income, so that sales
increase capital, and induces fewer sales if net interest income dominates, so that sales reduce
capital. With respect to ∆MBS, an increase in MX reduces losses on sales and, by reducing
capital, increases the probability banks have to liquidate toxic assets due to a loss of access
to funding. These effects induce more sales of toxic assets. Sales of toxic assets, however,
reduce capital due to losses on sales and the loss of net interest income. An increase in MX
reduces capital. Due to diminishing returns to capital, the impact of sales in reducing capital
is more harmful when capital is lower. This effect induces fewer sales of toxic assets.
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Tab. 2.3: Correlation Matrix
Variable ∆SAFE ∆MBS IMPTOT IMPPER CAP LLP DEP SAFEEXP MBSEXP MBSQUAL
∆SAFE 1.000
∆MBS 0.007 1.000
IMPTOT 0.225* -0.035 1.000
IMPPER 0.052 -0.027 0.580* 1.000
CAP -0.050 0.039 0.054 0.013 1.000
LLP 0.252* -0.042 0.165* 0.083 0.016 1.000
DEP 0.065 0.040 0.021 0.102* 0.083 0.079 1.000
SAFEEXP -0.345* -0.029 -0.023 0.026 0.017 -0.014 0.008 1.000
MBSEXP 0.058 -0.156* -0.120* -0.044 -0.104* 0.105* -0.004 -0.109* 1.000
MBSQUAL -0.288* 0.099* -0.407* -0.150* 0.014 -0.451* 0.136* -0.031 0.043 1.000
Values are Pearson correlations, calculated on a within-bank basis. * denotes statistical signif-
icance at the five-percent level.
2.6.5 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 2 and Table 3, I show summary statistics and a correlation matrix. Four comments:
First, the median of ∆SAFE is roughly zero, and its mean is positive. Banks were split 50-50
in being net buyers or net sellers of safe assets, but net purchases were greater in magnitude.
Second, the mean and median of ∆MBS are negative. Most often, banks were net sellers of
private-label MBS, in line with the view that banks wanted to dump these assets. Third, few
banks—37 of my 417 observations, or nine percent—took impairments on private-label MBS.
Even IMPTOT ’s and IMPPER’s 90th-percentile values are 0. Consequently, impairments
were not too common during the crisis, even among banks’ worst-performing assets. Fourth,
MBSQUAL has a negative link with IMPTOT and IMPPER—lower-quality private-label
MBS are linked with more impairments, capturing the intuition that impairments imply low-
quality private-label MBS. Due to the collinearity betweenMBSQUAL and IMP , I estimate
models (1) and (2) with and without MBSQUAL.
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Tab. 2.4: Regression Results
Dep. Var. ∆SAFE ∆MBS ∆SAFE ∆MBS ∆SAFE ∆MBS ∆SAFE ∆MBS
Est. # (I) (II) (III) (IV)
∆MBS
-0.044 -0.071 -0.004 -0.054
(0.057) (0.050) (0.058) (0.047)
∆SAFE
0.702 0.683 0.627 0.649
(0.547) (0.495) (0.504) (0.535)
IMPTOT
0.010*** -0.026** 0.007** -0.011*
(0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.006)
IMPPER
0.021 -0.168** 0.018 -0.187**
(0.027) (0.080) (0.032) (0.080)
CAP
-0.523 1.475 -0.458 1.264 -0.475 1.210 -0.411 1.132
(0.596) (1.123) (0.585) (1.321) (0.595) (1.027) (0.553) (1.182)
LLP
8.379** -16.577 7.068** -10.548 8.963** -16.613 7.091** -10.549
(3.718) (12.478) (3.029) (7.994) (3.873) (11.333) (3.600) (8.831)
DEP
0.275 1.078 0.350 0.846 0.293 1.075 0.376* 0.970*
(0.235) (0.672) (0.239) (0.604) (0.234) (0.658) (0.213) (0.583)
SAFEEXP
-3.158*** -3.226*** -3.169*** -3.252***
(0.650) (0.626) (0.701) (0.613)
MBSEXP
-12.525*** -14.390*** -11.571*** -14.290***
(2.785) (2.869) (2.752) (2.869)
MBSQUAL
-0.968** 5.510* -1.220*** 5.765*
(0.467) (3.142) (0.412) (3.248)
R2 (within) 0.197 0.022 0.167 0.069 0.205 0.196 0.020 0.072
N 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 417
# groups 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1. Bootstrapped (250 replications) standard errors are in parentheses.
2. All estimations include time and bank fixed effects.
3. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10-, five-, and one-percent level, respectively, using
two-tailed tests.
2.6.6 Results
Results for models (1) and (2) are in Table 4.14 My central result is that for model (2), sales of
private-label MBS, IMP is negative and significant—a marginal increase in impairments on
private-label MBS induces more sales of these securities. This result holds across definitions
14 In estimations (I) and (III), I exclude MBSQUAL; in estimations (II) and (IV), I include MBSQUAL.
In addition, estimations (I) and (II) use IMPTOT , the log of [1 + total impairments], while estimations (III)
and (IV) use IMPPER, a measure of impairment intensity (Section 6.4.2). Finally, since the residuals are
not normally distributed, I compute bootstrapped standard errors (250 replications) (Efron and Tibshirani
[1982]).
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of impairments and after including MBSQUAL, suggesting asset-quality effects do not drive
this result. A rise in MX can induce more sales of toxic assets by reducing losses on sales and
raising the odds of being hit by a wholesale run—of having to sell toxic assets at a later date.
The results above suggest that these effects dominate. IMP ’s effect is economically modest—
using IMPPER’s coefficients, a rise of 10 percentage points in impairment intensity implies
an increase of 0.02 percent in sales of private-label MBS. One possible reason for this limited
effect is that during the crisis, selling private-label MBS would have led to losses of as high as
20 cents on the dollar (Section 4.1, Figure 3). Still, these results suggest that on the margin,
taking larger impairments on private-label MBS led to more sales of these securities.
In addition, for model (1), sales of safe assets, IMP and ∆SAFE have a positive link,
though this result is not robust to how I define IMP ; IMPPER, the more precise measure of
MX , has a positive sign but is statistically insignificant. This result provides some evidence,
albeit relatively weak, that a marginal increase in impairments induces fewer net sales of safe
assets. By equation (9) in Section 5.4.1, this result suggests the net interest income foregone
by selling safe assets exceeds gains on sales, so that sales lower capital, in effect. An increase
in MX reduces capital. Due to diminishing returns to capital, this decline in capital makes
more harmful the decline in capital on sales.
Three more results are worth noting: First, MBSQUAL has a positive link with ∆MBS.
A marginal decline in the quality of private-label MBS induces more sales of these securities,
in line with the view that banks were particularly eager to sell low-quality private-label MBS.
MBSQUAL has a negative link with ∆MBS—a decline in the quality of private-label MBS
induces fewer net sales of safe assets. Holding especially toxic private-label MBS could have
led banks to load up on safe assets as a way to guard against future negative shocks. Second,
SAFEEXP has a negative link with ∆SAFE, so that a marginal rise in the portfolio weight
of safe assets gives rise to more sales of these assets. MBSEXP likewise has a negative link
with ∆MBS, with the same implications. Third, LLP has a positive link with ∆SAFE. A
57
marginal rise in loan losses leads to fewer net sales of safe assets. Loan losses reduce Tier 1
capital, potentially inducing banks to invest more in capital-light safe assets.
With respect to weak instruments, the minimum eigenvalues of ∆SAFE and ∆MBS are
55.40 and 14.60 (Table 5). Hence, for ∆SAFE, the nulls of a maximum endogeneity bias of
at least five percent and size bias of at least 10 percent relative to OLS can be rejected at the
five-percent level (see Stock and Yogo [2002]). For ∆MBS, the nulls of an endogeneity bias
of at least 30 percent and a size bias of at least 15 percent can be rejected at the five-percent
level. These results suggest that weak instruments are not a problem, especially for ∆SAFE.
With respect to instrument validity, since ∆SAFE and ∆MBS are just-identified, no tests
of overidentifying restrictions are possible. When I estimate models (1) and (2) via two-stage
least squares and via ordinary least squares, I get the same results (not tabulated).
2.7 Implications
The theoretical and empirical results above show how under fair value, banks have incentives
to sell more toxic assets and fewer safe assets than under historic cost. In this way, fair value
has a two-sided impact on crises. As a plus, with certain exceptions (e.g., Greek government
debt), toxic assets consume substantial capital because of their high risk-weights.15 Hence, in
selling these capital-intensive, poorly performing assets, banks free up capital to put toward
new, more-productive loans. Also, selling toxic assets while holding on to safe assets improves
balance-sheet strength, enhancing banks’ ability to raise external capital. As a result, crises
could come to a quicker conclusion, with fewer negative spillover effects to the real economy.
As a minus, sales of toxic asset depress prices, further impairing capital and reducing banks’
access to funding. Banks thus might reduce lending, or even trigger a self-reinforcing cycle
by selling more toxic assets (Cifuentes et al. [2005]). The net effect of these conflicting forces
15 Although most structured-finance products (e.g., private-label MBS) had high credit ratings at inception
and thus required little capital, large and widespread credit-rating downgrades (Moody’s [2009], [2010]) made
these assets capital-intensive during and after the 2007–8 crisis.
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Tab. 2.5: US Banks’ Asset Composition, Year-End 2010 ($ millions)
Bank Total Trading AFS
Trading % AFS %
Assets Assets Securities
Bank of America 2,268,347 265,091 360,389 0.117 0.159
JP Morgan 2,117,605 489,892 312,671 0.231 0.148
Citigroup 1,913,902 317,272 274,270 0.166 0.143
Wells Fargo 1,258,128 51,414 172,654 0.041 0.137
Goldman Sachs 911,330 345,538 3,643 0.379 0.004
Morgan Stanley 807,698 284,798 29,649 0.353 0.037
Metlife 730,906 18,590 343,036 0.025 0.469
Taunus 372,556 98,386 2,319 0.264 0.006
HSBC NA 343,700 44,729 48,859 0.130 0.142
US Bancorp 307,786 1,701 51,509 0.006 0.167
PNC 264,414 2,546 57,310 0.010 0.217
BNY Mellon 247,222 20,397 62,368 0.083 0.252
Capital One 197,503 427 41,531 0.002 0.210
TD Bank US 176,972 0 76,270 0.000 0.431
Suntrust 172,875 5,378 26,206 0.031 0.152
Others 4,008,737 44,870 731,540 0.011 0.182
Data source: FR Y9-C. The 15 banks shown are the 15-biggest US bank holding companies as
of the end of 2010, as measured by total assets. “Other banks” is aggregate data for all other
US bank holding companies.
is unclear a priori and would be an interesting area for future research.
These results are particularly important since fair value’s scope is set to increase sharply
under Basel III. Under current US banking regulations, fair value is applied for regulatory-
capital purposes primarily to trading assets. Very few banks—large banks, with large market-
making operations—have trading assets (Table 6). Basel III, however, calls for fair value to
be applied for regulatory-capital purposes to AFS securities, in addition to trading assets.16
AFS securities account for between 15 and 20 percent of the assets of all banks, large banks
and smaller banks alike. Fair value thus could have a larger impact in future crises than in
the 2007–8 crisis (see Laux and Leuz [2010]).
16 At present, under US accounting standards, AFS securities are valued under fair value on banks’ balance
sheets. Unrealized gains and losses on most of banks’ AFS securities, however, are excluded from regulatory
capital. Basel III calls for this exclusion to be eliminated (BCBS [2011], p. 13, footnote 10).
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2.8 Conclusion
Asset sales by banks are one of the key features of financial crises. I show how under fair-value
accounting, banks have incentives to sell more toxic assets and fewer safe assets than under
historic-cost accounting. Empirically, I find that in the 2007–8 crisis, larger write-downs on
private-label MBS are linked with more sales of these securities, even after controlling for the
quality of these securities. These results indicate that fair value can have an important role
in determining which asset types banks sell during crises. Since sales of toxic assets depress
prices, whereas sales of safe assets do not, fair value’s impact in this respect can play a vital
role in how crises evolve.
Appendix
The Y9-C mnemonics I use in my empirical tests are as follows:
Item Y9-C Mnemonic(s)
Treasuries BHCK1286
Agencies BHCK1291 + BHCK1297
Agency MBS BHCK1701 + BHCK1706 + BHCK1716 + BHCK1731
Private-label MBS BHCK1711 + BHCK1735
Tier 1 capital BHCK8274
Risk-weighted assets BHCKA223
Deposits BHDM6631 + BHDM6636 + BHFN6631 + BHFN6636
Total liabilities BHCK2948
Total assets BHCK2170
Loan-loss provisions BHCK4230
Impairment and reclassification data come from banks’ public financial statements.
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Variable definitions are as follows:
∆SAFEit = ln [1 + SAFEit]− ln [1 + SAFEit−1]
∆MBSit = ln [1 +MBSit +RAWIMPit −RECLASSit]− ln [1 +MBSit−1]
IMPTOTit = ln [1 + total impairments on private-label MBSit]
IMPPERit =
RAWIMPit
[MBSACVit +RAWIMPit −MBSFVit ]−
[
MBSACVit−1 −MBSFVit−1
]
CAPit =
Tier 1 capitalit − 0.06 [risk-weighted assetsit]
risk-weighted assetsit
LLPit =
loan-loss provisionsit
[total assetsit + total assetsit−1] /2
DEPit =
depositsit
total liabilitiesit
SAFEEXPit =
AFS Treasuries, Agencies, and Agency MBSit
total assetsit
MBSEXPit =
AFS private-label MBSit
total assetsit
MBSQUALit =
AFS private-label MBS, fair valueit
AFS private-label MBS, amortized-cost valueit
.
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3. DVA AND SYSTEMIC RISK
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ABSTRACT
DVA is a valuation adjustment on derivative liabilities. DVA’s earnings profile is akin to that
of a short position in own-credit risk. A rise in own-credit risk results in a gain; a decline, in a
loss. Theoretically, I show that tax effects can lead banks to hedge DVA’s impact on earnings
and that banks do so by taking long positions in other banks’ credit. DVA is relevant mainly
for large, global banks. DVA hedging thus increases systemic risk by tightening the links
between global banks, the systemically important financial institutions at the center of the
2007–8 financial crisis. Global banks are hedging DVA in this way, increasing the systemic
scope of future crises.
3.1 Introduction
Systemic risk has become a key policy concern after the 2007–8 financial crisis. Many recent
studies look at systemic risk (e.g., Huang, Zhou, and Zhu [2009], [2010]; Acharya et al. [2010];
Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011]). Most of these studies take as exogenous the systemic risk
in the financial sector and focus instead on measuring this risk or on assessing how much each
individual bank contributes to this risk (see Acharya [2009] for an exception). Systemic risk,
however, is an endogenous outcome of banks’ investment decisions. Hence, examining banks’
incentives to make investment decisions that increase systemic risk is useful in understanding
how systemic risk can arise. In addition, this type of examination can help identify regulatory
responses that limit the build-up of systemic risk.
In this study, I show that debt valuation adjustments (DVA) can increase systemic risk by
inducing large, global banks to take long positions in the credit of other global banks. United
States (US) and international accounting standards require DVA on derivative liabilities.1
DVA is a valuation adjustment whose earnings profile is equivalent to that of a short position
in own-credit risk. A rise in own-credit risk results in a gain; a fall, in a loss. DVA is “paper
income,” a pure accounting exposure with no economic substance. DVA reflects the change
in the value of derivative liabilities due to changes in own-credit risk. DVA has no impact on
the obligations of banks on these liabilities. Still, DVA affects both accounting earnings and
taxable income. Hence, insofar as DVA is exogenous and has negative effects (e.g., increases
earnings volatility), banks have incentives to mitigate its impact on earnings.
DVA is relevant only for global banks. For these banks, DVA is exogenous and can have
a strong impact on earnings. With respect to US banks, DVA accounted for eight percent of
2011 pre-tax income for both JP Morgan and Citigroup and for 18 percent, 41 percent, and 68
percent of income for Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America (Figure 1). DVA
1 Unless otherwise noted, I use DVA to refer only to credit-risk-related DVA on derivative liabilities (see
Section 2.1 for more).
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Fig. 3.1: 2011 Full-Year Earnings, Large, Global US Banks ($ millions)
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2011 Quarterly and Full-Year Earnings ($ millions)
Period JP Morgan
Bank of
Citigroup
Morgan Goldman
America Stanley Sachs
Q1, PTI 5,558 2,279 3,031 1,128 2,821
Q1, DVA -69 -357 -227 -193 -90
Q2, PTI 5,481 -8,810 3,332 1,402 1,103
Q2, DVA 92 121 76 204 140
Q3, PTI 4,274 5,983 3,742 2,268 -401
Q3, DVA 915 1,709 1,304 2,263 702
Q4, PTI 3,770 2,022 998 -102 1,064
Q4, DVA 499 -474 -251 -342 59
FY, PTI 19,083 1,474 11,103 4,696 4,587
FY, DVA 1,437 1,000 902 1,932 811
Data source: FR Y9-C. DVA is credit-risk-related DVA on derivative liabilities. PTI is pre-tax
income before extraordinary items.
is irrelevant for other US banks (Table 1). Media anecdotes indicate that internationally,
too, DVA is relevant only for global banks (e.g., Barclays; Carver [2012b]). These banks have
extensive market-making operations. Though banks can avoid DVA by not using derivatives,
derivatives are vital to market-making. In market-making in cash instruments (e.g., bonds),
banks use derivatives to hedge risks that arise from holding inventory. In market-making in
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derivatives, banks necessarily trade in derivatives on a large scale. Due to the importance of
derivatives in market-making, global banks cannot avoid using derivatives. Hence, derivatives
and the resulting DVA on derivative liabilities are substantively exogenous.
I build a model in which banks mitigate the impact of DVA on earnings by hedging DVA.
In doing so, banks balance the tax benefits against the distress costs of DVA hedging. DVA’s
impact on earnings and on taxable income is equivalent to that of an unhedged, undiversified
short position in own-credit risk. Consequently, given the potential for large swings in banks’
own-credit risk, DVA can have a large impact in increasing volatility in taxable income. As a
result of tax-function convexity, this rise in volatility increases the present value of expected
tax liabilities (Smith and Stulz [1985], Graham and Smith [1999]). Hedging DVA reduces the
net impact of DVA on taxable income. Hence, this increase in volatility is smaller, reducing
the rise in the present value of expected tax liabilities.
As a cost, DVA hedging raises distress costs, modeled as the costs of having to sell assets
at a below-fundamentals price after losing access to private-sector wholesale (i.e., uninsured)
funding. DVA is a short position in own-credit risk. Hence, banks hedge by taking positions
that are akin to a long position in own-credit risk. Common (i.e., systematic) factors drive
most of the changes in global banks’ credit risk (Eichengreen et al. [2009]). Global banks thus
hedge by taking long positions in other global banks’ credit. In good states, banks’ credit risk
declines, leading to gains on DVA hedges. In good states, however, banks’ balance sheets are
strong, and capital and liquidity are abundant. Hence, the odds of losing access to funding
are negligible even without these gains. Consequently, these gains do little to reduce distress
costs. In bad states (e.g., financial crises), credit risk rises, leading to losses on DVA hedges.
These losses amplify banks’ distress, increasing the odds of losing access to funding. Because
of this asymmetric impact on distress costs, DVA hedging increases these costs.
I develop a baseline model and two extensions; in each version, banks maximize post-tax
returns on capital. In my baseline model, banks internalize fully the tax benefits and distress
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Tab. 3.1: 2011 Derivatives and DVA, US Banks ($ millions)
Bank Holding Company
Total Trading Derivative
DVA
Assets Derivatives Liabilities
JP Morgan 2,265,792 64,617,524 74,477 1,437
Bank of America 2,136,578 62,285,711 55,838 1,000
Citigroup 1,873,878 47,169,692 56,273 902
Wells Fargo 1,313,867 2,653,753 12,512 40
Goldman Sachs 923,718 44,122,216 58,459 811
Metlife 799,625 0 4 0
Morgan Stanley 749,898 47,163,209 46,320 1,932
Taunus 354,737 762,140 5,909 0
US Bancorp 340,122 72,246 378 0
HSBC North America 331,403 3,578,233 5,422 0
Bank of New York 325,793 1,325,470 7,116 0
PNC 271,407 152,948 381 -4
State Street 216,436 1,385,450 6,396 0
Capital One 206,104 15,426 395 -1
TD Bank US 201,057 0 N/A 0
Other banks 4,145,066 947,135 12,500 0
Data source: FR Y9-C. N/A: not available. Trading derivatives are given in notional values and
account for over 98 percent of banks’ total derivatives. Derivative liabilities are the aggregate
fair value of trading derivatives whose fair value is negative. DVA is credit-risk-related DVA on
derivative liabilities. The banks above are the 15-largest US bank holding companies, as ranked
by total assets.“Other banks” is aggregate data for all other US bank holding companies.
costs of DVA hedging. As a result, an increase in exposure to other banks never is costless. A
marginal increase in exposure lowers expected tax liabilities on any given amount of pre-tax
earnings by reducing the effect of DVA in increasing earnings volatility. A marginal increase
in exposure, however, also increases distress costs by increasing the probability of being cut
off from funding. Banks balance these two effects when deciding how much exposure to take.
Hence, distress costs have a central role in limiting the extent to which banks take exposure
to other banks.
Next, I alter my baseline model by stipulating that banks do not internalize fully the dis-
tress costs of DVA hedging. I allow for public-sector support should private-sector creditors
pull funds. The public sector—central banks and governments—cannot commit ex ante not
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to support banks ex post, once a crisis hits. The prospect of this support helps insulate banks
from the adverse consequences of losing access to private-sector funding. Central banks, for
instance, can respond to a systemic crisis by lending against lower-quality collateral, ensuring
that banks do not have to liquidate assets at a below-fundamentals price. This commitment
problem and the moral hazard that results are especially acute vis-a´-vis large, global banks,
the banks DVA is most relevant for. In addition, public-sector support is most likely in bad
states, the states in which losses on DVA hedges are likely to be highest.
In this altered model, DVA hedging is more pervasive, in equilibrium, in that the prospect
of public-sector support leads banks to take more exposure to other banks. In the limit, when
public-sector support is certain, public-sector support eliminates distress costs by eliminating
the risk of having to sell assets at a below-fundamentals price. As a result, taking exposure to
other banks is strictly beneficial. In this case, banks’ hedging strategy is a corner solution—
banks take as much exposure to other banks as possible. More generally, as the probability of
public-sector support increases, the likelihood of having to sell assets at a below-fundamentals
price declines. Hence, distress costs decline, inducing more DVA hedging.
Finally, I stipulate that taking more exposure to other banks forces banks to hold more
capital. In this set-up, DVA hedging is less pervasive, in equilibrium. As a result of the moral
hazard arising from public-sector support, banks likely will do too much DVA hedging relative
to the social optimum. As a result, regulators have an interest in curbing its practice. Capital
requirements can help to do so. A marginal rise in exposure to other banks is beneficial in
reducing the present value of expected tax liabilities. A rise in exposure, however, in addition
to possibly raising distress costs, forces banks to hold more capital. Consequently, returns on
capital for any given amount of post-tax earnings are lower. Banks balance these conflicting
effects when determining how much exposure to take. Hence, an increase in exposure always
is costly, even when public-sector support is certain. More generally, this additional cost of
DVA hedging induces banks to take less exposure than when capital is independent of banks’
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exposure to other banks.
Global banks were at the heart of the 2007–8 financial crises and likely would have a vital
role in any future crisis. These banks already are hedging DVA, increasing the systemic scope
of future crises. Goldman Sachs hedges DVA by selling credit protection on other financial
firms (Moyer and Burne [2011]); several others use some type of DVA hedging or are thinking
about doing so (Carver [2012b]). Also, in 2008, several banks hedged prospective DVA gains
by selling credit protection on Lehman Brothers (Alloway [2012]). DVA hedging gives banks
direct exposure to other banks’ credit. Hence, in a crisis, when one bank becomes distressed,
other banks book losses, reducing capital while increasing credit risk. In turn, more banks
book losses, and so on. Concomitant DVA gains do nothing substantive to offset these losses.
In addition, Basel III calls for DVA to be excluded from capital (BCBS [2011]). As a result,
DVA gains during crises would offer no capital relief. Losses on DVA hedges thus could have
an important role in amplifying the scope and magnitude of crises.
The rest of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, I discuss the accounting standards that
govern DVA and banks’ operations that result in DVA. In Section 3, I discuss DVA’s impact
on earnings vis-a´-vis the rest of banks’ portfolios. In Section 4, I lay out my model’s primary
features and describe the costs and benefits of DVA hedging. In Section 5, I build my model
and discuss its implications. In the appendix, I show the FR Y9-C mnemonics for the data
I show.
3.2 Accounting Standards, DVA, and Global Banks
DVA is a valuation adjustment on liabilities banks value under fair-value accounting. DVA is
included in earnings and also in taxable income. With respect to how to calculate DVA and
the liabilities to calculate DVA on, US and international accounting standards are essentially
the same. DVA is a function of, inter alia, changes in own-credit risk. In the US, ASC 820-
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10-35-17 states,2 “The fair value of a liability [must incorporate] the effect of nonperformance
risk. Nonperformance risk includes . . . a reporting entity’s own credit risk.” Internationally,
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 13 makes the same requirement. Hence,
as a bank’s own-credit risk declines, its probability of default falls, the value of its liabilities
increases, and a loss thus results. A rise in own-credit risk works similarly to generate gains.
DVA reflects the change in the value of the liabilities of a bank. DVA does not affect a bank’s
obligations in connection with its liabilities. In this respect, DVA is an accounting exposure
with no underlying economic substance (i.e., with no cash-flow implications).
Banks calculate DVA on two types of liabilities. One is liabilities valued under the “fair-
value option.” DVA on these liabilities is endogenous. Banks have total discretion in choosing
whether to apply fair value to each liability, subject to certain eligibility restrictions. In the
US, ASC 825-10-15 and its predecessor, SFAS No. 159, govern the fair-value option. SFAS
No. 159 states (emphasis added), “This Statement permits all entities to choose, at specified
election dates, to measure eligible items at fair value” and that “[t]he decision about whether
to elect the fair value option is applied instrument by instrument . . . .” Internationally, IFRS
9 likewise gives banks discretion in applying this option. Banks do not have to use this option
at all. Insofar as DVA has undesirable effects, banks may avoid these effects by not applying
this option. Consistent with the notion that this option is benign, if not beneficial, Fiechter
[2011] finds that banks use this option to reduce earnings volatility.3
The second is derivative liabilities (i.e., derivatives that have a negative fair value). To a
large extent, derivative-liability DVA is endogenous only insofar as banks have discretion in
using derivatives. In general, gains and losses on derivatives affect earnings. In the US, ASC
815-10-35-2 states, “[Gains or losses on derivatives] not designated as a hedging instrument”
2 US and international accounting standards can be accessed through http://www.fasb.org and http://
www.iasb.org, the respective home pages of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International
Accounting Standards Board.
3 A bank, for instance, could reduce volatility in earnings by applying the fair-value option to only those
liabilities whose changes in value have a strong negative link with changes in the value of its assets.
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Tab. 3.2: Accounting Treatment of Derivatives, Fiscal-Year-End 2011
Notional Values Gross Deriv. Assets Gross Deriv. Liabilities
Bank
Accounting Hedge Accounting Hedge Accounting Hedge
Yes No Yes No Yes No
JP Morgan ($) N/A N/A 16 1,869 4 1,833
Bank of America ($) N/A N/A 20 1,862 15 1,847
Citigroup ($) 294 49,522 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Morgan Stanley ($) 91 52,208 8 1,192 0 1,166
Goldman Sachs ($) N/A N/A 22 964 0 875
Barclays (£) 244 43,096 4 535 3 525
Deutsche Bank (e) N/A N/A 4 852 3 834
Data source: 2011 annual reports. N/A: not available. Data are in billions of the denoted unit
of currency. “Accounting Hedge” denotes derivatives designated as an accounting hedge. Gross
derivative assets and liabilities are derivative assets and liabilities before netting and collateral
adjustments.
impact earnings. Internationally, accounting for derivatives under IFRS 39 and IAS 9 is the
same. Hence, DVA on derivatives designated as a hedging instrument could bypass earnings.
To qualify as a hedging instrument, however, a derivative has to meet certain conditions that
can be hard to satisfy (see, e.g., Citigroup’s 2011 10-K, pp. 144–5). As a result, even those
derivatives banks use as a hedge cannot necessarily be accounted for as such; also, banks can
opt not to designate as an accounting hedge derivatives that could be accounted for as such.
Essentially none of global banks’ derivatives are designated as a hedging instrument (Table
2). Gains and losses, DVA included, on the derivatives of these banks thus affect earnings.
3.2.1 Exogenous DVA, Global Banks, and Market-Making
DVA’s impact differs depending on whether DVA is endogenous or exogenous. Insofar as DVA
is endogenous, banks can choose to operate so as to avoid DVA. With respect to the fair-value
option, banks can elect not to apply this option. With respect to derivative liabilities, banks
can elect not to use derivatives. These decisions are within banks’ control. With endogenous
DVA, banks balance the costs and benefits of accounting or investment decisions that would
require DVA. A bank that wishes to use derivatives to hedge, for instance, could balance the
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benefits of its hedging program against the costs of booking DVA should its derivatives end
up as a derivative liability (have a negative fair value). Banks would not necessarily have to
mitigate DVA’s impact on earnings. Insofar as DVA’s adverse effects are “too costly,” banks
could choose to operate in a way that avoids DVA.
Exogenous DVA, by contrast, gives banks no discretion in avoiding DVA. DVA effectively
is imposed on banks, regardless of its costs. Hence, banks have stronger incentives to mitigate
the earnings effects of exogenous DVA due to its potentially higher costs. For global banks,
DVA on derivative liabilities is exogenous. Given the difficulty in designating derivatives as a
hedging instrument, banks can avoid derivative-liability DVA only by not using derivatives.
For global banks, this option is not viable. These banks have large market-making operations.
Derivatives are a vital part of market-making. By definition, in market-making in derivatives,
banks trade in derivatives as an ordinary matter. In market-making in cash instruments (e.g.,
bonds), derivatives are a critical risk-management tool. Goldman Sachs, for instance, “enters
into derivative transactions with clients and other market participants to provide liquidity
and to facilitate the transfer and hedging of risk . . . [and] to actively manage risk exposures
that arise from market-making” (Goldman’s 2011 10-K, p. 130).
In large part due to market-making, global banks trade in derivatives on a massive scale.
Notional values overstate true exposures but do capture the extent of these banks’ derivative
activity: As of year-end 2011, the five global US banks in Figure 1 all had between $44 trillion
and $65 trillion notional in derivatives outstanding (Section 1, Table 1). International banks
trade on a similarly large scale. At year-end 2011, for instance, Barclays and Deutsche Bank
had £43 trillion and e59 trillion notional in derivatives outstanding (source: annual reports).
Global banks thus have either to tolerate passively DVA’s exogenous impact on earnings or
to take steps to mitigate its impact. Based on a 2010 survey, the G-14—a group of 14 global
banks—account for 82 percent of over-the-counter derivatives outstanding (Mengle [2010]).
Hence, DVA on derivative liabilities is relevant mainly for these banks.
78
Tab. 3.3: 2011 DVA, CVA, and Pre-Tax Income
Bank
Assets Derivative
Net PTI CVA DVA
Returns
Non-Deriv. Derivatives Liabilities Assets CVA DVA
JPM 2,176,245 89,547 74,477 20,220 -2,574 1,437 0.97 % -2.87 % 1.93 %
BAC 2,073,288 63,290 55,838 1,080 -606 1,000 0.05 % -0.96 % 1.79 %
C 1,811,551 62,327 56,273 12,718 -2,517 902 0.73 % -4.04 % 1.60 %
MS 703,016 46,882 46,320 1,177 1,587 1,932 0.18 % 3.39 % 4.17 %
GS 845,558 78,160 58,459 4,014 -238 811 0.52 % -0.30 % 1.39 %
Data source: FR Y9-C. Data are in millions of dollars. “Net PTI” is pre-tax earnings excluding
extraordinary items, CVA, and DVA. Returns are earnings divided by ending book values.
3.3 DVA, CVA, and Earnings on Non-Derivative Assets
In principle, DVA could covary negatively with two other parts of earnings, reducing the need
of banks to hedge. The first is credit valuation adjustments (CVA), a valuation adjustment on
derivative assets. CVA is driven by changes in counterparty credit risk. A fall in counterparty
credit risk increases the value of derivative assets, resulting in a gain; a rise results in a loss.
Hence, insofar as a bank’s credit risk is positively correlated with that of its counterparties,
CVA and DVA offset. In good states, both its own and its counterparties’ credit risk decline,
giving rise to a DVA loss and a CVA gain. In bad states, a DVA gain and a CVA loss result.
The second is earnings on non-derivative assets. In good states, credit risk falls, leading to a
DVA loss, but high profits on non-derivative assets could help offset this loss. In bad states,
losses on non-derivative assets could offset DVA gains. In these respects, CVA and earnings
on non-derivative assets could act as natural hedges against DVA, reducing the need of banks
to hedge DVA explicitly.
Empirically, however, DVA has had only a weak negative correlation, if any, with both
CVA and earnings on non-derivative assets (Table 3). With respect to CVA, in 2011, Morgan
Stanley had $1.9 billion in DVA gains and $1.6 billion in CVA gains. Although the other four
global US banks all had DVA gains and CVA losses, these gains and losses differed sharply in
magnitude, with differences from $0.4 billion–$1.6 billion. These outcomes likely are not one-
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Tab. 3.4: Derivative-Asset Counterparty Exposure, Year-End 2011 ($ millions)
Banks Monolines Hedge Funds Sovereigns Corporations
Bank
Net Cash Net Cash Net Cash Net Cash Net Cash
Exp. Collateral Exp. Collateral Exp. Collateral Exp. Collateral Exp. Collateral
JPM 95,602 81,339 380 1 2,007 9,225 7,968 3 66,755 10,440
BAC 68,505 56,949 1,652 0 3,997 4,620 2,645 85 55,953 11,055
C 55,846 39,783 10 0 2,649 4,741 14,456 2,946 38,370 13,500
MS 70,225 64,981 447 1 1,587 7,527 5,041 87 47,877 19,172
GS 143,808 114,491 0 0 2,096 7,172 3,953 529 43,381 12,515
Bank
Cash Total Cash Total Cash Total Cash Total Cash Total
Coll. % Exp. % Coll. % Exp. % Coll. % Exp. % Coll. % Exp. % Coll. % Exp. %
JPM 85.08 % 19.89 % 0.26 % 0.53 % 459.64 % -10.07 % 0.04 % 11.11 % 15.64 % 78.54 %
BAC 83.13 % 19.25 % 0.00 % 2.75 % 115.60 % -1.04 % 3.22 % 4.26 % 19.76 % 74.78 %
C 71.24 % 31.90 % 0.00 % 0.02 % 178.97 % -4.15 % 20.38 % 22.85 % 35.18 % 49.38 %
MS 92.53 % 15.70 % 0.22 % 1.33 % 474.29 % -17.78 % 1.73 % 14.83 % 40.04 % 85.92 %
GS 79.61 % 50.09 % N/A 0.00 % 342.18 % -8.67 % 13.38 % 5.85 % 28.85 % 52.73 %
Data source: FR Y9-C. The top row lists the five types of banks’ derivative-asset counterparties
the Y9-C identifies. “Net Exp.” is exposure after accounting for netting agreements but before
accounting for collateral posted. “Cash Collateral” is cash collateral posted by the relevant
counterparty type. “Cash Coll. %” is cash collateral divided by net exposure. “Total Exp. %”
is the share of total cash-collateral-adjusted exposure each counterparty type accounts for.
time flukes. CVA is driven by changes in counterparty credit risk on derivative assets, whereas
DVA reflects changes in own-credit risk, which is driven by banks’ entire balance sheet.4 Also,
the heavy use of cash collateral limits banks’ derivative-asset counterparty exposure to other
banks (Table 4). Banks’ counterparty exposure thus is mainly to corporates. Consequently,
changes in corporate credit risk, not in bank credit risk, drive CVA. Different factors drive
changes in corporate credit risk and in bank credit risk (Amato [2005], Raunig and Scheicher
[2009]), limiting the positive correlation between changes in the two.
Similarly, the limited data that are available imply a weak link between DVA and earnings
on assets. JP Morgan and Bank of America, for instance, had the highest and lowest returns
on assets (0.97% and 0.05%) but the second- and third-highest DVA as a fraction of derivative
liabilities, with similar returns of 1.93% and 1.79%. As with DVA and CVA, this weak link
likely is not a one-time fluke. Most credit-risk measures (e.g., spreads on credit-default swaps
4 Most banks, for instance, have large mortgage books, the credit quality of which need not be correlated
with that of their derivative-asset counterparties.
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(CDS)) are forward-looking measures that reflect all available information, but banks’ assets
are valued primarily under historic-cost accounting, so that changes in asset values typically
do not affect earnings. Over 2007Q3–2008Q4, for instance, US banks took only $11.7 billion
in impairment losses on the $67.7 billion decline in value of their banking-book private-label
mortgage-backed securities (sources: FR Y9-C, financial statements, author’s calculations).
CDS spreads likely reflected the fall in asset quality and the resulting increase in credit risk
this decline in value implied; for the most part, accounting earnings did not.
3.4 DVA, DVA Hedging, and Moral Hazard
In this section, I detail the intuition behind my model. In Section 4.1, I discuss DVA and its
impact on earnings volatility. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, I go over the tax benefits and distress
costs of DVA hedging. In Section 4.4, I discuss why regulators have incentives to discourage
DVA hedging.
3.4.1 DVA, Earnings Volatility, and DVA Hedging
My starting point is that banks can best mitigate the impact of DVA on earnings by hedging
DVA. DVA is akin to an unhedged, undiversified short position in own-credit risk. In addi-
tion, based on the limited data that are available, DVA has a weak negative link, if any, with
the rest of banks’ earnings (Section 3, Table 3). As a result, DVA can have a strong effect in
increasing volatility in earnings and in taxable income. Consistent with this notion, a recent
survey finds that DVA is one of “the larger drivers of volatility in the quarterly results of
large financial institutions” (Ernst & Young [2012]). Banks can mitigate this rise in volatility
by taking positions whose earnings profile is opposite to that of DVA—by hedging.
To hedge DVA, global banks take long positions in the credit of other global banks. Since
DVA is in effect a short position in own-credit risk, banks can hedge by taking positions that
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are akin to a long position in own-credit risk. Common factors account for 62 percent of
the changes in global banks’ credit risk (Eichengreen et al. [2009]). Hence, changes in these
banks’ credit risk have a strong positive link. In good states, credit risk falls, leading to DVA
losses and gains on banks’ long positions in other banks’ credit. In bad states, an increase in
credit risk gives rise to DVA gains and losses on hedges. Banks can take exposure to other
banks via simple means, such as selling credit protection via CDS or buying bonds.
DVA hedging can play a useful role in reducing DVA’s net impact on earnings. In 2011Q3,
for instance, banks’ credit spreads increased. As a consequence of this rise in own-credit risk,
JP Morgan, Citigroup, and Bank of America booked $1.9 billion, $1.9 billion, and $1.7 billion,
respectively, in DVA gains (Moyer and Burne [2011]).5 Goldman Sachs, by contrast, booked
only a $450 milllion net DVA gain. This relatively small gain was due to Goldman’s decision
to hedge DVA by “selling credit default swaps on a range of financial firms.” The increase in
banks’ credit spreads resulted in losses on these CDS. These losses helped negate Goldman’s
DVA gains due to the increase in its own-credit risk.
3.4.2 DVA Hedging: Tax Benefits
Banks have incentives to hedge DVA only insofar as the impact of DVA in increasing volatility
in earnings and in taxable income is costly. This rise in volatility could generate costs in two
ways. First, higher volatility in earnings implies higher credit risk (e.g., Trueman and Titman
[1988]), potentially increasing banks’ cost of (wholesale) funding. In line with this concern,
the Ernst & Young survey cited in Section 4.1 reports, “[Banks are] thinking actively about
stakeholder communication around measurement, management and reporting [of DVA . . .
and] are focused on hedging strategies to manage . . . [the] income statement volatility” that
arises from DVA. Anecdotally, however, investors ignore DVA when evaluating the earnings
of banks (e.g., Burne [2011]) because of its lack of economic substance. As a result, although
5 These figures are for total DVA rather than for credit-risk-related DVA on derivative liabilities and thus
differ from the figures in Section 1, Table 1.
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DVA increases volatility in earnings, this increase in volatility likely has a limited impact in
increasing banks’ credit risk, as perceived by markets participants.
Second, DVA is included in taxable income. Hence, due to tax-function convexity, DVA’s
impact in increasing volatility in taxable income increases the present value of expected tax
liabilities (Smith and Stulz [1985], Graham and Smith [1999]). Consequently, given DVA’s
strong impact on earnings (Section 1, Figure 1), tax concerns give banks incentives to hedge
DVA. As stated by the risk manager of a US bank, “I don’t care about truth in accounting
rules. I have to use it [DVA], it goes into my reports, I’m charged tax on it—and that makes
it real” (Carver [2012a]). Due to its inclusion in taxable income, DVA is relevant for banks
despite its lack of economic substance.
Absent tax-function convexity, DVA would have no effect on the present value of expected
tax liabilities. DVA gains would increase tax liabilities by the amount of the gain multiplied
by the marginal tax rate, while DVA losses would reduce tax liabilities by the amount of the
loss multiplied by the marginal tax rate. Hence, DVA would be tax-neutral, in expectation.
When taxable income is beneath zero before DVA losses, however, or when DVA losses drive
taxable income beneath zero, DVA losses do not reduce taxable income by the amount of the
losses multiplied by the marginal tax rate. While these outcomes would result in tax benefits
(net-operating-loss carryforwards) that could offset future tax liabilities, banks could not use
these benefits until future periods. Consequently, on a per-dollar basis, the present value of
these benefits is less than the present value of the taxes banks always pay on DVA gains. In
this respect, DVA increases the present value of expected tax liabilities.
3.4.3 DVA Hedging: Distress Costs
Banks hedge DVA by going long other banks’ credit (Section 4.1). This approach to hedging
raises distress costs. In good states, banks’ credit risk falls, leading to gains on DVA hedges.
In good states, however, capital and liquidity are abundant, and banks’ earnings and balance
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sheets are strong. Distress costs thus are low even apart from these gains. Hence, these gains
have minimal scope to reduce distress costs. In bad states, banks’ credit risk rises, leading to
losses on DVA hedges. In bad states, even apart from these losses, losses reduce capital, and
asset quality declines. Exposure to other banks leads to even larger losses and a larger decline
in asset quality, amplifying banks’ distress. Due to this asymmetric impact on distress costs,
DVA hedging increases these costs, in expectation.
Distressed banks are subject to a “wholesale run”—a loss of access to wholesale funding,
uninsured funding most global banks rely heavily on, particularly on the margin (Carpenter
and Demiralp [2010], Disyatat [2011]). Wholesale runs can force banks to liquidate assets at
a distressed, fire-sale price. In a perfect-market setting, without frictions, a bank can always
sell assets at their fundamentals-based price. In this setting, forced liquidations are costless.
Most of banks’ assets, however, are illiquid and are traded in markets that have only a small
number of traders, such as hedge funds (e.g., Blundell-Wignall [2007]). Consequently, banks
have a small pool of buyers even in normal times. Also, during periods of systemic distress,
aggregate capital is low (Shleifer and Vishny [1992]. Hence, prospective buyers can pay only
a low, below-fundamentals price. Selling at these low prices imposes costs on banks. Duffie
[2010] and Huang and Ratnovski [2011] illustrate how wholesale runs can arise.
Wholesale runs have imposed large costs on banks in the 2007–8 crisis and in the ongoing
European crisis. Wholesale runs were vital to the demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Broth-
ers (Acharya and O¨ncu¨ [2010]). Even in less extreme settings, wholesale runs have generated
costs by forcing banks to sell assets or even to exit entire lines of business. Between end-May
and end-November 2011, for instance, US money-market funds cut by 89 percent their ex-
posure to French banks and shifted their remaining exposures toward shorter maturities and
secured lending (Fitch [2011a, 2011b]). Due in part to this run, French banks have exited or
reduced scale in areas that rely on dollar funding despite previously being among the most
active banks in certain of these areas, such as trade finance (see, e.g., HSBC [2011]).
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3.4.4 DVA Hedging, Moral Hazard, and Systemic Risk
In a world with no frictions, banks would internalize in full the distress costs of DVA hedging.
Moral hazard, however, prevents banks from doing so. The public sector—central banks and
governments—cannot commit ex ante not to support banks ex post, once a crisis hits, leading
to moral hazard. As a result, banks assume more risk ex ante (e.g., Bhattacharya, Boot, and
Thakor [1998]). At a minimum, banks can borrow from their central bank’s discount window.
Throughout the 2007–8 crisis and the ongoing European crisis, public-sector support has far
exceeded this minimum. Consequently, the prospect of public-sector support during a crisis
reduces distress costs in general. With respect to wholesale runs in particular, central-bank
liquidity gives banks access to an alternative funding source. Hence, banks hit by a wholesale
run do not necessarily have to sell assets at a below-fundamentals, fire-sale price.
Regulators have an interest in curbing DVA hedging. Given that banks do not internalize
in full the distress costs of DVA hedging, banks likely will do too much DVA hedging—take
too much exposure to other banks—compared to the social optimum. Furthermore, public-
sector support and the moral hazard that results are particularly acute vis-a´-vis systemically
important, “too big to fail” banks. These banks are the class of banks DVA and DVA hedging
are most relevant for. In hedging DVA, these banks take more exposure to other global banks,
tightening the links between these banks. In this respect, DVA increases systemic risk, giving
regulators an especially strong reason to limit its practice.
3.5 Model
3.5.1 Preliminaries
I have two goals in this model: to show that DVA can induce banks to take long positions in
other banks’ credit and to show that regulators can discourage DVA hedging by imposing a
higher capital charge on positions that increase banks’ exposure to other banks. Banks max-
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imize returns on capital (equity), driven in part by the probability that wholesale creditors
roll over funding. I make four essential assumptions.
(1) Banks’ assets are financed by uninsured wholesale debt that matures before their assets;
(2) DVA increases volatility in earnings, increasing expected tax liabilities;
(3) to blunt DVA’s impact in increasing earnings volatility, banks hedge DVA; and
(4) liquidating assets due to a loss of access to funding results in distress costs—for instance,
the cost of selling assets at a below-fundamentals price.
To simplify the exposition, I assume earnings are equivalent to taxable income. Also, I take as
exogenous banks’ derivatives and the resulting DVA on derivative liabilities, consistent with
the substantively exogenous nature of the derivatives global banks use in market-making.
I specify the model so that DVA’s only role is to raise earnings volatility. More specifically,
I assume that DVA is excluded from post-tax earnings available to shareholders and also that
creditors ignore DVA when deciding whether to roll over funds (when assessing banks’ credit
risk). DVA is a pure accounting exposure that lacks economic substance, in that DVA has no
cash-flow implications. A DVA gain does not mean that banks can pay less on their derivative
liabilities6; a DVA loss does not mean that banks must pay more. Banks’ obligations on these
liabilities are independent of—are not affected by—DVA. Hence, tax effects aside, DVA gains
and losses have no direct impact on the cash available to give to shareholders or to pay back
creditors. I thus specify the model so that DVA’s only impact relates to its tax effects.
Banks balance the tax benefits against the distress costs of DVA hedging, where distress
costs are modeled as having to liquidate assets at a below-fundamentals price should creditors
pull funding. I build a baseline model and two extensions, as outlined below:
6 Technically, a DVA gain implies that banks are less likely to pay out on their derivative liabilities, but
banks realize this benefit only upon defaulting. In this model, I exclude this possible outcome.
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(1) In my baseline model, banks internalize in full the distress costs of DVA hedging, public-
sector support is ruled out, and capital is taken as a constant.
(2) In my first extension, banks have some probability of getting public-sector support should
private-sector creditors pull funding. The prospect of this support reduces distress costs.
Capital is taken as a constant.
(3) In my second extension, banks have some probability of public-sector support, if required.
Capital is an endogenous function of how much exposure banks take to other banks, with
positions that increase banks’ exposure requiring more capital.
In (3), the punitive capital charge reduces DVA hedging. This effect rests on the assumption
that banks maximize returns on capital, not returns, in violation of Modigliani-Miller (MM).
MM’s relevance for banks is a controversial subject. Bolton and Freixas [2006], for instance,
argue that information asymmetries that increase the cost of equity could lead to a violation
of MM, while Admati et al. [2011] argue that MM largely applies. Regardless, banks operate
as if holding more equity capital is costly. In light of Basel III’s tougher capital requirements,
for instance, the capital charge of a position has a large effect on banks’ investment decisions
(see, e.g., Wood [2012]).7 Hence, requiring more capital against positions that result in more
exposure to other banks likely would discourage banks from taking such positions.
3.5.2 Set-Up
This model consists of five dates, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and banks that maximize post-tax returns
on capital. The timeline is as follows (see Figure 2):
7 Along similar lines, banks almost invariably target returns on equity. Credit Suisse CEO Brady Dougan,
for instance, highlighted Credit Suisse’s return on equity of 15 percent when going through the bank’s 2012Q3
earnings (Scha¨fer and Shotter [2012]). As a result, assuming that banks maximize returns on equity is useful
in focusing on a performance metric most banks place heavy weight on.
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• At time 0, banks are endowed with A in assets (e.g., loans, securities), D in derivatives,
and H in a hedging security used to blunt D’s impact on earnings.
A matures at time 4 and is financed fully by wholesale liabilities that mature at time 3.
Holding A to maturity yields earnings of pi. Having to sell A at time 3 yields earnings
of φ < pi.
For simplicity, all of D are derivative liabilities, and earnings on D are a result only of
changes in own-credit risk. D thus represents DVA. A rise in own-credit risk results in
a gain on D; a decline, in a loss.
H can be seen as a CDS on which the bank is the protection seller and another bank (or
group of banks) is the reference entity; H can be seen also as another bank’s bond. To
simplify, I suppress the impact of H on earnings and focus solely on its role in hedging.
Assuming credit-risk measures (e.g., CDS spreads) follow a martingale process, so that
the expected value tomorrow is same as the actual value today, H’s expected earnings
are zero. Hence, suppressing earnings on H does not omit anything of substance.
Banks haveK in capital. At first, K is fixed and exogenous, but in my second extension,
I make K an endogenous function of σDH , the covariance between earnings on D and
H. To simplify the exposition, I stipulate that σDH < 0.
• At time 1, banks select σDH . D is akin to a short position in own-credit risk. Hence, as
σDH becomes lower (more negative), H becomes closer to a long position in own-credit
risk. Earnings on H thus have a stronger positive link with changes in other banks’
credit—a given decline in other banks’ credit risk results in a larger gain, while a given
rise leads to a larger loss. Consequently, as σDH becomes lower, banks effectively have
more exposure to other banks.
• At time 2, a shock hits the economy—for instance, a housing-price decline, or a change
in corporate credit risk. This shock impacts every bank in the same way (qualitatively).
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Negative shocks result in a gain on D and a loss on H; positive shocks, in a loss on D
and a gain on H.
• At time 3, banks refinance A. Private-sector creditors roll over funding with probability
0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Conditional on the private sector withdrawing funds, public-sector entities
provide support with probability 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. As a consequence, the probability of being
cut off from private- and public-sector funding is [1− p] [1− q].
Public-sector support can be viewed as, for instance, expanded central-bank liquidity
facilities.
Losing access to both private- and public-sector funding forces banks to liquidate A at
a fire-sale price, yielding earnings of φ < pi. pi− φ is the distress costs of having to sell
assets at a below-fundamentals price.
In deciding whether to refinance, private-sector creditors focus on A and H. If the time-
2 shock is positive, A is seen as “high-quality.” As a result, creditors have no reason to
pull funds. Hence, gains on H are redundant in inducing creditors to refinance. If the
time-2 shock is negative, A is viewed as “low-quality.” Creditors thus have incentives to
pull funds. Losses on H amplify these incentives. Due to these asymmetric outcomes,
a decline in σDH effectively increases p. As discussed above, creditors ignore D (DVA)
when deciding whether to roll over funding.
• At time 4, banks that maintain access to funding collect pi in earnings on A. Thereafter,
banks pay taxes on either pi or φ and distribute to shareholders post-tax earnings.
Letting T and V denote the effective tax rate and returns on capital, banks’ problem is
max
σDH
V ≡ [pi [p+ q − pq] + φ [1− p] [1− q]] [1− T ]
K
. (3.1)
Breaking down (1),
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Figure 2: Model Timeline
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• p = p (σDH), where p () is increasing and concave in σDH . A decline in σDH increases
exposure to other banks, reducing the probability that creditors roll over funding. p ()’s
concavity reflects diminishing returns to increasing σDH in increasing p.
• T = T (σDH), where T () is increasing and convex in σDH . A decline in σDH reduces
D’s net effect on earnings, reducing volatility in earnings and thus in taxable income.
Hence, banks’ effective tax rates fall, increasing post-tax earnings for any given amount
of pre-tax earnings. The convexity of T () reflects diminishing returns to reducing σDH
in reducing T .8
• K = K (σDH), where K () is decreasing in σDH .9 When σDH is lower, banks have more
exposure to other banks. As a consequence, a decline in σDH forces banks to hold more
capital against H in the models in which K is endogenous.10
As a consequence, hedging DVA—choosing a lower σDH—is beneficial in reducing banks’ tax
liabilities but is costly in increasing the odds that private-sector creditors withdraw funds. In
8 T ()’s convexity means that when σDH is “high,” a marginal change in σDH has a stronger impact on T
than when σDH is “low.” As a result, when σDH is high, a marginal decline in σDH has a stronger impact in
reducing T . As banks reduce σDH , the marginal impact of a decline in σDH in reducing T becomes smaller.
Hence, marginal declines in σDH have diminishing returns in reducing T .
9 I assume that K () is linear in σDH , so that a marginal change in σDH has the same effect on K regardless
of σDH ’s value prior to this change.
10 For simplicity, I suppress banks’ cost of funding. In my second extension, an increase in K is harmful in
reducing post-tax returns on capital for any given amount of post-tax earnings. An increase in K, however,
reduces leverage, implying less credit risk. Hence, banks’ cost of funding likely would fall, increasing post-tax
earnings. I suppress this effect, with the implicit assumption that this effect is not large enough to offset the
adverse effect of lower post-tax returns on capital for any given amount of post-tax returns.
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addition, when K is endogenous, a decline in σDH increases K, reducing returns on capital
for any given amount of post-tax returns.
3.5.3 Results
Baseline Model: No Public-Sector Support, Constant Capital
In this section, I solve for banks’ equilibrium hedging choice in my baseline model, in which
K is constant and q = 0, so that public-sector support is ruled out. Differentiating (1) with
respect to σDH yields the first-order necessary and second-order sufficient conditions below,
where the σ sub-script denotes a partial derivative with respect to σDH :
∂V
∂σDH
=
pσ () [pi − φ] [1− T ()]− Tσ () [pip () + φ [1− p ()]]
K
= 0 (3.2)
∂2V
∂σ2DH
=
pσσ () [[pi − φ] [1− T ()]]2 − 2pσ () [pi − φ]Tσ ()− Tσσ () [[pip () + φ [1− p ()]]]2
K
< 0. (3.3)
Re-arranging (2),
pσ () [pi − φ] [1− T ()]
K
=
Tσ () [pip () + φ [1− p ()]]
K
. (3.4)
In (4), the left-hand side is the impact of a marginal fall in σDH in reducing p, the probability
creditors roll over funds, multiplied by the fall in post-tax earnings due to having to liquidate
A should creditors pull funds. The right-hand side is the effect of a marginal decline in σDH
in reducing the effective tax rate, T , multiplied by pre-tax earnings. In this situation, taking
more exposure never is strictly costless, in that a rise in exposure always lowers the likelihood
that creditors roll over funding. Banks choose σDH so as to equate the distress costs and tax
benefits of a marginal fall in σDH . Since
∂2V
∂σ2DH
< 0, this choice is a maximum.
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Extended Model: Public-Sector Support, Constant Capital
In this section, K is again held constant, but q > 0, so that public-sector support is possible.
Differentiating (1) with respect to σDH yields the first- and second-order conditions
∂V
∂σDH
=
pσ () [1− q] [pi − φ] [1− T ()]− Tσ () [pi [p () + q − p () q] + φ [1− p ()] [1− q]]
K
= 0 (3.5)
∂2V
∂σ2DH
=
α
K
< 0 (3.6)
α = pσσ () [[1− q] [pi − φ] [1− T ()]]2 − 2pσ () [1− q] [pi − φ]Tσ ()
− Tσσ () [pi [p () + q − p () q] + φ [1− p ()] [1− q]]2 < 0.
Re-arranging (5),
pσ () [1− q] [pi − φ] [1− T ()]
K
=
Tσ () [pi [p () + q − p () q] + φ [1− p ()] [1− q]]
K
(3.7)
(7) differs from (4) only through its inclusion of q. Hence, (7) has the same interpretation as
(4)—(7)’s left- and right-hand sides capture the distress costs and tax benefits of a marginal
fall in σDH . In equilibrium, banks choose σDH so as to equate these costs and benefits. The
second-order condition (6) is negative. Consequently, banks’ equilibrium choice of σDH is a
maximum.
Allowing for public-sector support, so that q > 0, has a large effect on the trade-offs DVA
hedging involves. In the extreme, with q = 1, so that public-sector support is certain should
private-sector creditors pull funding, the left–hand side of (7) becomes
pσ () [1− 1] [pi − φ] [1− T ()]
K
=
0
K
= 0.
Hence, in equilibrium, choosing a lower σDH is costless. A fall in σDH reduces the probability
that private-sector creditors roll over funds, but the guarantee of public-sector support makes
banks indifferent to this effect; banks can always replace private-sector funding with public-
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sector funding. Hence, banks’ equilibrium choice of σDH is a corner solution, in that banks
set σDH as low as possible—maximize their exposure to other banks—so as to minimize T .
More generally, the prospect of public-sector support leads banks to choose a lower σDH—
to take more exposure to other banks. Comparing the right-hand sides of (7) and (4),
public-sector support︷ ︸︸ ︷
Tσ () [pi [p () + q − p () q] + φ [1− p ()] [1− q]]
K
>
no public-sector support︷ ︸︸ ︷
Tσ () [pip () + φ [1− p ()]]
K
.
In equilibrium, the rise in tax benefits due to a marginal decline in σDH is higher with public-
sector support than without. Public-sector support reduces the odds banks have to sell A at
time 3. Hence, pre-tax earnings rise, increasing the tax savings due to a marginal fall in T .
As a result, to satisfy the first-order conditions (5) and (2), the rise in distress costs due to
a marginal decline in σDH must be higher with public-sector support than without. Because
p () is concave, a marginal change in σDH has a larger effect on p when σDH is lower. A fall in
σDH thus has a larger effect in reducing p when σDH is lower. Consequently, in equilibrium,
banks choose a lower σDH with public-sector support.
Extended Model: Public-Sector Support, Endogenous Capital
In this section, q > 0, so that public-sector support is allowed, and K is a decreasing function
of σDH , so that a lower σDH increases K. Endogenous K can be regarded as a punitive capital
charge regulators impose against positions that increase banks’ exposure to other banks.11
11 One alternative set-up would be to make K an increasing function of risk-weighted assets and to stipulate
that a lower σDH increases the risk-weighting factor of H. Consequently, a lower σDH would increase the
risk-weighted assets on a given quantity of H; this rise in risk-weighted assets, in turn, would require more
capital. This approach yields identical results but makes the notation more burdensome.
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Differentiating (1) with respect to σDH yields the first- and second-order conditions
12
∂V
∂σDH
=
β
K ()2
= 0 (3.8)
β ≡ K () [pσ () [1− q] [pi − φ] [1− T ()]
− Tσ () [pi [p () + q − p () q] + φ [1− p ()] [1− q]]]
−Kσ () [pi [p () + q − p () q] + φ [1− p ()] [1− q]] [1− T ()]
∂2V
∂σ2DH
=
α
K ()
< 0, (3.9)
where α < 0 is the same as in Section 5.3.2. Re-arranging,
pσ () [1− q] [pi − φ] [1− T ()]
K ()
− γ = Tσ () [pi [p () + q − p () q] + φ [1− p ()] [1− q]]
K ()
(3.10)
γ ≡ Kσ () [pi [p () + q − p () q] + φ [1− p ()] [1− q]] [1− T ()]
K ()2
< 0.
In (10), the first left-hand-side term and the right-hand side capture the impact of a marginal
fall in σDH in increasing, respectively, distress costs and tax benefits. These costs and benefits
are the same as those in Section 5.3.2, where public-sector support is possible but capital is
taken as a constant.
(10) differs from (7) via the inclusion of γ. γ captures the impact of a marginal decline in
σDH in forcing banks to hold more capital. This rise in capital reduces post-tax returns on
capital for any given amount of post-tax earnings. In sum, a marginal fall in σDH increases
tax benefits, forces banks to hold more capital, and possibly increases distress costs, with the
magnitude of this effect depending on q. In equilibrium, banks choose σDH so as to equate
the first effect with the sum of the second and third. Even when distress costs are zero (i.e.,
q = 1), a marginal decline in σDH forces banks to hold more capital. As a result, as opposed
12 The second-order condition (9) should include in the denominator also a second term, −2K ()Kσ ()β.
The first-order condition (8), however, implies β = 0, in equilibrium. Hence, I drop this term from (9).
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Fig. 3.2: Equilibrium Choices of σDH—Constant v. Endogenous Capital
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“EQ1” is σDH ’s equilibrium value when capital is constant. “EQ2” is σDH ’s equilibrium value
when capital is a decreasing function of σDH .
to the set-up with constant K, a marginal decline in σDH never is costless.
The impact of γ—of forcing banks to hold more capital when σDH is lower—leads banks
to choose a higher σDH relative to a setting with constant K. Hence, banks take less exposure
to other banks, in equilibrium. In Figure 2, “EQ1” and “EQ2” denote the equilibrium value
of σDH when capital is, respectively, a constant and a decreasing function of σDH . Requiring
banks to hold more capital when σDH is more negative pushes to the right the marginal-cost
curve. This rightward shift makes less negative the value of σDH at which the marginal-cost
and marginal-benefit curves intersect. Consequently, in equilibrium, σDH is less negative, so
that banks are less exposed to other banks.
Implications
My model’s results have two main implications. First, due to moral hazard, banks likely will
do too much DVA hedging relative to the social optimum—global banks will take too much
exposure to other global banks, increasing systemic risk. The primary cost of DVA hedging
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is distress costs. In bad states, losses on hedges would amplify banks’ distress. Hence, banks
would face higher odds of a wholesale run, among other undesirable outcomes. Expectations
of public-sector support mitigate this concern. A bank, for instance, might expect its central
bank to establish special liquidity facilities should a crisis occur, reducing funding pressure.
In addition, expectations of public-sector support are strongest for the global, systemically
important banks most relevant to DVA. These banks are especially unlikely to internalize in
full the distress costs of DVA hedging.
Second, regulators can can limit DVA hedging by imposing a punitive capital charge on
positions that expose banks to other banks’ credit. Due to the excessive DVA hedging that
results from moral hazard and the rise in systemic risk that results, regulators have incentives
to reduce its practice. A punitive capital charge would impose non-trivial costs on banks. To
keep the same capital ratio, banks would have to increase capital, putting downward pressure
on returns on capital, or reduce risk-weighted assets—by, for instance, selling assets, which
likely would harm banks’ earning power. Alternatively, banks could maintain a lower capital
ratio, which would risk inducing a negative reaction from regulators and market participants.
None of these options are attractive. Either way, banks’ equilibrium choice of σDH is higher
than when K is constant. As a result, banks are less exposed to other banks.
3.6 Conclusion
For large, global banks, DVA is akin to an exogenously imposed short position in own-credit
risk that can have a strong impact in increasing earnings volatility. Tax concerns give banks
incentives to hedge DVA so as to mitigate this rise in volatility. Global banks do so by going
long other global banks’ credit. Hence, DVA hedging tightens the link between global banks,
increasing systemic risk. I show that moral hazard likely will induce global banks to do too
much DVA hedging—to take too much exposure to other global banks—relative to the social
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optimum. Regulators thus have incentives to reduce DVA hedging. In this vein, I show that
regulators can reduce DVA hedging by imposing a punitive capital charge on positions that
expose banks to other banks.
Appendix
The FR Y9-C mnemonics corresponding to the data I show are as follows:
Item Mnemonic Table
Total Assets BHCK2170 Tables 1, 3
Trading Derivatives BHCKA126–A127, BHCK8723–8724 Table 1
Derivative Assets BHCM3543 Table 3
Derivative Liabilities BHCK3547 Tables 1, 3
DVA BHCKK094 Tables 1, 3
CVA BHCKK090 Table 3
Pre-Tax Income BHCK4300 Table 3
Net Exposure BHCKG418–G422 Table 4
Cash Collateral BHCKG423–G432 Table 4
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ABSTRACT
I examine whether banks engage in balance-sheet management (BSM) to improve their
reported financial ratios (e.g., capital ratios). I argue that large banks’ business models
give these banks stronger incentives to do so and that BSM in assets has a larger effect
in improving banks’ financial ratios than does BSM in liabilities. Consistent with these
arguments, for large banks, weaker financial ratios lead to more BSM in assets but not in
liabilities; for other banks, weaker financial ratios do not lead to more BSM in either assets
or liabilities. These results suggest that large banks use BSM in assets to improve their
reported financial ratios.
4.1 Introduction
During the 2007–8 financial crisis, Lehman Brothers used its “Repo 105” program to cut its
reported leverage (Valukas [2010], Vol. 4).1 In light of Repo 105, balance-sheet management
(BSM) by financial institutions has drawn regulatory attention. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), for instance, sent 24 financial institutions a “Dear CFO” letter regarding
their use of reverse repurchase agreements (repo). Banks can use BSM to give a temporary
boost to financial ratios that are based on positions at quarter-end, a´ la Lehman and Repo
105. Consequently, banks can use BSM to report financial ratios that are stronger than those
maintained during the quarter, in between reporting dates.
I focus on whether banks use BSM to strengthen their reported financial ratios. By BSM,
I mean reducing assets and liabilities at quarter-end relative to average assets and liabilities
during the quarter. I focus separately on BSM by large banks and on BSM by small and mid-
size banks (“other banks”). Due to differences in business models, large banks have stronger
incentives to use BSM to strengthen their reported financial ratios. Large banks have weaker
financial ratios, rely more on wholesale (i.e., uninsured) debt, and have stronger incentives to
maintain a high credit rating. These differences strengthen large banks’ incentives to engage
in financial-ratio-driven BSM (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4 for more).
My two main findings are as follows: First, for large banks, weaker financial ratios induce
more BSM in assets. A fall in regulatory capital ratios and a rise in raw leverage (in contrast
with regulatory leverage; see below) are linked with a larger fall in quarter-end assets relative
to average assets during the quarter. Furthermore, this link between lower capital ratios and
more BSM in assets is larger when banks have less capital and have assets whose disposal has
a stronger effect in increasing capital ratios. These results suggest that large banks respond
1 In Repo 105, right before quarter-end, Lehman entered into reverse repurchase agreements, moved off-
balance-sheet the assets used as collateral, and used the cash obtained to retire debt. Lehman reversed this
sequence of transactions at the start of the next quarter. Hence, Lehman effectively used Repo 105 to reduce
its reported size and leverage relative to its size and leverage during the quarter.
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to weaker financial ratios by using BSM in assets to strengthen these ratios. For other banks,
capital ratios and raw leverage have no effect on BSM in assets.
Second, for large banks, weaker financial ratios do not consistently give rise to more BSM
in liabilities. Higher raw leverage is linked with more BSM in short-term liabilities (fed funds
purchased plus reverse repo) but with less BSM in “other borrowings” (see Section 4.1 for a
definition). Also, higher raw leverage has no effect on BSM in short-term liabilities and other
borrowings, taken together. Short-term liabilities have short durations, often overnight, and
are seen as a relatively risky type of debt. Consequently, a rise in raw leverage and the rise in
credit risk that results could lead banks to report less of this relatively high-risk type of debt
and more relatively low-risk debt, such as other borrowings, with no effect on end-of-quarter
total liabilities. Consistent with this notion, BSM in short-term liabilities and BSM in other
borrowings have a negative link—a larger drop in end-of-quarter short-term liabilities implies
a larger increase in end-of-quarter other borrowings. For other banks, weaker financial ratios
do not induce more BSM in either short-term liabilities or other borrowings.
In addition, I examine the effect of regulatory leverage on BSM. Regulatory capital ratios
and raw leverage are based on end-of-quarter assets, whereas regulatory leverage is based on
average assets during the quarter. As a result, BSM in assets has a larger effect in improving
capital ratios and raw leverage than in improving regulatory leverage. Consequently, banks
have stronger incentives to use BSM to improve their capital ratios and raw leverage. In line
with this argument, for large banks, regulatory leverage does not affect BSM in assets. This
result differs from the findings that lower capital ratios and higher raw leverage induce more
BSM in assets.
These results have two main implications. First, large banks use BSM in assets to improve
their reported financial ratios. These results do not indicate banks have used Repo 105-like
programs. Lehman cut its reported (i.e., quarter-end) leverage relative to its average leverage
during the quarter by accounting for reverse repos as true sales and using the cash from these
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transactions to retire debt. Banks could generate the same balance-sheet and financial-ratio
effects via transaction timing or similar methods—by, for instance, selling assets right before
quarter-end and buying similar assets early in the next quarter. These results, however, have
similar implications: Banks with weak financial ratios can use BSM to improve the reported
quarter-end value of these ratios relative to their average value during the quarter.
Second, focusing on regulatory ratios and financial ratios more generally that use average
assets, not end-of-quarter assets, could reduce BSM in assets. Banks are opaque institutions
(Morgan [2002]) with much flexibility in carrying out transactions. Regulatory capital ratios
use assets at the end of the quarter. As a result, disposing of assets at quarter-end is an easy
way for banks to improve these ratios. Regulatory leverage, by contrast, uses average assets
during the quarter. Hence, disposing of assets at quarter-end has little effect on regulatory
leverage. My results suggest that for large banks, capital ratios have a large effect in inducing
BSM in assets, whereas regulatory leverage has little effect in doing so. Consequently, more
regulatory emphasis on regulatory leverage, or on any ratio that uses average positions during
the quarter, could discourage BSM by large banks.
The rest of this paper is as follows: Related literature is in Section 2. In Section 3, I go
over banks’ main financial ratios, how BSM affects these ratios, and banks’ incentives to use
BSM to improve these ratios; I also discuss why large banks have more incentives to use BSM
to improve these ratios. My empirical tests’ set-up is in Section 4. Results are in Section 5.
Concluding remarks are in Section 6. Supplemental information is in the appendix.
4.2 Related Literature
The notion that banks use BSM to improve their financial ratios rests on two premises. First,
reporting strong financial ratios is important enough for banks to take steps to improve these
ratios. Many studies find that banks do so, especially with respect to their regulatory capital
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ratios. Lower capital ratios are linked with fewer charge-offs on loans (Beatty, Chamberlain,
and Magliolo [1995], Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen [1995]) and with more “gains trading,”
where banks boost capital by selling at a gain assets whose price has increased (Moyer [1990],
Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson [1990]). Furthermore, Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas [1999] find
that banks use loan-loss provisions to manage their capital ratios.
Second, BSM is useful in strengthening banks’ reported financial ratios and balance sheets
more generally. BSM has a long history. In the late 19th century, British banks used BSM to
report in their financial statements high cash balances relative to their average cash balances
during the quarter (Capie and Webber [1985], p. 266]). Empirically, previous studies find that
financial institutions use BSM, or window-dressing, to disclose higher-quality assets. Pension
funds, for instance, sell poorly performing stocks prior to their year-end sponsor evaluations
(Lakonishok et al. [1991]); institutional investors do the same before their required year-end
portfolio disclosures (He, Ng, and Wang [2004]). Also, Musto [1999] finds that money-market
mutual funds that invest in both government and private paper hold more of the former and
less of the latter around disclosure dates than at other times during the year.
For banks in particular, Allen and Saunders [1992] find that end-of-quarter assets exceed
average assets, suggesting that banks report higher-than-normal assets at quarter-end. Allen
and Saunders, however, look mainly at whether banks do engage in BSM, without examining
what drives banks (e.g., financial-ratio concerns) to do so. In addition, Kotomin and Winters
[2006] argue that these results are due to customer-driven behavior and thus do not capture
explicit BSM by banks. Most closely connected to this study, Yang and Shafer [2010] focus
on BSM in assets, while Owens and Wu [2011] focus on BSM in liabilities. Yang and Shafer
find mixed evidence of a link between capital ratios and BSM in assets; Owens and Wu find
a link between higher leverage and more BSM in short-term liabilities.
Most fundamentally, this study differs from Yang and Shafer [2010] and Owens and Wu
[2011] in examining separately BSM by large banks and BSM by other banks. Large banks’
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business models increase these banks’ incentives to use BSM to improve their financial ratios.
Consequently, focusing on BSM among all banks, taken together, risks overlooking differences
among types of banks in financial-ratio-driven BSM. Also, with respect to liability-side BSM,
I examine BSM in both short-term liabilities and other borrowings, whereas Owens and Wu
focus on BSM solely in short-term liabilities. Examining BSM in both short-term liabilities
and other borrowings allows for a closer look at liability-side BSM—at whether, for instance,
weaker financial ratios lead banks to report at quarter-end fewer liabilities in general or more
of one type of liability and less of another.
4.3 Institutional Details
4.3.1 Banks, Regulatory Ratios, and Raw Leverage
In this section, I go through the details of banks’ financial ratios. Three of the main ratios of
United States (US) banks are regulatory capital ratios, regulatory leverage, and raw leverage.
These ratios are calculated as follows2:
Tier 1 capital ratio (total capital ratio) =
Tier 1 capital (total capital)
risk-weighted assets
regulatory leverage =
Tier 1 capital
regulatory average assets
raw leverage =
raw total assets
balance-sheet equity
.
In evaluating banks, regulators focus on capital ratios and regulatory leverage, classifying as
“well-capitalized” banks that have a Tier 1 capital ratio, a total capital ratio, and regulatory
leverage of at least six percent, 10 percent, and five percent, respectively. Regulators give no
formal attention to raw leverage. Anecdotally, market participants (e.g., wholesale creditors,
2 Regulatory average assets excludes certain intangible assets (e.g., goodwill). Also, Tier 1 capital includes
only core capital (e.g., retained earnings); total capital includes a wider range of capital (e.g., subordinated
debt). FDIC [1992] has more information on the use of these ratios in regulating banks.
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credit-rating agencies) tend to focus on capital ratios and raw leverage.
With respect to BSM, these ratios have two key features. First, regulatory capital ratios
and raw leverage are based on assets at quarter-end, whereas regulatory leverage uses average
assets during the quarter. Ignoring differences across ratios in how assets are defined, suppose
a bank has on days 1, 2, and 3 assets of 120, 110, and 70: For capital ratios and raw leverage,
its assets are 70, its day-3 assets, while for regulatory leverage, its assets are 100, its average
assets over these three days. Hence, BSM—reducing assets at quarter-end relative to average
assets during the quarter—has a smaller impact on regulatory leverage than on capital ratios
and raw leverage.
Second, regulatory capital ratios are based on risk-weighted assets, not on total raw assets.
Each asset has a risk-weighting factor that depends on its risk; riskier assets have higher risk-
weights and thus count more toward risk-weighted assets. The risk-weighted equivalent of an
asset is its book value multiplied by its risk-weight. US Treasuries, US Agency securities, and
corporate bonds, for instance, have risk-weights of zero percent, 20 percent, and 100 percent.3
Hence, risk-weighted assets for 100 notional of Treasuries, Agencies, and corporates are zero,
20, and 100. Consequently, disposing of assets with a higher risk-weight has a larger effect in
reducing risk-weighted assets, putting more upward pressure on banks’ capital ratios. Sales
of Treasuries, for instance, do not affect risk-weighted assets at all, whereas selling corporate
bonds lowers risk-weighted assets on a dollar-for-dollar basis (i.e., by $1 for each dollar sold).
When I examine BSM in assets, I exploit variation in risk-weights.
4.3.2 The Financial-Ratio Effects of BSM
In this section, building on the discussion above, I go over how shedding assets and liabilities
at quarter-end affects banks’ regulatory ratios and raw leverage.
Capital Ratios
3 See http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/422020.pdf, Section 120B.7.
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• With respect to assets, capital ratios are based on end-of-quarter risk-weighted assets.
Most of banks’ assets have a non-zero risk-weight. Hence, disposing of assets at quarter-
end generally reduces risk-weighted assets, increasing capital ratios.
• With respect to liabilities, in retiring debt, cash is the only asset removed from banks’
balance sheets.4 Cash has a zero-percent risk-weight. Consequently, reducing liabilities
at quarter-end has no effect on capital ratios.
Regulatory Leverage
• With respect to assets, regulatory leverage is based on average regulatory assets during
the quarter, not on end-of-quarter assets. Consequently, reducing assets at quarter-end
has little effect on regulatory leverage.
• With respect to liabilities, retiring debt reduces cash. Cash is part of the asset base of
regulatory leverage, but regulatory leverage is based on average assets. Hence, reducing
liabilities at quarter-end has a limited impact on regulatory leverage.
Raw Leverage
• With respect to assets, raw leverage is based on total raw assets at quarter-end. Hence,
in general, reducing assets at quarter-end reduces raw leverage.
• With respect to liabilities, using cash to retire debt reduces total raw assets, reducing
raw leverage.
In sum, BSM in assets can have a strong impact in improving capital ratios and raw leverage
but not regulatory leverage. Liability-side BSM can have a strong impact in improving raw
leverage but not capital ratios or regulatory leverage.
4 Notably, reducing even reverse repos has no effect on capital ratios. To a first approximation, the proper
accounting for a reverse repo is to debit cash and to credit short-term liabilities; upon terminating a reverse
repo, the reverse entry is made. The assets used as collateral stay on banks’ balance sheets. Hence, changes
in reverse repos have no impact on any asset-side accounts except cash. Cash has a zero-percent risk-weight.
As a result, changes in reverse repos do not affect capital ratios.
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4.3.3 Incentives to Use BSM
In this section, I detail banks’ incentives to improve their financial ratios via BSM. Banks face
discipline from two sources: regulators and market participants. With respect to regulators,
government support (e.g., deposit insurance) can give rise to moral hazard, inducing banks to
assume more risk (Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor [1998]). Banking regulators can mitigate
this problem by, among other tactics, imposing capital and leverage requirements on banks
and imposing sanctions on banks that fail to satisfy these requirements. In 2011, for instance,
the Federal Reserve deemed First Chicago Bank & Trust “significantly undercapitalized” and
forced First Chicago either to raise equity or to sell itself.5 Reporting weak regulatory ratios
increases the odds of these and other regulatory sanctions.
With respect to market participants, two dynamics give banks incentives to report strong
financial ratios. First, the wholesale and interbank markets are important sources of funding
for (large) banks, especially on the margin (Carpenter and Demiralp [2010], Disyatat [2011]).
Wholesale and interbank debt is not government-insured. As a result, in these markets, credit
risk matters, even in secured-lending markets (e.g., the repo market), wherein borrowers must
post collateral (Copeland, Martin, and Walker [2010], Fitch [2012]). Weaker financial ratios
imply higher credit risk, increasing the cost of or reducing access to wholesale and interbank
financing. Empirically, lower capital ratios are linked with higher bond yields (Hannan and
Hanweck [1988], Goyal [2005]).
In addition, financial ratios are important inputs in banks’ credit ratings.6 Credit ratings
matter, for two reasons. First, (large) banks make extensive use of derivatives. Credit-rating
downgrades can force banks to put up additional collateral to their derivative counterparties.
As of November 2011, for instance, a one-notch credit-rating downgrade would have required
Morgan Stanley to post another $1.29 billion in collateral (Campbell [2011]). Second, certain
5 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20110412a1.pdf.
6 See, for instance, http://www.fitchratings.com.cn/en/method_3_3.php.
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investors in the wholesale markets are prohibited from investing in firms whose credit rating
is below some threshold (e.g., investment grade). Weaker financial ratios imply higher credit
risk, increasing the odds of a credit-rating downgrade.
With respect to market participants, the notion that banks use BSM to strengthen their
financial ratios implies banks can “fool the market”—that reporting better quarter-end ratios
is seen in a positive way by, for instance, wholesale creditors, even if these ratios are stronger
than banks’ intra-quarter ratios and if creditors can infer this difference (using, for instance,
financial-statement information). What matters, however, is not whether banks can fool the
market but whether banks think they can do so. In Repo 105, for instance, one of Lehman’s
main aims was to avoid a credit-rating downgrade by reducing its reported leverage (Valukas
[2010]). As a result, as long as banks think that reporting stronger quarter-end ratios reduces
perceived credit risk, banks have incentives to use BSM to improve these ratios.7
4.3.4 Large Banks v. Other Banks
Three factors strengthen large banks’ incentives to use BSM to improve their financial ratios
compared to other banks. First, large banks have weaker financial ratios, particularly capital
ratios. During the 56 quarters from 1997Q1–2010Q4, the median quarterly weighted-average
Tier 1 ratio of the 30-largest banks was 8.3 percent, compared to 11.6 percent for other banks
(Figure 1, left y-axis). Second, large banks rely less on deposits and more on wholesale and
interbank funding, which is not government-insured. During 1997–2010, large banks’ median
quarterly weighted-average fraction of deposits in total liabilities was 50 percent, compared to
other banks’ deposit share of 80 percent (Figure 1, right y-axis). Hence, credit-risk concerns
are stronger for large banks. Third, large banks dominate derivative activity. In each quarter
during 1997–2010, large banks accounted for over 99 percent of the total derivatives of banks.
Consequently, the collateral calls that can result from a credit-rating downgrade are a bigger
7 In addition, market participants might regard quarter-end positions as more relevant going forward than
average positions during the quarter and thus give more weight to these positions.
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Fig. 4.1: Tier 1 Ratio and Deposit Share, Large Banks v. Other Banks
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“Large banks” are the 30-biggest banks in each different quarter, as measured by total assets.
“Other banks” are all other banks. Figures are on a weighted-average basis.
concern for large banks.
To be clear, these differences between large banks and other banks are driven primarily
by differences in operations and in business models, not by size per se. Most large banks, for
instance, have large market-making arms in addition to their lending arms, whereas smaller
banks focus primarily on lending. Hence, small banks whose operations are similar to those
of large banks would have stronger incentives to engage in financial-ratio-motivated BSM;
likewise, large banks whose operations are similar to those of small banks would have weaker
incentives to engage in financial-ratio-motivated BSM . In general, however, few small banks
operate in the same way as large banks, while most large banks operate in a similar way. As
a result, I divide my sample by size (see Section 4.2).
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4.4 Empirical Tests: Set-Up
4.4.1 Definition of BSM
I define BSM as reducing positions as of quarter-end relative to average positions during the
quarter. Using this definition, one important factor to consider is secular trends in positions.
Banks with weak capital ratios, for instance, could report low end-of-quarter assets in quarter
t relative to average assets in t due to a permanent reduction in assets, not to BSM. Hence, I
define BSM in assets as follows, where EOQASS is end-of-quarter total assets and AV GASS
is average total assets during the quarter:
BSMASSit =
EOQASSit − [AV GASSit+1 + AV GASSit] /2
[AV GASSit+1 + AV GASSit] /2
.
This definition is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Owens and Wu [2011]). I use the same
definition of BSM for two liability-side accounts. One is short-term liabilities, BSMSTL,
the sum of fed funds sold and reverse repos. The second is “other borrowings,” BSMOTH,
the sum of commercial paper and “other borrowed money”; other borrowed money includes,
inter alia, re-discounted notes and bills and borrowings on promissory notes.8 Also, I examine
BSM in short-term liabilities and other borrowings taken jointly, denoted by BSMLIAB.
A lower (more negative) value of BSMASS implies more BSM in assets, in that end-of-
quarter assets in quarter t are lower relative to the average of average assets in quarters t and
t+1. Defining BSMASS in this way is useful in capturing as BSM declines in end-of-quarter
assets that do not translate into lower average assets in the next quarter. Insofar as a bank
permanently reduces assets, BSMASS would imply little, if any, BSM. Suppose that a bank
has 100 in assets at the start of quarter t and subsequently shrinks, leading to average assets
in t and t + 1 of 90 and 70 and end-of-quarter assets in t of 80: The numerator of BSMASS
8 These two specific accounts are taken directly from the FR Y9-C. The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s
“Data Dictionary,” found at http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_
reports/bhc_data.cfm, has further details on the liabilities included in other borrowings.
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would be 80− 70+90
2
= 80− 80 = 0, reflecting this bank’s permanent contraction. BSMASS
thus implies more BSM only insofar as quarter-end assets are low relative to average assets
over the prior and subsequent quarters.
4.4.2 Data, Sample Selection, and Sample Partition
All data are from the FR Y9-C.9 My sample is a quarterly panel, unbalanced, that consists
of each bank in each quarter t from 1997Q2–2010Q3 that has data in t and t+ 1 for average
positions during the quarter in total assets, short-term liabilities, and other borrowings; data
in t for end-of-quarter positions in these three accounts; and data in t− 1 for the non-BSM-
related variables I use (Section 4.3). This initial sample consists of 59,167 bank-quarters and
2,680 different banks. Because of large banks’ stronger incentives to engage in BSM (Section
3.4), I divide this sample into large banks and other banks. I do so as follows:
(1) For each quarter in my sample, I rank banks by total assets at the start of the quarter;
(2) I compute each bank’s average size, so that a bank, for instance, ranking 25th in size in
one quarter, 30th in the next, and 20th in the third has an average size of 25th; and
(3) I classify as “large banks” those banks with an average size of 30th or lower, and I classify
as “other banks” all the rest.
I follow this approach so that banks do not change between groups over time. When I define
as large banks the 35- or 40-largest banks, I get largely the same results (not tabulated).
9 The FR Y9-C is a regulatory report that all banks, large banks and small banks alike, file in each quarter.
Hence, my initial sample includes banks of all types.
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4.4.3 Models
I estimate the models below (more-precise variable definitions are in the appendix):
BSMASSit = β0 + β1CAPit−1 + β2SIZEit−1 + β3STLIABit−1 + β4OTHBORRit−1
+ β5NPAit−1 + β6BSMSTLit + β7BSMOTHit
+ β8RISKit−1 + β9CAP 2 + β10CAPRISK + it (1)
BSMSTLit = γ0 + γ1CAPit−1 + γ2SIZEit−1 + γ3STLIABit−1 + γ4OTHBORRit−1
+ γ5NPAit−1 + γ6BSMASSit + γ7BSMOTHit + εit (2)
BSMOTHit = δ0 + δ1CAPit−1 + δ2SIZEit−1 + δ3STLIABit−1 + δ4OTHBORRit−1
+ δ5NPAit−1 + δ6BSMASSit + δ7BSMSTLit + νit. (3)
BSMLIABit = ω0 + ω1CAPit−1 + ω2SIZEit−1 + ω3STLIABit−1 + ω4OTHBORRit−1
+ ω5NPAit−1 + ω6BSMASSit + υit (4)
, ε, and ν are error terms. In line with prior studies (e.g., Gambacorta [2004]), I define CAP
as banks’ Tier 1 capital ratio above a six-percent baseline, the level below which regulators no
longer classify banks as well-capitalized. Also, I estimate each model using RAWLEV and,
separately, REGLEV rather than CAP . RAWLEV is raw leverage (i.e., total assets divided
by balance-sheet equity). REGLEV is regulatory leverage above a five-percent baseline, the
level beneath which regulators no longer classify banks as well-capitalized. Finally, I include
in each model also time and bank fixed effects. The other variables are controls of no inherent
interest given my focus. SIZE is the log of total assets. STLIAB and OTHBORR are the
share of short-term liabilities and other borrowings in total liabilities; these variables control
for debt-composition effects (Allen and Saunders [1992]). NPA is non-performing assets as
a share of total assets and controls for asset-quality effects.
Two aspects of these models warrant comments. First, in each model, I include as controls
BSM in the other balance-sheet accounts. In model (1), for instance, BSM in assets, I include
as controls BSMSTL and BSMOTH. BSM in assets likely has liability-side effects, while
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BSM in liabilities likewise has asset-side effects.10 Suppose, for instance, that banks engage
in BSM in short-term liabilities: Retiring debt at the end of the quarter necessarily involves
a decline in cash (in assets). Hence, focusing on BSM in assets without controlling for BSM
in liabilities runs the risk of identifying BSM in assets that actually is BSM in liabilities that
has asset-side effects. Including as controls BSM in banks’ other accounts helps alleviate this
concern and ensures that each model focuses in BSM in the relevant balance-sheet account.
More formally, this approach helps guard against omitted-variable bias.11
Second, to avoid endogeneity, I use lags for the non-BSM-related independent variables.
Consequently, I examine the effect of these variables as measured at the start of the period
on BSM during the upcoming quarter. This decision is especially important with respect to
the financial-ratio variables. Expected end-of-quarter financial ratios should drive BSM, not
financial ratios at the start of the quarter, but end-of-quarter financial ratios are endogenous
with respect to BSM, in that BSM affects these ratios. With respect to CAP , for instance,
expectations of a lower CAPit should induce more BSM during quarter t. Quarter-t BSM,
however, raises CAPit, weakening the link between a lower observed CAPit and more quarter-
t BSM. To avoid this problem, I use lags for the financial-ratio variables. This decision likely
weakens my ability to detect a link between financial ratios and BSM.
Also, two more notes: First, customer- and creditor-driven changes in assets and liabilities
can occur just before quarter-end. Hence, gaps between end-of-quarter and average positions
are not fully endogenous (i.e., are not fully within banks’ control). These exogenous forces,
however, would affect my results only insofar as they are systematically linked with the
financial ratios of banks. To the best of my knowledge, no empirical evidence or theoretical
arguments identify this type of relationship. Second, though a bank with weak financial ratios
could lose access to funding, its creditors could just as easily pull funding early in the quarter
10 Insofar as banks engage in BSM by selling non-cash financial assets for cash, BSM in assets has no effect
on liabilities, but using this cash to pay down debt, a´ la Lehman in Repo 105, does.
11 When I estimate these models without these controls, my results are essentially the same.
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as just before quarter-end. Consequently, this sort of behavior would not systematically bias
my measures of BSM in liabilities.
4.4.4 Hypotheses
Banks have incentives to use BSM to improve their financial ratios (Section 3.3). As a result,
I focus on the following hypotheses, stated in alternative form:
(1) Weaker financial ratios—lower CAP , higher RAWLEV , and lower REGLEV—induce
more BSM in assets, short-term liabilities, other borrowings, and the sum of short-term
liabilities and other borrowings.
BSM in assets and liabilities, however, impact CAP , RAWLEV , and REGLEV in different
ways (Section 3.2). BSM in assets can have a large impact in improving banks’ capital ratios
and raw leverage but has little effect in improving regulatory leverage. BSM in liabilities can
have a strong impact in improving raw leverage but has little impact in improving regulatory
leverage and no impact in improving banks’ capital ratios. As a result, a priori, CAP should
have a strong effect only on BSM in assets, RAWLEV should have a strong effect on BSM in
each account, and REGLEV should have a small impact on BSM in each account. Insofar as
weaker financial ratios induce more BSM, CAP and REGLEV should have a positive sign,
and RAWLEV , a negative sign—weaker financial ratios result in a larger fall in quarter-end
positions relative to average positions during the quarter.
With respect to BSM in assets, I examine two hypotheses that allow for non-linearity in
CAP . First, a marginal capital-ratio rise likely has a stronger effect in preventing regulatory
sanctions or in boosting market confidence when this rise is from a lower capital ratio—going,
for instance, from a six- to a seven-percent Tier 1 ratio is more helpful along these lines than
is moving from a 14- to a 15-percent Tier 1 ratio. More formally, the benefits of using BSM
to improve capital ratios have diminishing marginal returns. I thus examine the hypothesis
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below:
(2) The negative link between capital ratios and BSM in assets is stronger when the capital
ratios of banks are lower.
Since BSM in assets affects the capital ratios of banks but BSM in liabilities does not, I test
this hypothesis only for model (1), BSM in assets, where CAP 2 = CAP ×CAP . Hypothesis
(2) implies that the sign of CAP 2 is negative—the positive link between CAP and BSMASS
(the link between lower capital ratios and more BSM in assets) is greater when CAP is lower.
Second, shedding assets with a higher risk-weight leads to a larger decline in risk-weighted
assets, increasing capital ratios by more (Section 3.1). I thus examine the hypothesis below:
(3) The negative link between capital ratios and BSM in assets is larger when banks’ assets
have higher risk-weights.
This hypothesis states that capital-ratio-motivated BSM is more prevalent when banks have
assets whose disposal has a larger impact in improving their capital ratios. To test hypothesis
(3), I include in model (1) RISK, risk-weighted assets divided by total raw assets, and the
interaction term CAPRISK = CAP×RISK.12 A higher value forRISK means that banks’
assets have higher risk-weights. Hence, shedding assets at quarter-end reduces risk-weighted
assets by more, putting more upward pressure on capital ratios. As a result, banks can better
use BSM to improve their capital ratios when RISK is high, strengthening the link between
lower capital ratios and more BSM in assets. Hypothesis (3) implies that CAPRISK’s sign
is positive—the positive link between CAP and BSMASS (the link between lower capital
ratios and more BSM in assets) is larger when banks have more high-risk-weight assets.13
12 In the appendix, I examine CAPRISK in more detail.
13 I focus only on the interaction effect of RISK, not on its main effect. A priori, RISK’s sign is unclear. In
shedding high-risk-weight assets, BSM has a stronger impact in increasing banks’ capital ratios, so that higher
RISK implies more BSM. High-risk-weight assets, however, tend to be illiquid assets that are relatively hard
to dispose of, while low-risk-weight assets tend to be liquid assets that are relatively easy to sell (e.g., US
Treasuries). In its Repo 105 program, for instance, Lehman used mainly US Treasuries and other government-
related securities (Valukas [2010], Vol. 4, pp. 795–6). In this way, higher RISK implies less BSM.
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Tab. 4.1: Summary Statistics
Bank Type Large Banks (N = 1,571; # groups = 60)
Variable Mean
Standard Percentiles P-Value,
Deviation 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Wilcoxon Test
BSMASS -0.004 0.053 -0.047 -0.015 0.002 0.017 0.034 0.618
BSMSTL -0.110 0.364 -0.445 -0.242 -0.091 0.018 0.141 0.000
BSMOTH 0.017 0.210 -0.146 -0.056 0.002 0.059 0.167 0.581
BSMLIAB -0.034 0.139 -0.172 -0.094 -0.029 0.023 0.088 0.000
CAP 0.030 0.035 0.010 0.017 0.026 0.042 0.066 0.000
RAWLEV 15.417 17.989 9.001 10.426 12.093 14.036 17.157 0.000
REGLEV 0.022 0.037 0.003 0.012 0.020 0.031 0.044 0.000
SIZE 18.630 1.088 17.399 17.785 18.405 19.345 20.246 0.000
STLIAB 0.105 0.120 0.015 0.036 0.066 0.132 0.239 0.000
OTHBORR 0.145 0.094 0.041 0.077 0.131 0.194 0.258 0.000
NPA 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.000
RISK 0.755 0.196 0.511 0.656 0.770 0.881 0.980 0.000
Bank Type Other Banks (N = 57,596; # groups = 2,620)
Variable Mean
Standard Percentiles
Deviation 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
BSMASS 0.001 0.032 -0.021 -0.007 0.002 0.012 0.025
BSMSTL 0.472 42.038 -1.000 -0.326 -0.045 0.089 0.451
BSMOTH 0.652 51.542 -0.251 -0.066 0.000 0.077 0.295
BSMLIAB 0.034 0.983 -0.197 -0.074 -0.002 0.075 0.222
CAP 0.066 0.057 0.026 0.039 0.056 0.081 0.116
RAWLEV 531.575 41,551.460 8.404 9.933 11.761 14.109 16.925
REGLEV 0.039 0.030 0.014 0.024 0.036 0.049 0.066
SIZE 13.376 1.137 12.163 12.493 13.172 13.897 14.940
STLIAB 0.037 0.057 0.000 0.004 0.021 0.049 0.089
OTHBORR 0.074 0.070 0.005 0.022 0.057 0.105 0.162
NPA 0.007 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016
RISK 0.714 0.112 0.573 0.645 0.719 0.790 0.850
My sample runs from 1997Q2–2010Q3. Large banks are those banks that have an average size
of 30th or lower; other banks are all other banks. BSMASS: end-of-quarter assets in quarter
t minus the average of average assets in quarters t and t + 1, divided by the average of average
assets in t and t + 1; BSMSTL, BSMOTH, and BSMLIAB are defined in the same way for
short-term liabilities, other borrowings, and short-term liabilities plus other borrowings. CAP :
Tier 1 capital ratio in excess of a six-percent baseline; RAWLEV : total raw assets divided by
balance-sheet equity; REGLEV : regulatory leverage in excess of a five-percent baseline; SIZE:
log of total assets; STLIAB: short-term liabilities as a share of total liabilities; OTHBORR:
other borrowings as a share of total liabilities; NPA: non-performing assets as a share of total
assets; RISK: risk-weighted assets divided by total raw assets. In the far-right column, I show
the p-values for a Wilcoxon rank-sum test that assesses whether differences across bank types
in a given variable are statistically significant.
With respect to BSM in liabilities, financial-ratio concerns likely have a stronger impact
in inducing BSM in short-term liabilities than in other borrowings. Short-term liabilities are
a relatively high-risk form of funding. These liabilities have short maturities, often overnight.
Creditors thus can pull these liabilities on short notice, exposing banks to rollover risk (e.g.,
Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer [2011]). This exposure to rollover risk increases banks’ credit
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Tab. 4.2: Correlation Matrices
Variable BSMASS BSMSTL BSMOTH BSMLIAB CAP RAWLEV REGLEV SIZE STLIAB OTHLIAB NPA RISK
BSMASS 1.000 0.001 -0.004 0.065* -0.011* 0.004 0.015* 0.048* -0.005 0.021* -0.010* 0.029*
BSMSTL 0.155* 1.000 0.000 0.047* 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.002 0.008 -0.003
BSMOTH 0.285* -0.046 1.000 0.147* 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.011* -0.009* -0.008* 0.008* 0.003
BSMLIAB 0.459* 0.307* 0.674* 1.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.008* -0.009* -0.011* -0.008 0.015* -0.005
CAP 0.027 0.088* 0.006 0.037 1.000 -0.013* 0.711* -0.171* -0.015* -0.086* -0.082* -0.309*
RAWLEV -0.141* -0.039 0.051* -0.077* -0.263* 1.000 -0.014* 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.011* -0.003
REGLEV 0.031 0.049 -0.002 0.032 0.266* -0.058* 1.000 -0.026* -0.033* -0.059* -0.085* 0.105*
SIZE 0.074* -0.003 0.031 0.085* 0.060* 0.067* 0.040 1.000 0.083* 0.237* 0.278* 0.379*
STLIAB -0.111* -0.001 -0.037 -0.104* -0.095* 0.300* -0.081* -0.232* 1.000 -0.079* -0.061* -0.053*
OTHLIAB 0.016 -0.001 0.085* 0.138* -0.062* -0.039 -0.016 0.292* -0.390* 1.000 0.011* 0.073*
NPA 0.016 0.002 -0.008 0.011 0.302* -0.069* 0.113* 0.316* -0.272* 0.070* 1.000 0.080*
RISK 0.026 -0.048 0.009 0.011 -0.295* -0.182* 0.024 -0.093* -0.305* 0.073* -0.048 1.000
Large banks and other banks are on the lower and the upper diagonal, respectively. Values are
Pearson correlations, computed on a within-bank basis. * denotes statistical significance at the
five-percent level. Variable definitions are the same as in Table 1.
risk. In 2011, for instance, Moody’s downgraded two large French banks, Cre´dit Agricole and
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, in part due to their extensive use of short-term wholesale funding (Moody’s
[2011a], [2011b]). Weaker financial ratios imply higher credit risk. Consequently, the rise in
credit risk that results from reporting more short-term liabilities could be especially harmful
when banks’ financial ratios are weaker. Hence, weaker financial ratios could have a stronger
impact in inducing more BSM in short-term liabilities than in other borrowings.
4.4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics and a correlation matrix are in Tables 1 and 2.14 I show separate data for
large banks and other banks. The data in Table 1 stress further the differences between these
groups of banks. Large banks have a median CAP of 0.026 (i.e., a median Tier 1 ratio of 8.6
percent), compared to 0.056 (Tier 1 ratio of 11.6 percent) for other banks. In addition, large
banks have a median STLIAB and OTHBORR of 6.6 percent and 13 percent, compared to
2.1 percent and 5.7 percent for other banks. Large banks thus have weaker capital ratios and
rely more on wholesale and interbank funding. Both factors increase these banks’ incentives
14 For other banks, the mean of RAWLEV is driven by a small number of outliers whose values are driven
by a minuscule equity base. When I estimate my models without these banks, I get the same results.
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to use BSM to improve their financial ratios.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 BSM in Assets
Results for model (1), BSM in assets, are in Table 3.15 My main findings are that for large
banks, CAP is positive and significant, while RAWLEV is negative and significant. Also,
CAP 2 is negative and significant, so that the impact of a marginal decline in CAP in inducing
more BSM is larger when the capital ratio of a bank is lower, and CAPRISK is positive and
significant, so that a marginal rise in RISK—in having high-risk-weight assets—strengthens
the impact of a marginal fall in CAP in inducing more BSM. Economically, financial ratios
have a modest effect: a fall of 100 basis points (bps) in a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio—from, for
instance, 11 to 10 percent—implies a rise of 0.20 percentage points in BSM—end-of-quarter
assets are 0.20 percentage points lower than the average of average assets. This modest effect
could be driven by the use of lagged CAP and RAWLEV instead of contemporaneous CAP
and RAWLEV , as the latter likely have a stronger impact in inducing BSM.
Two more results are worth noting: First, for large banks, REGLEV does not affect BSM
in assets, in contrast with the findings for CAP and RAWLEV ; one possible reason for this
difference is that regulatory leverage is based on average assets, limiting the ability of banks
to use BSM to strengthen this ratio. Second, for other banks, CAP , CAP 2, CAPRISK, and
RAWLEV have no effect on BSM in assets, consistent with the argument that other banks
have weaker incentives to use BSM to improve their financial ratios. Although REGLEV ’s
coefficient is positive, so that a marginal decline (deterioration) in regulatory leverage induces
more BSM, its impact is an order of magnitude smaller than is the impact of CAP for large
banks, implying less economic importance.
15 Since the residuals of each model are not normally distributed, I compute bootstrapped standard errors,
with 250 replications (Efron and Tibshirani [1982]).
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Tab. 4.3: BSM in Assets
Bank Type Large Banks Other Banks
Dep. Var. BSMASS BSMASS
CAP
0.199* 0.015
(0.116) (0.017)
RAWLEV
-6.2E-4*** 9.5E-9
(2.0E-4) (5.3E-8)
REGLEV
0.035 0.048***
(0.118) (0.015)
SIZE
0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
STLIAB
-0.167*** -0.108** -0.165*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.010
(0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
OTHBORR
-0.060** -0.068** -0.071** 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NPA
-0.566* -0.485 -0.359 -0.015 -0.018 -0.009
(0.306) (0.353) (0.303) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
BSMSTL
0.023** 0.022** 0.023** 8.4E-7 8.2E-7 6.8E-7
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (1.9E-5) (1.9E-5) (1.9E-5)
BSMOTH
0.068*** 0.069*** 0.067*** -1.7E-6 -1.7E-6 -1.7E-6
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (2.2E-6) (2.2E-6) (2.2E-6)
RISK
0.020 0.004 0.012 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
CAP2
-1.697** 0.004
(0.687) (0.071)
CAPRISK
0.667** 0.054
(0.270) (0.048)
R2 (within) 0.136 0.147 0.130 0.004 0.004 0.004
N 1,571 1,571 1,571 57,596 57,596 57,596
# groups 60 60 60 2,620 2,620 2,620
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Std. Errors bootstrapped (250 replications), clustered by bank and quarter
Notes:
(1) Large banks are those with an average size of 30th or lower. Other banks are all the rest.
(2) All estimations include time and bank fixed effects.
(3) CAP 2 = CAP ×CAP . CAPRISK = CAP ×RISK. In the estimations with CAP , to
reduce multicollinearity, CAP and RISK are centered (Aiken and West [1991]).
(4) Bootstrapped (250 replications) standard errors, clustered by both bank and quarter, are
in parentheses.
(5) *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, five-, and one-percent level, respectively,
using two-tailed tests.
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4.5.2 BSM in Liabilities
Results for models (2), (3), and (4)—BSM in short-term liabilities, other borrowings, and the
sum of the two, respectively—are in Tables 4, 5, and 6. My primary finding is that for large
banks, weaker financial ratios are not consistently linked with more BSM. RAWLEV , for
instance, has a negative sign with respect to BSMSTL but a positive sign with respect to
BSMOTH. A marginal increase in raw leverage induces more BSM in short-term liabilities
but less BSM in other borrowings. If leverage concerns drove liability-side BSM, an increase
in raw leverage would be linked with more BSM in both types of liabilities. For other banks,
I find no link between financial ratios and BSM in short-term liabilities, other borrowings,
or the sum of the two.
These large-bank results suggest a rise in raw leverage induces a shift away from reported
short-term liabilities and toward reported other borrowings—an increase in raw leverage leads
banks to alter the composition of their end-of-quarter liabilities, without necessarily affecting
total reported liabilities. Short-term liabilities are a relatively risky source of funding (Section
4.4). Banks thus could respond to the rise in credit risk that results from a rise in raw leverage
by reporting fewer of these high-risk liabilities. In a similar vein, CAP and BSMSTL have a
positive link (Table 4), so that a marginal decline in CAP results in more BSM in short-term
liabilities. A capital-ratio decline likewise implies higher credit risk, possibly inducing banks
to report fewer short-term liabilities even though BSM in liabilities does not improve capital
ratios (Section 3.1).
This argument—that financial-ratio concerns induce large banks to alter the mix of their
reported liabilities, without necessarily affecting total liabilities—has two implications. First,
banks borrow to fund assets. Consequently, in reducing short-term liabilities at quarter-end,
banks have to turn to other funding sources (e.g., other borrowings) to avoid having to dump
assets. As a result, a larger decline in quarter-end short-term liabilities should be linked with
a larger rise in quarter-end other borrowings. Consistent with this argument, BSMSTL and
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Tab. 4.4: BSM in Short-Term Liabilities
Bank Type Large Banks Other Banks
Dep. Var. BSMSTL BSMSTL
CAP
1.715* 3.260
(0.889) (12.282)
RAWLEV
-8.8E-4* -9.6E-7
(4.9E-4) (2.2E-5)
REGLEV
0.474 22.574
(1.295) (14.473)
SIZE
-0.082*** -0.096*** -0.094*** 0.046 -0.010 0.274
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.478) (0.346) (0.460)
STLIAB
0.458** 0.549*** 0.480** -8.293 -8.289* -7.767
(0.178) (0.192) (0.192) (5.361) (4.869) (5.729)
OTHBORR
0.231 0.209 0.219 2.000 1.912 2.503
(0.187) (0.197) (0.191) (1.807) (1.637) (1.642)
NPA
-4.430*** -3.891** -3.862*** 33.118 32.468 36.647
(1.516) (1.527) (1.438) (52.534) (48.443) (48.957)
BSMASS
1.459*** 1.445*** 1.465*** 1.538 1.547 1.264
(0.166) (0.157) (0.161) (9.972) (9.292) (10.424)
BSMOTH
-0.181*** -0.176*** -0.180*** -2.4E-5 -2.0E-5 -4.0E-5
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (3.2E-4) (4.8E-5) (3.2E-4)
R2 (within) 0.045 0.041 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1,571 1,571 1,571 57,596 57,596 57,596
# groups 60 60 60 2,620 2,620 2,620
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Std. Errors bootstrapped (250 replications), clustered by bank and quarter
Notes:
(1) Large banks are those with an average size of 30th or lower. Other banks are all the rest.
(2) All estimations include time and bank fixed effects.
(3) Bootstrapped (250 replications) standard errors, clustered by both bank and quarter, are
in parentheses.
(4) *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, five-, and one-percent level, respectively,
using two-tailed tests.
BSMOTH have a negative link (Table 4). On the margin, a fall in quarter-end short-term
liabilities results in a rise in quarter-end other borrowings, consistent with the notion that
cutting back on short-term liabilities forces banks to turn to other funding sources. Second,
weaker financial ratios have a limited effect, if any, on BSM in liabilities overall. In line with
this argument, financial ratios do not impact BSMLIAB, BSM in short-term liabilities plus
other borrowings, taken together (Table 6).
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Tab. 4.5: BSM in Other Borrowings
Bank Type Large Banks Other Banks
Dep. Var. BSMOTH BSMOTH
CAP
0.112 3.935
(0.374) (5.942)
RAWLEV
0.002** 5.7E-8
(0.001) (2.1E-5)
REGLEV
-0.036 10.556
(0.373) (11.868)
SIZE
-0.032* -0.034* -0.034* 0.507 0.439 0.572
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.448) (0.435) (0.476)
STLIAB
0.196 4.2E-4 0.195 -17.957 -17.957 -17.711
(0.149) (0.174) (0.140) (13.433) (13.664) (14.406)
OTHBORR
0.401*** 0.384*** 0.399*** -12.456* -12.565* -12.288*
(0.123) (0.123) (0.117) (6.785) (6.988) (7.221)
NPA
1.406 1.940* 1.471 -65.176 -65.978 -64.015
(1.168) (1.164) (1.081) (43.439) (44.542) (45.233)
BSMASS
1.324*** 1.377*** 1.325*** -5.155 -5.146 -5.277
(0.249) (0.284) (0.258) (5.509) (5.123) (5.662)
BSMSTL
-0.055** -0.053** -0.055** -3.7E-5 -3.1E-5 -6.2E-5
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 (within) 0.097 0.107 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1,571 1,571 1,571 57,596 57,596 57,596
# groups 60 60 60 2,620 2,620 2,620
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Std. Errors bootstrapped (250 replications), clustered by bank and quarter
Notes:
(1) Large banks are those with an average size of 30th or lower. Other banks are all the rest.
(2) All estimations include time and bank fixed effects.
(3) Bootstrapped (250 replications) standard errors, clustered by both bank and quarter, are
in parentheses.
(4) *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, five-, and one-percent level, respectively,
using two-tailed tests.
4.5.3 Synopsis and Implications
In sum, the results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggest large banks use BSM in assets to improve
their financial ratios, especially their capital ratios and raw leverage. Also, capital ratios have
an especially large effect when banks have low capital ratios and have assets whose disposal
has a larger effect in increasing their capital ratios. For large banks, BSM in liabilities seems
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Tab. 4.6: BSM in Short-Term Liabilities plus Other Borrowings
Bank Type Large Banks Other Banks
Dep. Var. BSMLIAB BSMLIAB
CAP
0.150 -0.157
(0.176) (0.132)
RAWLEV
-2.8E-4 5.6E-9
(2.2E-4) (3.4E-7)
REGLEV
0.065 -0.499
(0.197) (0.307)
SIZE
-0.033*** -0.034** -0.034*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
STLIAB
0.102 0.129 0.105 -0.295*** -0.295*** -0.306***
(0.095) (0.100) (0.090) (0.092) (0.099) (0.090)
OTHLIAB
0.377*** 0.377*** 0.377*** -0.162*** -0.157*** -0.171***
(0.085) (0.082) (0.082) (0.052) (0.056) (0.054)
NPA
-0.911 -0.910 -0.870 1.542* 1.574* 1.481*
(0.619) (0.647) (0.621) (0.873) (0.872) (0.842)
BSMASS
1.317*** 1.311*** 1.317*** 2.007*** 2.007*** 2.013***
(0.128) (0.147) (0.132) (0.150) (0.155) (0.151)
R2 (within) 0.231 0.231 0.231 0.005 0.005 0.005
N 1,571 1,571 1,571 57,596 57,596 57,596
# groups 60 60 60 2,620 2,620 2,620
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Std. Errors boostrapped (250 replications), clustered by bank and quarter
Notes:
(1) Large banks are those with an average size of 30th or lower.
(2) All estimations include time and bank fixed effects.
(3) Bootstrapped (250 replications) standard errors, clustered by both bank and quarter, are
in parentheses.
(4) *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, five-, and one-percent level, respectively,
using two-tailed tests.
geared toward affecting the composition of banks’ reported liabilities, not toward improving
their financial ratios. Finally, for other banks, financial ratios have little impact in inducing
BSM, consistent with the idea that other banks have relatively weak incentives to use BSM
to improve their financial ratios.
These results imply large banks react to weak financial ratios by using BSM—by reducing
assets at quarter-end—so as to improve these ratios. These results do not suggest banks use
Repo 105-like programs. Banks can shed assets and improve their financial ratios in a variety
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of ways (see, e.g., Jones [2000]). The British banks cited in Section 2, for instance, increased
their reported cash balances by holding assets that matured right before the banks’ reporting
dates. Still, disposing of assets at quarter-end can have a strong impact in improving banks’
reported financial ratios. Lehman, for instance, used Repo 105 to cut its reported net leverage
in 2007Q4, 2008Q1, and 2008Q2 from 17.8 to 16.1, from 17.3 to 15.4, and from 13.9 to 12.1,
an average reduction of 180 bps (Valukas [2010], Vol. 4, p. 748). BSM need not involve Repo
105-like tactics but can have the same balance-sheet and financial-ratio effects.
Newly proposed banking regulations give large banks still further incentives to use BSM
to improve their capital ratios. Most importantly, Basel III requires banks to hold more and
higher-quality capital than before. Anecdotally, banks are using numerous tactics to do so.
JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon, for instance, has expressed his intent to “manage the hell out
of [risk-weighted assets]” so as to comply with Basel III (Braithwaite [2011]). Capital ratios
use end-of-quarter assets. Together with banks’ opacity (Morgan [2002]) and their flexibility
in carrying out transactions, basing capital ratios on assets as of quarter-end makes BSM an
easy way for banks to strengthen these ratios. Going forward, large banks will have greater
incentives to do so. Focusing more on regulatory ratios that are based on average positions
during the quarter rather than positions at quarter-end could help combat this behavior.
4.6 Conclusion
BSM in assets is an important tool large banks use to improve their financial ratios. Capital
ratios, in particular, have a statistically significant and economically large impact in inducing
BSM in assets. BSM in liabilities, by contrast, seems aimed toward altering the composition
of large banks’ liabilities, not toward improving their financial ratios. Large banks’ business
models, however, differ from those of other banks in ways that increase large banks’ incentives
to improve their financial ratios via BSM. For other banks, weak financial ratios have little
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effect in inducing BSM in either assets or liabilities, highlighting the importance of focusing
separately on BSM by large banks and by other banks.
Appendix
Variable definitions are as follows:
BSMASSit =
EOQASSit − [AV GASSit+1 +AV GASSit] /2
[AV GASSit+1 +AV GASSit] /2
BSMSTLit =
EOQSTLit − [AV GSTLit+1 +AV GSTLit] /2
[AV GSTLit+1 +AV GSTLit] /2
BSMOTHit =
EOQOTHit − [AV GOTHit+1 +AV GOTHit] /2
[AV GOTHit+1 +AV GOTHit] /2
BSMLIABit =
[EOQSTLit + EOQOTHit]− [AV GSTLit+1 +AV GSTLit +AV GOTHit+1 +AV GOTHit] /2
[AV GSTLit+1 +AV GSTLit +AV GOTHit+1 +AV GOTHit] /2
CAPit =
Tier 1 capitalit − 0.06 [risk-weighted assetsit]
risk-weighted assetsit
RAWLEVit =
total raw assetsit
balance-sheet equityit
REGLEVit =
Tier 1 capitalit − 0.05 [average regulatory assetsit]
average regulatory assetsit
SIZEit = log total assetsit
STLIABit =
short-term liabilitiesit
total liabilitiesit
OTHBORRit =
other borrowingsit
total liabilitiesit
NPAit =
non-performing assetsit
total assetsit
With respect to CAPRISK, writing out this variable in terms of its components,
CAP ×RISK =
[
Tier 1 capital
risk-weighted assets
− 0.06
]
× risk-weighted assets
total raw assets
=
Tier 1 capital
risk-weighted assets
× risk-weighted assets
total raw assets
− 0.06× risk-weighted assets
total raw assets
=
Tier 1 capital
total raw assets
− 0.06× risk-weighted assets
total raw assets
.
A marginal increase in risk-weighted assets, by raising the second term in the bottom-most
line, decreases CAPRISK. Hence, CAPRISK’s positive coefficient (Section 5.1, Table 3)
means that a rise in risk-weighted assets relative to total raw assets and the fall in CAPRISK
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that results amplifies the effect of a fall in CAP in inducing more BSM in assets—when banks
hold more high-risk-weight assets, a decline in a bank’s capital ratio has a larger impact in
inducing more BSM in assets.
The Y9-C line-items I use are as follows:
Balance-Sheet Item Y9-C Mnemonic
total assets, raw
end-of-quarter: BHCK2170
average: BHCK3368
short-term liabilities
end-of-quarter: BHCK2800 (1997Q1–2001Q4)
end-of-quarter: BHDMB993 + BHCKB995 (2002Q1–2010Q4)
average: BHCK3365
other borrowings
end-of-quarter: BHCK2309 + BHCK2332 + BHCK2333
average: BHCK2635
total liabilities BHCK2948
balance-sheet equity BHCK3210
Tier 1 capital BHCK8274
total risk-weighted assets BHCKA223
regulatory average assets BHCKA224
non-performing assets BHCK5525 + BHCK5526
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5. FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING, DERIVATIVES, AND HEDGING
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ABSTRACT
Prior studies show that fair-value accounting can negatively affect financial-sector stability.
Fair value can do so by allowing changes in asset prices to impact banks’ earnings and
capital. Empirically, I find that banks’ use of derivatives helps shield their earnings and
capital from asset-price changes; for any given change in prices, derivatives reduce the net
effect on earnings of banks’ assets that are valued under fair value. Derivatives thus dampen
fair value’s negative effects. These findings suggest that in assessing fair value’s impact,
focusing jointly on banks’ assets and derivatives is necessary.
5.1 Introduction
Fair-value accounting1 often is criticized for adversely affecting financial-sector stability. Fair
value can amplify the pro-cyclical nature of banks’ lending (ECB [2004], Novoa, Scarlata, and
Sole´ [2008], Bernanke [2009]). Also, fair value can result in contagion, with price-depressing
asset sales by one bank requiring others to take write-downs. The impact of fair value in this
respect can lead to asset-price downward spirals (Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin [2005]), to the
liquidation of fundamentally solvent banks (Allen and Carletti [2008]), and to an increase in
asset-price volatility that is driven by the impact of fair value on banks’ investment decisions,
not by fundamentals (Plantin, Sapra, and Shin [2008]).
In this study, I show that derivatives can reduce fair value’s negative impact by insulating
banks’ earnings (and capital) from changes in asset prices. In the studies above, fair value has
negative effects by letting asset-price changes impact earnings—by exposing banks to market
risk, the risk of profit or loss due to changes in asset prices. An increase in credit spreads, for
instance, reduces the prices of corporate bonds. Under fair value, banks book losses on their
corporate bonds because of this decline in price. In this respect, fair value exposes banks to
market risk. The studies above, however, all focus on fair value’s application only to banks’
assets, but fair value is applied also to derivatives. Banks thus could use derivatives to lay off
unwanted market risk—to hedge. As a result, insofar as banks use derivatives to hedge, and
insofar as derivatives are effective in hedging, derivatives could play a useful role in blunting
fair value’s negative effects.
My two main results are as follows: First, I find a positive link between banks’ quantity
of assets that are valued under fair value (“fair-valued assets”) and banks’ derivative use. On
the margin, a rise in fair-valued assets and the market risk thereon induces more hedging via
derivatives. To translate this result into a concrete example, suppose that a bank acquires a
1 Fair value is a broader version of mark-to-market accounting (see Laux and Leuz [2009]). For simplicity,
I use fair value to refer to both.
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fair-valued corporate bond: Rather than staying exposed to the interest-rate-related market
risk on this bond, this bank uses interest-rate derivatives to lay off this risk. As a result, this
bank hedges ex ante, in anticipation of possible changes in prices due to changes in interest
rates. I obtain this result using fixed effects. In the cross-section, large dealer banks (e.g., JP
Morgan) have the largest holdings of fair-valued assets and dominate trading in derivatives.
Hence, cross-sectionally, fair-valued assets and derivative use have a positive link for reasons
possibly unrelated to hedging. Using fixed effects helps ensure that this result is driven solely
by cross-temporal, within-bank variation, mitigating this concern.
Second, derivatives blunt fair-valued assets’ net effect on earnings. I regress (the absolute
value of) total fair-value income on assets and derivatives on fair-valued assets, derivatives,
and the interaction between the two. I find a positive link between fair-value income and fair-
valued assets. A marginal rise in fair-valued assets increases fair-value income, in magnitude
(see Section 4.1). This result is not my main finding. My main finding is that the interaction
term is negative. On the margin, an increase in derivatives reduces the impact of a rise in fair-
valued assets in increasing the magnitude of fair-value income. In this respect, derivatives
are effective in hedging. Returning to the corporate-bond example, for any given change in
interest rates, the bank’s interest-rate derivatives reduce its net profit or loss on its corporate
bonds. As a consequence, ex post, once prices change, derivatives are effective in hedging—in
reducing the net effect on earnings of any given change in prices.
In sum, these results suggest that derivatives help blunt fair value’s impact on earnings.
These results relate to the debate about fair value’s potential to have a negative effect on
financial-sector stability. Fair value could do so by exposing banks to market risk, with asset-
price changes thus affecting earnings and capital. My results suggest banks use derivatives to
mitigate these effects. Derivatives were useful in this respect even during the 2007–8 financial
crisis, when fair value’s negative impact was strongest. Morgan Stanley’s 2008 trading losses
of $3.1 billion, for instance, “reflected fair value losses on loans and commitments that were
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partly offset by gains on related hedges” (source: Morgan Stanley’s 2008 10-K, p. 43). These
$3.1 billion in losses were large but would have been even larger without derivatives. Hence,
while my results do not imply that fair value is incapable of having destabilizing effects, they
do suggest that focusing jointly on banks’ assets and derivatives is essential to evaluating its
impact.
The rest of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, I discuss fair-value-related literature. In
Section 3, I discuss fair value, market risk, and how banks deal with this risk. My empirical
tests’ set-up and results are in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 6, I use two examples to show how
derivatives could blunt the adverse effects of fair value. Concluding remarks are in Section
7. Supplemental information on my empirical tests is in the appendix.
5.2 Related Literature: Fair-Value Accounting
In surveys of the trade-offs involved between fair-value accounting and historic-cost account-
ing, Landsman [2006] and Laux and Leuz [2009] argue that asset and liability values under
fair value are more relevant but could have less reliability. Early studies that focus on fair
value examine empirically whether the fair values of banks’ assets and liabilities are reflected
in stock prices; most conclude that they are. Barth [1994], Eccher, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan
[1996], and Nelson [1996] find that the fair values of securities are impounded in banks’ stock
prices. Barth, Beaver, and Landsman [1996] obtain the same result for securities, loans, and
long-term debt. Furthermore, Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen [1995] find that fair values help
predict future violations of prudential capital requirements, even though these requirements
are based largely on historic-cost values.
Recent studies, however, focus theoretically on how fair value could have a negative effect
on financial-sector stability. ECB [2004] and Novoa et al. [2008] highlight how fair value can
amplify the through-the-cycle volatility in banks’ capital and lending. Other studies focus on
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how fair value can result in contagion—because asset sales (in illiquid markets) reduce prices,
fair value’s use can force banks to take write-downs, even if fundamentals remain unchanged.
Cifuentes et al. [2005] show how fair value’s impact in this respect can help cause asset-price
downward spirals; Allen and Carletti [2008] and Plantin et al. [2008] identify other ways for
this sort of contagion to have destabilizing effects.
5.3 Fair Value, Market Risk, and Hedging
Fair value and historic cost expose banks to different types of risks. Under historic cost, banks
are exposed primarily to interest-rate risk and credit risk. Banks fund long-term assets with
short-term liabilities. Hence, in general, a rise in interest rates lowers net interest income; a
decline increases net interest income. Also, a rise in the credit risk of entities on which banks
have claims results in higher loan-loss provisions, with outright defaults reducing net interest
income. Interest-rate risk and credit risk thus have a central effect on earnings. Price changes
per se, by contrast, do not affect earnings. Roughly put, an asset valued under historic cost
is carried at its acquisition-date value, irrespective of how its price has changed since being
acquired. As result, when prices change, banks do not book gains and losses.
Fair value differs from historic cost by exposing banks to market risk, the risk of profit or
loss due to asset-price changes. Under fair value, when prices change, banks book immediate
gains and losses. Under historic cost, banks do not. Suppose, for instance, that a bank buys
corporate bonds and credit spreads later rise, reducing the price of these bonds: Under fair
value, this bank books a loss on the decline in the price of these bonds. Under historic cost,
this decline in price does not result in losses. Hence, under fair value and historic cost, banks
are exposed to and insulated from, respectively, asset-price changes. Fair value’s impact in
exposing banks to market risk can have a strong impact on earnings. Moreover, in the second
set of studies in Section 2.1, fair value has negative effects by exposing banks to market risk,
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so that changes in prices affect earnings and capital.
One question these studies do not ask is why banks would stay exposed to the market risk
that arises under fair value. These studies focus on fair value’s application to banks’ assets,
but fair value is applied also to derivatives. Prior studies (Gorton and Rosen [1995], Carter
and Sinkey [1995], Purnanandam [2007]) find that derivatives are a useful risk-management
device for banks. As a result, banks could use derivatives to hedge their market risk on fair-
valued assets. Insofar as banks do use derivatives to hedge this risk, and insofar as derivatives
are effective in hedging this risk, derivatives insulate banks’ earnings and capital from changes
in asset prices. In doing so, derivatives blunt the negative effects of fair value. Anecdotally,
derivatives are a critical tool banks use to lay off unwanted market risk. Goldman Sachs, for
instance, states in its 2012 10-K, “We manage our market risk by . . . establishing economic
hedges in related securities or derivatives,” among other tactics.
5.4 Empirical Tests: Preliminaries
5.4.1 Fair-Valued Assets, Fair-Value Income, and Market-Making
My three main variables are banks’ assets and derivatives valued under fair value and income
on these assets and derivatives, or total fair-value income.2 While none of these variables are
explicitly provided in the financial statements or regulatory reports of banks, useful proxies
are available. I define these variables as follows:
• Fair-valued assets: I use trading assets. Since 1996, fair value has been applied to all of
the trading assets and to virtually none of the other assets of banks. As a result, trading
assets and fair-valued assets have close to a one-to-one correspondence. Trading assets
consist mainly of debt securities.
2 Fair value’s negative effects arise via its impact on earnings and regulatory capital. Hence, I always refer
to fair value’s use vis-a´-vis only earnings and capital, not vis-a´-vis banks’ balance sheets. Securities classified
as available for sale are valued under fair value with respect to banks’ balance sheets but under historic cost
with respect to earnings and capital. As a result, I ignore this class of securities in my empirical tests.
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Banks face market risk on all of their trading assets, even default-risk-free government
securities (e.g., United States (US) Treasuries). Changes in interest rates, for instance,
affect Treasury prices; under fair value, banks book gains and losses on these changes in
prices. The FR Y9-C trading-assets line-item includes trading assets and the aggregate
fair value of trading derivatives with a positive fair value. In calculating trading assets,
I exclude the latter.
• Derivatives: I use the notional value of trading derivatives. Trading derivatives account
for over 98 percent of banks’ total derivatives, and fair value is applied to almost all of
banks’ derivatives.3
Notional values are not a perfect measure of banks’ true exposures on derivatives. A
bank, for instance, could enter into a derivative as part of its market-making operations
(e.g., with a corporate customer) and use the inter-dealer market to take an offsetting
position in another derivative. While these transactions would increase notional values,
net exposure would stay the same. A more useful measure of derivative use, however, is
not available, and using notional values is in line with prior studies (e.g., Demsetz and
Strahan [1997]). The substantial noise that results from using notional values weakens
the power of my tests. As a result, any results I find are in spite of using, not because
of using, notional values.
• Fair-value income: I use trading income, which includes all earnings on changes in the
prices of trading assets and trading derivatives. Trading income includes also earnings
from other sources (e.g., incidental income and expenses on trading-book transactions).
The inclusion of these sources makes trading income an imperfect measure of fair-value
income, but a more useful measure is not available.
3 Technically, banks do not apply fair value vis-a´-vis earnings and capital to derivatives that are designated
as a “hedging instrument.” Only a trivial share of banks’ derivatives, however, are designated as a hedging
instrument. As of fiscal-year-end 2011, for instance, only $294 billion of Citigroup’s $49,816 billion in total
derivatives (notional values) were designated as a hedging instrument.
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I use trading income’s absolute value. A bank with more exposure to market risk could
end up booking either larger gains or larger losses, depending on which way prices move.
Holding more Treasuries, for instance, would result in larger losses on a given increase
in interest rates and in larger gains on a given decline, but these outcomes have identical
implications—holding more fair-valued assets increases exposure to market risk, so that
any given price change has a larger impact on earnings (before accounting for any of the
offsetting effects of derivatives). Using trading income’s absolute value helps mitigate
this problem.
In focusing on trading assets, I focus on assets whose risks banks are especially likely to
hedge. In large part, banks’ trading accounts are linked to their market-making operations.
In market-making, banks profit from bid-ask spreads, not from price changes per se. Banks
thus aim for as little exposure to price changes—to market risk—as possible. In an overview
of market-making, Stigum and Crescenzi [2007] (p. 885), for instance, state that “[d]ealers
who run swap books . . . are of the opinion that they are neither paid to nor supposed to incur
a lot of market risk. Dealers hedge their swaps books.” This aversion to market risk implies
risk-aversion. Also, the possibility of regulatory sanctions should banks violate prudential
capital requirements likewise could encourage risk-aversion in market-making (and less-risky
behavior more generally (Milne [2002])). Empirically, Lyons [1995], Reiss and Werner [1998],
and Gaˆrleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman [2009] all find that market-makers trade in a risk-
averse way.
5.4.2 Set-Up and Hypotheses
Empirically, I take a two-step approach to examining the derivative use of banks with respect
to their fair-valued assets. First, I focus on whether banks use derivatives to hedge ex ante,
in anticipation of changes in prices—do banks with fair-valued assets remain exposed to the
market risk on these assets, or do banks use derivatives to lay off this risk? Second, I examine
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whether derivatives are effective in hedging ex post—once prices change, so that banks book
gains or losses on their fair-valued assets, do derivatives decrease the net impact on earnings
of these changes in prices? The first question concerns banks’ hedging strategies; the second,
the efficacy of these strategies.
In line with previous studies, I take as exogenous banks’ fair-valued assets (i.e., trading
assets) and the market risk thereon. I focus instead on banks’ derivative use in mitigating this
risk. In taking as exogenous banks’ fair-valued assets, I abstract from banks’ decisions to hold
assets in their trading account, as opposed to, for instance, in their held-to-maturity account.
In addition, I abstract from banks’ decisions in choosing the size and the composition of their
trading books (e.g., whether banks hold mainly high- or low-risk trading assets). These issues
are important but have been ignored by prior studies. To ensure my results relate as closely
as possible to those of prior studies, I abstract from these issues.
In my first set of tests, I examine whether banks use derivatives to hedge ex ante, after
their fair-valued assets are in place but before prices change. When banks hold more fair-
valued assets, a given price change results in more fair-value income, in magnitude. Banks
thus have more upside and downside, with larger gains should prices rise but larger losses
should prices fall. In this respect, banks have more exposure to market risk, in expectation.
A priori, banks’ response to this rise in exposure is unclear. Moral hazard can lead banks to
take more risk (e.g., Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor [1998]), making attractive this rise in
exposure. This effect discourages hedging. Risk-aversion, however (Section 4.1), encourages
hedging. Insofar as banks use derivatives to hedge, a rise in fair-valued assets should increase
derivative use. Hence, my first hypothesis, stated in null form, is as follows:
(1) Banks’ quantity of fair-valued assets and banks’ derivative use are uncorrelated.
Also, I examine how the relationship between fair-valued assets and derivatives changes
with the capital ratios of banks. Shrieves and Dahl [1992] and Haubrich and Wachtel [1993]
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find that banks with less capital bear less risk. These findings suggest that insofar as fair-
valued assets and derivatives have a positive link, so that a rise in fair-valued assets induces
more derivative use, this positive link is stronger when banks’ capital ratios are lower. One
key reason why low-capital banks might tolerate less risk is that banks that violate prudential
capital requirements are subject to regulatory sanctions; for low-capital banks, a given decline
in capital has a stronger impact in increasing the odds of regulatory sanctions. Consequently,
the rise in exposure to market risk that results from a rise in fair-valued assets is potentially
more damaging when capital is lower. As a consequence, a rise in fair-valued assets could have
a stronger effect in increasing banks’ use of derivatives. I thus test the following hypothesis,
stated in alternative form:
(2) Any positive link between fair-valued assets and derivatives is stronger when the capital
ratios of banks are lower.
In my second set of tests, I examine whether derivatives are effective in hedging ex post,
after prices change. Hedging exposes banks to basis risk. In general, changes in the prices of a
derivative and of the hedged asset do not have a perfect negative correlation; the derivative’s
price might move less sharply, more sharply, or even in the same way as that of the hedged
asset. Hence, even if banks use derivatives to hedge ex ante, in anticipation of price changes,
basis risk could reduce derivatives’ hedging efficacy ex post—in general, when prices change,
the change in the price of the derivative does not offset fully, or even at all, the change in the
price of the hedged asset. Insofar as basis risk does limit derivatives’ hedging efficacy, banks
still face market risk on their fair-valued assets. Consequently, asset-price changes still affect
earnings and capital, allowing fair value to have negative effects.
As a preliminary issue, I look at the link between fair-valued assets and fair-value income.
This link should be positive. For a given change in prices, an increase in fair-valued assets
should increase fair-value income (in absolute values); a rise in Treasuries, for instance, leads
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to larger gains on a given decline in interest rates. I assess how this positive link varies with
the derivative use of banks. Insofar as derivatives are effective in hedging, a rise in derivatives
lowers this positive link between fair-valued assets and fair-value income; an increase in fair-
valued assets might still increase fair-value income, in magnitude, but derivatives reduce this
rise, on net. While a rise in Treasuries results in larger gains on a given fall in interest rates,
a rise in derivatives reduces the extent of these gains, on net—the net increase in gains due
to an increase in Treasuries is lower with derivatives than without. I thus examine the two
hypotheses below, both stated in alternative form:
(3) Banks’ quantity of fair-valued assets and banks’ fair-value income have a positive link,
and
(4) a rise in derivatives weakens this positive link.
5.4.3 Data & Sample Selection
My data are from the FR Y9-C, a regulatory report US bank holding companies file in each
quarter. My sample runs from 1996Q1–2010Q4 and includes each bank over this period that
meets two criteria. First, banks must complete the “Trading Assets and Liabilities” schedule
in the Y9-C. I use the data in this schedule to adjust trading assets and trading liabilities for
derivatives (Sections 4.1, 4.4). From 1996–2000, banks with at least $1 billion in total assets
or $2 billion in derivatives (notional values) had to complete this schedule (Schedule HC-B,
part II); since 2001, banks that have at least $2 million in average trading assets have had to
complete this schedule (Schedule HC-D). The only banks that do not complete this schedule
are those with minimal trading books (i.e., fair-valued assets). Imposing this criterion thus
has the effect of getting rid of banks that are of no interest in the first place.
Second, banks must have held fair-valued assets in at least half of the quarters they filed
the Y9-C. My interest is in banks’ use of derivatives in hedging their fair-valued assets, not in
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their use of derivatives more generally. Few banks hold trading assets. Over 1996Q1–2010Q4,
the median share of banks in each quarter with trading assets was 6.8 percent. Consequently,
a broader sample would include many irrelevant banks. To avoid double-counting, I exclude
subsidiary bank holding companies whose parent files the Y9-C (i.e., holding companies with
BHCK9802 = 2). My sample consists of 4,891 bank-quarters and 196 different banks. Since
a 50-percent cut-off point is arbitrary, I show in Section 5.3 results using cut-off points of 40
percent, 60 percent, and 75 percent; nothing of substance changes.
5.4.4 Model: Banks, Market Risk, and Hedging
In my first set of regressions, I estimate the model
DERIVit = β0 + β1DERIVit−1 + β2TRADit−1 + β3CAPit−1
+ β4LIABit−1 + β5SIZEit−1 + β6TRADCAP + it. (1)
DERIV , TRAD, and LIAB are log [1 + derivatives], trading assets,4 and trading liabilities5;
CAP is banks’ Tier 1 capital ratio less a six-percent baseline; SIZE is log total assets less
trading assets; TRADCAP = TRAD×CAP ; and  is an error term. To avoid endogeneity,
I use lags for all of the regressors.6 Model (1) includes also time and bank fixed effects. Large
dealer banks (e.g., JP Morgan) have the largest trading books and also dominate trading in
4 I elect not to use trading assets as a share of total assets because banks face risks on all of their assets,
not only on their fair-valued assets. Examining the link between derivative use and the share of fair-valued
assets in total assets would test whether a rise in fair-valued assets relative to other types of assets increases
derivative use. This test effectively would assess whether banks are more or less inclined to use derivatives to
hedge their risks on fair-valued assets than on other types of assets. I want to focus on whether banks hedge
their market risk on fair-valued assets, without concern for whether this risk induces more or less derivative
use than risks on other types of assets. Using raw fair-valued assets is necessary to do so.
5 I calculate TRAD and LIAB as trading assets and trading liabilities less the total fair value of trading
derivatives with, respectively, a positive and a negative fair value. In addition, to clarify, TRAD and LIAB
are log [1 + trading assets] and log [1 + trading liabilities], respectively.
6 With respect to TRAD, banks’ trading assets and derivatives are jointly determined. Hence, TRADit
is endogenous with respect to DERIVit. To be consistent with previous fair-value-focused studies, I want to
take as exogenous banks’ fair-valued assets and examine banks’ derivative use in hedging their market risk
on these assets. To do so, using TRADit−1 is necessary.
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derivatives. Hence, in the cross-section, DERIV and TRAD have a natural positive link. In
using fixed effects, model (1) captures only cross-temporal, within-bank variation, mitigating
this concern. Using time fixed effects controls for period-specific shocks that affect DERIV
and TRAD across all banks—during periods of heavy financial-market activity (e.g., market-
making), for instance, all banks could have large holdings of derivatives and trading assets.
Using time fixed effects strips out the impact of this type of banking-sector-wide shock.
In model (1), I examine whether banks use derivatives to hedge ex ante, in anticipation
of asset-price changes. I focus on TRAD. The fair-valued assets and trading assets of banks
essentially have a one-to-one correspondence (Section 4.1). Hence, I focus on whether a rise
in fair-valued assets and the rise in market-risk exposure that results induces more derivative
use (hypothesis (1), Section 4.2). Insofar as banks do use derivatives to hedge, TRAD’s sign
should be positive. In addition, the increase in market-risk exposure that results from a rise
in fair-valued assets is potentially more damaging when a bank’s capital is lower (hypothesis
(2), Section 4.2). As a result, a capital-ratio decline should strengthen the rise in derivatives
that results from a rise in fair-valued assets, implying a negative sign for TRADCAP .
Banks face risks on all of their positions, not only on their fair-valued assets. SIZE and
LIAB control for derivatives used to hedge risks on banking-book assets (i.e., assets valued
under historic cost) and trading liabilities (e.g., short positions); both variables should have
a positive sign. TRAD thus captures whether a marginal rise in fair-valued assets increases
derivative use after controlling for banks’ use of derivatives in mitigating other risks. With
respect to CAP , a priori, its main effect is ambiguous. Holding fair-valued assets constant,
a marginal decline in capital might make banks want to hedge more, implying an increase in
derivative use. Derivatives themselves, however, expose banks to market risk. This exposure
could lead banks to react to a decline in capital by hedging less, all else equal.
I include lagged DERIV since DERIV has strong positive serial correlation and lagged
DERIV and lagged TRAD have a strong positive correlation (ρ = 0.646). Excluding lagged
151
DERIV thus would bias upward TRAD’s coefficient. While including both lagged DERIV
and fixed effects results in inconsistent estimates (Nickell [1981]), with T = 59, this inconsis-
tency is small.7 Generalized-method-of-moment (GMM) estimators (e.g., Blundell and Bond
[1998]) can handle dynamic panel data, but these estimators are designed mainly for small-T
panels. When T is large, GMM tends to encounter serious problems (Roodman [2009]), and
tests of instrument validity have little power (Bowsher [2002]).8 With T = 59, these issues
seem more severe than those due to using fixed effects with lags. Hence, I use the latter.
5.4.5 Model: The Hedging Efficacy of Derivatives
In my second set of regressions, I estimate the model
TRADINCit = γ0 + γ1TRADINCit−1 + γ2DERIVit−1 + γ3TRADit−1 + γ4CAPit−1
+ γ5LIABit−1 + γ6SIZEit−1 + γ7DERIV TRAD + it. (2)
TRADINC is the absolute value of trading income,9 DERIV TRAD = DERIV × TRAD
and ε is an error term. I include also time and bank fixed effects. I include lagged TRADINC
since ρ = 0.926 between contemporaneous and lagged TRADINC, and lagged TRADINC
has a strong positive correlation with lagged DERIV and lagged TRAD. Similar to model
(1), including both lagged TRADINC and fixed effects gives rise to inconsistent estimates,
but this inconsistency is minimal, with a bias of only -0.033 (based on Nickell [1981], p. 1422,
eq. [19]). In addition, with T = 59, using GMM would lead to the same problems discussed
in Section 4.4 in the context of model (1).
In model (2), I examine whether derivatives are effective in hedging ex post, once prices
7 Inserting into equation (19) from Nickell [1981; p. 1422] ρ = 0.975 for DERIVit and DERIVit−1 and T
= 59 yields a bias of only -0.034.
8 Consistent with this concern, when I estimate model (1) with GMM, the Sargan test’s p-value is 1.000.
9 I define TRADINC also by taking trading income, subtracting different minimum required returns on
trading assets (e.g., 15 percent), and using the absolute value of the resulting figure. Using this definition of
TRADINC, I get essentially the same results (not reported).
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change. As a result, I focus on DERIV TRAD, not on DERIV and TRAD. TRADINC is
a proxy for the absolute value of fair-value income (Section 4.1)—for net profits due to price
changes on fair-valued assets and on derivatives. DERIV ’s and TRAD’s coefficients capture
the impact on fair-value income of an increase in derivatives and in fair-valued assets. Banks
face market risk on both derivatives and fair-valued assets. As a consequence, both DERIV
and TRAD should have a positive sign. With respect to DERIV , holding fixed fair-valued
assets and changes in prices, a marginal rise in derivatives should increase fair-value income,
in magnitude. Similar reasoning applies with respect to TRAD. (I use the time fixed effects
to control for differences over time in price changes.)
I focus on DERIV TRAD. DERIV TRAD concerns how the link between TRAD and
TRADINC varies with DERIV . A positive sign for TRAD would mean that on the margin,
a rise in fair-valued assets increases the absolute value of fair-value income, so that a given
change in prices has a stronger impact on earnings and capital (hypothesis (3), Section 4.2).
I focus on how this increase in fair-value income varies with banks’ derivative use. A negative
sign for DERIV TRAD would mean that on the margin, a rise in derivatives dampens this
rise in fair-value income that results from a rise in fair-valued assets (hypothesis (4), Section
4.2). Hence, a given change in prices has a smaller net effect on earnings and capital. In this
respect, derivatives would be effective in hedging.
5.4.6 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics and a correlation matrix are in Tables 1 and 2. Two points on these data:
First, 1,937 of my 4,891 observations (40 percent) have no derivatives, so that DERIV = 0.
In my second set of tests, I take steps to remedy this zero-value problem. Second, in the final
two rows of Table 1, I show raw (non-logged) data for derivatives and trading assets. These
data show that banks’ derivative portfolios often are several orders of magnitude larger than
are their portfolios of fair-valued assets. Hence, given the relative enormity in raw terms of
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Tab. 5.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean
Standard Percentiles
Deviation 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
DERIV 9.605 8.157 0.000 0.000 12.005 16.307 19.420
TRAD 10.159 4.510 3.638 8.186 10.528 12.936 15.462
TRADINC 7.073 3.702 0.000 5.147 7.662 9.587 11.397
CAP 0.056 0.083 0.015 0.025 0.041 0.064 0.097
LIAB 4.761 6.181 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.629 13.991
SIZE 16.612 1.841 14.128 15.328 16.551 17.903 18.970
DERIV, raw 1,136,620 6,758,124 0 0 164 12,084 271,529
TRAD, raw 8,634 40,430 0 4 37 415 5,189
I use unbalanced quarterly panel data from 1996Q1–2010Q4. My sample includes each bank
with trading assets at least 50 percent of the time, for a sample of 4,891 observations and 196
different banks. Variable definitions: DERIV : log trading derivatives, notional value; TRAD:
log trading assets less derivatives that have a positive fair value; TRADINC: absolute value of
log trading income; CAP : Tier 1 ratio less a six-percent baseline; LIAB: log trading liabilities
less derivatives that have a negative fair value; SIZE: log total assets less total trading assets.
DERIV , raw and TRAD, raw are non-logged derivatives and trading assets, respectively, in
millions of dollars. In my regressions, I always use logged DERIV and TRAD.
Tab. 5.2: Correlation Matrix
Variable DERIV TRAD TRADINC CAP LIAB SIZE
DERIV 1.0000
TRAD 0.2980* 1.0000
TRADINC 0.3766* 0.4659* 1.0000
CAP -0.0215 0.0257 -0.0032 1.0000
LIAB 0.1621* 0.2893* 0.1919* -0.0150 1.0000
SIZE 0.4628* 0.3066* 0.3998* -0.0749* 0.1589* 1.0000
Values are Pearson correlations, calculated on a within-bank basis. * denotes statistical signif-
icance at the five-percent level.
banks’ derivatives, even a small percentage change in derivatives could suffice to hedge much
of the rise in market risk that comes from a given percentage rise in fair-valued assets.
Four more bits of data: First, fair-valued assets account for a small share of banks’ assets.
Of the 60 quarters from 1996–2010, the aggregate median share of fair-valued assets in total
assets was 8.9 percent, with a high of 13.3 percent (2008Q1). Second, fair-valued assets and
derivatives have been increasing over time, in raw terms and relative to total assets (Figure
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Fig. 5.1: Time Trends in Total Assets, Fair-Valued Assets, and Derivatives
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Tab. 5.3: Banks’ Aggregate Derivative Composition
Quarter
Interest Foreign
Equity
Commodity
Rate Exchange & Other
1998Q1 71.90 % 26.47 % 1.38 % 0.67 %
2002Q1 83.18 % 14.52 % 1.84 % 0.48 %
2006Q1 87.80 % 9.63 % 1.91 % 0.66 %
2010Q1 88.10 % 8.35 % 2.29 % 1.25 %
1). In model (1), I use time fixed effects and, alternatively, a time trend to control for these
trends as a way to avoid a spurious correlation between DERIV and TRAD (Granger and
Newbold [1974]). Third, banks use mainly interest-rate derivatives (Table 3). Fourth, in the
aggregate and on a bank-level basis, fair-value income generally has been positive except for
2007Q3–2008Q4, the worst of the financial crisis (Figure 2).
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Fig. 5.2: Aggregate Fair-Value Income
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Fair-Value Income Relative to Fair-Valued Assets, Bank-Level Data
Quarter Mean
Standard Percentiles
Deviation 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
1996Q1 0.172 1.813 -0.021 0.005 0.025 0.082 0.227
2000Q1 0.313 0.828 -0.001 0.011 0.046 0.212 0.735
2004Q1 0.313 1.350 0.000 0.009 0.036 0.126 0.395
2008Q1 0.261 1.266 -0.071 -0.019 0.004 0.110 0.452
2010Q1 0.235 1.093 0.000 0.007 0.028 0.111 0.254
Values are trading income divided by trading assets. In 2008Q1, a small number of large banks
booked large fair-value losses. Consequently, while most banks had positive fair-value income,
fair-value income in the aggregate was negative.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Banks, Market Risk, and Hedging
Model (1)’s results are in Table 4.10 My main finding is that TRAD is positive and significant.
On the margin, a rise in fair-valued assets induces more derivative use. A rise in fair-valued
assets increases banks’ exposure to market risk. To mitigate this increase in exposure, banks
10 Since models (1) and (2) both have non-normal residuals, I compute bootstrapped standard errors (250
replications) for both (Efron and Tibshirani [1982]).
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use more derivatives. This finding holds using both time fixed effects (estimation [1]) and a
time trend, TIME (estimation [2]). Again, I estimate model (1) using fixed effects. Hence,
this positive link between DERIV and TRAD is not due to large dealer banks’ both having
more trading assets and using more derivatives. In estimation [3], I include the interaction
TRADCAP = TRAD×CAP . TRADCAP is not significant, but its sign is negative, with
a p-value (0.131) just outside standard significance levels. A marginal fall in a bank’s capital
ratio amplifies the positive link between DERIV and TRAD—a decline in capital amplifies
the effect of a rise in fair-valued assets in inducing more hedging. This finding provides some
more support, albeit relatively weak, for the notion that banks use derivatives to hedge.
One limitation of model (1) is that DERIV includes derivatives used to hedge and also
those used to “speculate.” Hence, the positive link betweenDERIV and TRAD could be due
to cross-temporal variation in banks’ propensity to take risks. A bank, for instance, expecting
interest rates to fall could buy US Treasuries and enter at the same time into interest-rate
derivatives whose value rises when interest rates fall (e.g., receive-fixed, pay-floating swaps).
Banks thus could use derivatives and trading assets to take the same economic exposure.
Based on publicly available data, distinguishing between hedging and speculative derivatives
is not possible, and the extant derivatives literature does not identify a good way of doing so.
As a result, I let model (2)’s results speak to this story’s validity. Insofar as banks use cash
instruments (e.g., bonds) and derivatives to assume the same economic exposure, derivatives
would have no hedging efficacy. Finding that derivatives have a strong effect in hedging, by
contrast, would suggest that hedging motives drive model (1)’s results.
5.5.2 Results: The Hedging Efficacy of Derivatives
The results of model (2) are in Table 5. My main finding is that DERIV TRAD is negative
and significant. TRAD is positive and significant. On the margin, a rise in fair-valued assets
increases fair-value income, or realized market risk, in magnitude. DERIV TRAD’s negative
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Tab. 5.4: Baseline Results—Banks, Market Risk, and Hedging
Dep. Var. DERIV
Est. # [1] [2] [3]
DERIV, lag 0.8028*** 0.8041*** 0.8030***
(0.0202) (0.0175) (0.0171)
TRAD 0.0248** 0.0235* 0.0303**
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0118)
CAP 0.5898 0.5884 1.1206
(1.5705) (1.6923) (1.6094)
LIAB -0.0009 -0.0025 -0.0035
(0.0114) (0.0122) (0.0117)
SIZE 0.2969** 0.3216** 0.2905**
(0.1324) (0.1298) (0.1321)
TIME 0.0107***
(0.0034)
TRADCAP -0.2661
(0.1762)
R2 (within) 0.6766 0.7422 0.6773
N 4,891 4,891 4,891
# groups 196 196 196
Time FEs Yes No Yes
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes
Std. Errors
bootstrapped (250 reps.), clustered
by bank and quarter
Notes:
(1) All estimations include bank fixed effects, all estimations aside from estimation [2] include
time fixed effects, and all regressors are lagged. TIME is a time trend.
(2) In estimation (3), I center TRAD and CAP so as to reduce multicollinearity (Aiken and
West [1991]).
(3) Bootstrapped standard errors (250 replications), clustered at the bank- and quarter-level,
are in parentheses.
(4) *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10-, five-, and one-percent level (two-
tailed tests).
sign means that on the margin, a rise in derivatives reduces this increase in fair-value income
caused by a rise in fair-valued assets. In this respect, derivatives are effective in hedging. In
addition, this result suggests hedging motives drive the results of model (1). In estimations
[1] and [2], 40 percent of my observations have DERIV = 0. Hence, in estimations [3]–[8],
I show model (2)’s results after imposing minimum cut-off points for DERIV . As with my
baseline results, DERIV TRAD always is negative and significant. TRAD, although always
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Tab. 5.5: Baseline Results—The Hedging Efficacy of Derivatives
Dep. Var. TRADINC
Est. # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
TRADINC, lag
0.5837*** 0.5674*** 0.5436*** 0.5167*** 0.4773*** 0.4525*** 0.4589*** 0.4509***
(0.0232) (0.0234) (0.0324) (0.0327) (0.0383) (0.0363) (0.0392) (0.0389)
DERIV
0.0303*** 0.0281*** 0.0510*** 0.0353*** 0.0518*** 0.0351** 0.0390*** 0.0272**
(0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0104) (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0106) (0.0107)
TRAD
0.0915*** 0.0573*** 0.0546*** 0.0181 0.0445*** 0.0168 0.0648*** 0.0439***
(0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0162) (0.0127) (0.0168) (0.0146) (0.0160) (0.0162)
CAP
1.1334 1.2659 0.9162 1.6079 -1.3524 -0.2522 -1.1164 -0.6466
(1.1121) (1.1209) (1.4028) (1.5334) (1.5430) (1.5431) (1.3213) (1.3251)
LIAB
0.0067 0.0157* 0.0182** 0.0254*** 0.0099 0.0145** 0.0086 0.0103
(0.0090) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0065)
SIZE
0.1708** 0.2106** 0.1908** 0.2551*** 0.3020*** 0.3373*** 0.2411*** 0.2910***
(0.0850) (0.0955) (0.0873) (0.0963) (0.0926) (0.0896) (0.0804) (0.0779)
DERIVTRAD
-0.0061*** -0.0066*** -0.0076*** -0.0063***
(0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0020)
R2 (within) 0.4566 0.4604 0.4263 0.4327 0.3274 0.3351 0.2810 0.2851
N 4,891 4,891 3,094 3,094 2,718 2,718 2,626 2,626
# groups 196 196 102 102 90 90 87 87
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Min. TRAD % 50.0 % 50.0 % 50.0 % 50.0 % 50.0 % 50.0 % 75.0 % 75.0 %
Min. DERIV % 0.0 % 0.0 % 50.0 % 50.0 % 75.0 % 75.0 % 75.0 % 75.0 %
Std. Errors bootstrapped (250 reps.), clustered by bank and quarter
Notes:
(1) All estimations include time and bank fixed effects, and all regressors are lagged.
(2) DERIV = DERIV ×TRAD. In estimations that include DERIV TRAD, I center both
DERIV and TRAD (Aiken and West [1991]).
(3) Min. TRAD %: minimum share of quarters in which a bank had to hold trading assets
(i.e., to have TRAD > 0) to be in the sample.
(4) Min. DERIV %: minimum share of quarters wherein a bank had to use derivatives (i.e.,
to have DERIV > 0) to be in the sample.
(5) Bootstrapped standard errors (250 replications), clustered at the bank- and quarter-level,
are in parentheses.
(6) *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, five-, and one-percent level, respectively.
positive, loses its significance in estimations [4] and [6] but regains significance in estimation
[8], which uses a higher cut-off for fair-valued assets.11
Derivatives have an economically large effect in mitigating the impact on fair-value income
11 One potentially surprising finding is that based on estimation [2]’s results, a one-percent rise in trading
assets increases the absolute value of trading income by only 0.06 percent. This result could be due to the
strong positive correlation between lagged TRADINC and TRAD (ρ = 0.752) and the multicollinearity that
results. My focus, however, is on the hedging efficacy of derivatives, not on TRAD’s impact on TRADINC.
Hence, I do not explore further this result.
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of a rise in fair-valued assets. Based on estimation [2]’s coefficients, a one-standard-deviation
rise in fair-valued assets works via TRAD to increase TRADINC by 0.258; a one-standard-
deviation rise in derivatives works through DERIV TRAD to reduce TRADINC by -0.504.
Hence, derivatives more than cancel out the effect on fair-value income of a rise in fair-valued
assets. While DERIV is positive and significant, so that a marginal increase in derivatives
increases fair-value income, in magnitude, a one-standard-deviation rise in DERIV works
via DERIV to increase TRADINC by 0.229, with 0.258 + 0.229 = 0.487 being smaller in
magnitude than -0.504. Doing this exercise using estimation [4]’s, [6]’s, and [8]’s coefficients,
the same story results: Derivatives go a long way toward reducing fair-value income, in mag-
nitude, even after accounting for their own impact on fair-value income. Hence, derivatives
mitigate the impact on earnings and capital of fair-valued assets.12
Going over an example can make more concrete the results above. Suppose, for instance,
a bank acquires a corporate bond as part of its market-making operations and thus is exposed
to credit-risk-related market risk: Model (1)’s results mean that this bank, for instance, buys
credit protection using a credit-default swap (CDS) to protect itself against the price effects
of credit-spread changes. Consequently, this bank hedges ex ante, in anticipation of possible
price changes. Model (2)’s results mean that once credit spreads do change, the CDS reduces
the bond’s net effect on earnings. Should credit spreads rise, the bond’s price falls, resulting
in fair-value losses on this bond, but the CDS’s price rises, leading to offsetting gains. Should
credit spreads fall, the bond’s price increases, leading to fair-value gains, but the CDS’s price
falls, resulting in offsetting losses. In this respect, the CDS reduces the net effect on earnings
and capital of changes in asset prices.
12 Another way to view the link between fair-valued assets and derivatives is within a risk-return framework.
In general, apart from the 2007–8 crisis, banks have had positive fair-value income (Section 4.6, Figure 2),
implying earnings on fair-valued assets are positive. In using derivatives to hedge, banks reduce earnings, in
expectation, but also are exposed to less risk. Consequently, in deciding how much to hedge, banks balance
the decline in expected earnings versus the decline in risk that results from hedging.
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5.5.3 Supplemental Results: Alternative Cut-Off Points
Initially, I use a plausible but arbitrary 50-percent cut-off point for trading assets. In Table 6,
I present the results of models (1) and (2) with trading-asset cut-off points of 40 percent, 60
percent, and 75 percent. Nothing changes. With respect to model (1), TRAD is positive and
significant, with point estimates of 0.030, 0.028, and 0.032 using cut-off points of 50, 60, and
75 percent. With respect to model (2), TRAD is positive and significant, andDERIV TRAD
is negative and significant, with point estimates of -0.0061, -0.0057, and -0.0059 using cut-off
points of 50, 60, and 75 percent. Also, the coefficients in Table 6 for DERIV , TRAD, and
DERIV TRAD imply similar economic importance for derivatives as those in Table 5. Based
on estimation [5]’s results, for instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in TRAD works
via TRAD to increase TRADINC by 0.225; a one-standard deviation rise in DERIV works
viaDERIV TRAD to reduce TRADINC by -0.491 and viaDERIV to increase TRADINC
by 0.201, with 0.225 + 0.201 = 0.426 being smaller in magnitude than -0.491.
5.6 Derivatives and Fair Value’s Negative Effects
Before concluding, I use two examples to show more explicitly how derivatives could mitigate
fair-value accounting’s negative effects. First, fair value has been criticized for exacerbating
banks’ (naturally occurring) pro-cyclical lending. For now, suppose that banks do not hedge:
During upturns, asset prices rise, banks can write up the value of their assets, these write-ups
increase capital, and so banks lend more. During downturns, the opposite dynamics operate:
Prices decline, and so banks take write-downs and thus issue less credit. As a consequence,
banks’ through-the-cycle volatility in capital and in lending is greater under fair value than
under historic cost, under which asset-price changes do not affect capital.
ECB [2004] and Novoa et al. [2008] run simulations that show these boom-bust dynamics.
Both, however, focus on the application of fair value only to banks’ assets, effectively ruling
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Tab. 5.6: Supplemental Results, Alternative Cut-Off Points
Dep. Var. DERIV TRADINC
Est. # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
DERIV, lag
0.8095*** 0.7981*** 0.8039*** 0.0329*** 0.0248*** 0.0345***
(0.0181) (0.0207) (0.0233) (0.0075) (0.0082) (0.0084)
TRAD
0.0188* 0.0284** 0.0319* 0.0494*** 0.0539*** 0.0640***
(0.0107) (0.0143) (0.0192) (0.0112) (0.0143) (0.0150)
CAP
0.8490 1.2308 0.7134 0.8816 1.3767 1.2241
(1.4750) (1.5853) (1.7648) (1.0503) (1.1825) (1.1089)
LIAB
-0.0073 0.0044 0.0017 0.0137 0.0214** 0.0121
(0.0109) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0090) (0.0101) (0.0085)
SIZE
0.2530* 0.3335** 0.4694*** 0.1364 0.2684*** 0.2145**
(0.1345) (0.1395) (0.1379) (0.0867) (0.0818) (0.0845)
TRADCAP
-0.2495 -0.2706 -0.2674
(0.1843) (0.2038) (0.2204)
TRADINC, lag
0.5740*** 0.5653*** 0.5388***
(0.0215) (0.0242) (0.0290)
DERIVTRAD
-0.0066*** -0.0057*** -0.0059***
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015)
R2 (within) 0.6825 0.6687 0.6747 0.4647 0.4426 0.4004
N 5,280 4,494 3,996 5,280 4,494 3,996
# groups 211 174 154 211 174 154
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Min. TRAD % 40.0 % 60.0 % 75.0 % 40.0 % 60.0 % 75.0 %
Std. Errors bootstrapped (250 reps.), clustered by bank and quarter
Notes:
(1) All estimations include time and bank fixed effects, and all regressors are lagged.
(2) TRADCAP = TRAD × CAP ; DERIV = DERIV × TRAD. In estimations that have
interactions, I center the components of the interaction terms (Aiken and West [1991]).
(3) Min. TRAD %: minimum share of quarters in which a bank had to hold trading assets
(i.e., to have TRAD > 0) to be in the sample.
(4) Bootstrapped standard errors (250 replications), clustered at the bank- and quarter-level,
are in parentheses.
(5) *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10-, five-, and one-percent level, respectively.
out the possibility that banks use derivatives to hedge. Suppose that banks do use derivatives
to hedge: During upturns, when asset prices increase, the value of banks’ derivatives declines.
These declines in value offset the impact on capital of the rise in asset prices. Consequently,
banks cannot expand. Similarly, during downturns, when prices fall, banks still have to take
write-downs, but the value of banks’ derivatives increases. Hence, banks do not have to cut
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back on lending. In both instances, derivatives mitigate realized market risk and thus help
head off fair value’s pro-cyclical effects.
Second, fair value has come under attack for contributing to asset-price downward spirals
(see, e.g., Cifuentes et al. [2005]). Fair value has a role in downward spirals by giving rise to
contagion—when one bank sells assets (in an illiquid market), prices decline, and the use of
fair value forces others to take write-downs. These write-downs deplete the capital of these
other banks. Consequently, assuming no hedging, these banks sell assets, prices decline once
more, and the cycle continues. Under historic cost, by contrast, sales still reduce prices, but
banks do not have to take write-downs due to these declines in prices. As a result, fair value,
by allowing asset-price declines to reduce banks’ capital, has a central role in these sort of
downward spirals.
As in the example above, however, derivatives could stop these dynamics from arising.
When banks hedge, the initial asset sales still force banks to take write-downs. These write-
downs deplete capital, but the value of banks’ derivatives rises. Hence, on net, capital stays
at its pre-write-down level. Consequently, banks are not forced to sell assets; the downward
spiral thus does not arise. In the examples above, I assume perfect hedging, which overstates
the offsetting effects of derivatives. Nonetheless, these two examples highlight how derivatives
can dampen fair value’s negative effects—in reducing realized market risk, on net, derivatives
help insulate banks’ capital from the effects of changes in asset prices.
5.7 Conclusion
My two main findings are that banks use derivatives to hedge their market risk on fair-valued
assets and that derivatives are effective in hedging this risk. Derivatives thus are an important
risk-management tool banks use to guard against market risk. In using derivatives in this
way, banks reduce the net effect of asset-price changes on earnings and capital, blunting fair
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value’s capacity to have negative effects. These results suggest that focusing jointly on banks’
assets and derivatives is essential to assessing the effects of fair value. These results, however,
have at least one limitation. I focus only on banks’ portfolio-level derivatives and fair-valued
assets. I thus do not examine variation across types of assets or types of derivatives in either
banks’ decision to hedge or derivatives’ hedging efficacy. Addressing these issues would yield
additional insights into the interplay between fair-valued assets and derivatives.
Appendix
The Y9-C line-items I use are as follows:
Balance-Sheet Item Y9-C Mnemonic
trading derivatives, notional values BHCKA126 + BHCKA127 + BHCK8723 + BHCK8724
trading assets, total BHCK3545
trading derivatives with a positive fair value
BHCK3543 + BHFN3543 (1996Q1–2007Q4)
BHCM3543 (2008Q1–2010Q4)
trading income BHCKA220
Tier 1 capital BHCK8274
risk-weighted assets BHCKA223
trading liabilities, total BHCK3548
trading derivatives with a negative fair value BHCK3547
total assets BHCK2170
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